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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the present state of the law of 
dismissal in Japan, Great Britain and the USA, with a 
view to evaluating the adequacy of regulation, 
accessibility of procedure and effectiveness of remedy in 
each of these systems from the perspective of employment 
protection. Possible improvements of these systems are 
considered, having regard to the policies underlying 
them.
In the first chapter, the development of the law of 
dismissal in each country is briefly reviewed. The second 
chapter considers the extent to which the protection of 
the law of dismissal covers different forms of the 
termination of employment in each country. The third, 
fourth, and fifth chapters examine the general law of 
dismissal in these countries and identify what kind of 
regulation, procedures and remedies apply to dismissals 
in each case.
The sixth chapter examines the legal status of 
provisions in collective agreements concerning dismissal 
in each country, and special attention is paid to how 
arbitration regulates dismissals in Britain and the US. 
The seventh chapter examines the grounds on which it is 
unlawful to dismiss employees, the administrative bodies 
which deal with discriminatory dismissal claims, and the 
procedures and remedies for discriminatory dismissals, in 
each country.
Chapter eight examines the regulation, procedure and 
remedies applicable to dismissals for redundancy or 
economic reasons in each country. The ninth chapter 
examines the effectiveness of the legal systems of 
dismissal of each country from the view-point of the 
employee’s protection, and the tenth chapter considers 
the policy behind the system of each country. The final 
chapter considers the prospects for improvement of the 
systems and reflects on Japanese employment law.
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- PART I -
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
It can be said that dismissal (or discharge) is the 
equivalent of capital punishment for the worker. 
Sometimes it may deprive the worker and his (or her) 
family of their only financial resources and therefore 
put them in jeopardy. It also means that the worker is 
excluded from the workplace community through which the 
worker derives his social status and self-esteem and 
which may provide the principal source of friendships and 
social status.* Today, in most of the industrialized 
market economies, there are some sorts of legal 
protection against unjust or unfair dismissal. However, 
this has not been the case until relatively recently 
even, in the earliest industrialized countries. Far from 
that, even legal equality between the employee and the 
employer could not be established and the former was 
bound to the employment of the latter by legal sanctions 
outside their contract until the late 19th century.
1.1. UP TO THE LATE 19TH CENTURY 
Britain
In Britain, for example, which experienced the 
earliest industrial revolution in fhe world, for a long 
time under the Statute of Labourers after the Black 
Death, workers were compelled to enter employment for a
23
certain term. The Statute prohibited employees from 
leaving their employment and provided for imprisonment
p
for those who did. The term of employment had to be a 
year in many cases under the Elizabethan Statute of
•z
1562. Such employment could only be terminated at the 
end of the term by a quarter’s notice given before the 
end of the term.^ The employment relationship later came 
under the control of a series of Master and Servant Acts 
until 1875. The first of these Acts was passed in 1721 
and by 1829 they covered most employment.^ Under these 
Acts, where manual employees breached their contract, for 
example by leaving their employment without due notice, 
they could be imprisoned.
On the other hand, under the influence of the
■7
Statutes of Labourers and the Poor Laws, the common law
O
presumption of a yearly hiring gradually developed. 
This presumption was not only applied to servants in 
husbandry but also to domestic and other servants in
q
1826. However, since the presumption of a yearly hiring 
is most suited to agricultural employment,^ its strict 
application became more and more irrelevant through the 
course of industrialization. Long fixed term contracts 
seem to have hampered the employers of industrial labour 
in adjusting their labour force quickly and easily in 
response to the state of trade.
Thus, the employers tended to abandon the practice 
of long fixed term contracts and instead to adopt the
24
practice of contracts terminable by a certain period of
notice.1* Accordingly, the presumption of a yearly hiring
1 ?became very flexible and easily rebutted by 1844. Even
where courts could not find any custom of the trade under
which the contract was terminable with notice, they had
become willing to hold, by the end of the last century,
that it was terminable with reasonable notice. In
determining what was reasonable notice, the courts
generally paid special regard to the period of
remuneration and the duties of employment.14 Thus, in
1861 Pollock C.B. stated that "No doubt the general rule
is, that notice need not be more extensive than the
period of payment."1  ^ For instance, a foreman who was
paid a weekly wage was held to be entitled to a week’s 
1 finotice.
However, the duties of employment seem to have been
a more decisive factor for the court’s determination of
what was reasonable notice. Thus, "the more important and
responsible are the duties of the employment, and the
higher the remuneration, the longer will be the
1 7appropriate notice." For example, the following periods
were held to be reasonable although it depended upon all
the facts of each case. A year’s notice to a newspaper
editor, six months’ notice to a general sales manager,
three months’ notice to a sales representative, a month’s
notice to a shop manager, and a week’s notice to a milk 
1 8carrier.
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United States
In the United States, when the American states were 
the colonies of Britain, they used English statutes and 
the common law as a model for themselves, because they 
thought English law well-suited to their relative dearth
1 q
of labour. They adopted similar systems to the wage
regulation provided under the English Statute of
Labourers. Thus, the colonial courts punished those who,
by the offer of higher wages or other terms, enticed an
employee to quit the employment of his employer before
2 nthe end of the contractual term. The American colonies 
also imitated English settlement regulation which 
permitted a person to obtain a settlement in a parish by 
being employed for a year after 1691. If a person 
obtained settlement in a parish, he, on becoming poor, 
was given poor law relief by that parish. Many American
colonies permitted a person to get a settlement in a town
2 1by proving that he had been employed for a year. 
However, settlement by hiring never came into wide use in 
the American colonies and by 1810 over half of the 
original thirteen states of the United States no longer 
allowed it.^
In contrast to Britain, states in the United States
never enacted any similar statute to the English Master
and Servant Acts either before or after the Revolutionary 
2 ^War. Nevertheless, even in the United States,
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imprisonment for debt was imposed on employees who
neither performed the work nor refunded the money. It was
2 4often used in the case of indentured labour or contract 
labour where the worker was obliged to work for a 
definite period as well as in the case of a peon who was 
held in servitude in order to work off a debt or other 
obligations. It was left to each state to determine not 
only whether criminal punishment might be applied to 
breach of contract but also whether forms of forced
p c
labour such as peonage might be enforced. However, 
imprisonment for debt was abolished in Kentucky state in
p D
1821 and gradually abolished in many states. Finally it 
was prohibited under the 13th and 14th Amendments to the 
US Constitution and the federal anti-peonage act of 
1867.27
As in Britain, it seems to be that the presumption
of a yearly hiring was applied at least to menial and
agricultural employees in the United States until the
mid-nineteenth century. Thus, Johnson, J. stated in a
case in 1857 as follows: "The case strongly resembles
those of the hiring of clerks, servants in husbandry, and
other similar employments, in which, to avoid the
inconvenience above alluded to, and to give each party
the benefit of all the seasons during the year, an
indefinite hiring is taken to be a hiring for a year, or
from year to year, the compensation payable at the same 
2 8time." However, the presumption did not apply to
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industrial employees. Some courts applied rate-of-pay
rule to those employees. Thus, those courts held that a
weekly or monthly wage paid to an employee implied a
weekly or monthly hiring. But this rule was most often
applied to the cases where the employees were paid an
annual salary. Other courts rejected the rate-of-pay rule
on the grounds that the period of pay was not sufficient
evidence of the parties' intention for the duration of 
29employment.
However, in 1877, Mr. Wood insisted in his book
•z n
"Master and Servant" that the English rule of the 
presumption of yearly hiring had never been approved by 
any American court. He argued that the English rule 
generally arose, not between master and servant, but in 
settlement cases which were peculiar to England. He 
further argued that a general or indefinite hiring in the
T 1
United States was prima facie a hiring at will. His 
argument was quickly reflected in subsequent judicial 
decisions probably because the doctrine of employment-at- 
will would serve the employers of industrial labour 
well.32 Therefore, at the latest after 1887, most courts 
came to adopt the rule of employment-at-wi11 in the
•Z  T.
United States. The rate-of-pay rule was still applied 
to salaried employees for a while after 1877 but had 
almost died out by the 1910s.3^
The situation in the United States was very 
different from Britain where employees of higher status
28
enjoyed relatively long notice for dismissal. S.M.Jacoby
explained this as based on differences in societal
perception about status distinctions in employment and
3 Rdifferences in trade union attitudes toward dismissal. 
With regard to the latter difference, he stated that 
British unions did not seek statutory restrictions on the 
employer's power to dismiss. They instead relied on the 
closed shop and the lightning strike to protect their 
members against redundancies and what they viewed as 
unjust dismissal. In contrast, American unions were 
relatively weak and remedied their weakness by seeking 
both statutory and contractual restraints on 
dismissals.
Japan
Japan entered into industrialization after the
United States during the Meiji Era between 1868 and 1911.
During the Tokugawa Era between 1603 and 1867, the
employment relationship was mainly controlled by private
3 7contracts with a strong feudalistic tinge. Most
employment was created by contracts. Many of these
contracts were for a fixed term of half a year or one
year but some of them had a longer fixed term, e.g. ten
or twenty years. In some cases, the term was for life.
Thus, some contracts could be classified in fact as
3 8contracts for a sort of peonage. Every worker who
entered into employment was obliged to be entered in his
3 9or her employer's family register. During the
29
contractual term, only the employer could exercise the 
right to terminate the employment.4® If the employee was 
missing from his employment during the term of his 
contract, the person who was a surety for the employee 
was obliged to search for him and, if he failed in both 
refunding the employee’s advances and taking him back to 
the employer, could be punished. This punishment was 
handcuffing, imprisonment, banishment, exile or even 
death in the first half of the Tokugawa Era. But after 
the act of 1742, a surety who failed in taking an
employee back to his employer was only fined and if he
could not refund the employer’s advances, execution by 
sale was made against his property.41
In 1872, just after the Mei.ji Restoration, the 
Government issued an ordinance which provided as follows: 
Any sort of human traffic shall be banned. The term 
of apprenticeship shall not be over seven years. 
Every fixed term employment shall be a yearly 
hiring. Workers who are held in service against
their will in order to work off debt shall be
free.42
However, the Government could not completely wipe out the 
feudalistic characteristics of the employment 
relationship all at once. A notification issued by the 
Judicial Department in 1874 provided that an employee who 
left his employment during its term should be imprisoned 
for 30 days.4  ^ Until the Japanese Civil Code was enacted
30
in 1898, employment still kept a feudalistic tinge, for 
example, a duty to reside with the employer’s family.44
1.2. FROM THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO THE END 
OF WORLD WAR II
In Japan, a Civil Code was enacted in 1898 which
provided that ”If no period of service has been fixed by
the parties, either party may at any time give notice to
the other party to terminate the contract; in such a case
the contract of service shall come to an end upon the
expiration of two weeks after such notice has been 
4 *5given.” Around this period of time, yearly hiring was
still popular in industry. For example, among textile
manufacturers in rural areas, the number of non-fixed
term contracts only started to increase around 1905 and
became the prevalent form of employment by 1925.4 ®
According to a survey carried out by the city of Osaka,
however, only about a third of companies with a hundred
employees or more made use of fixed term contracts in
1923.4  ^ Between the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) and the
Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) when Japanese industrial
capital was established, the annual rate of labour
4 Rturnover exceeded 100 per cent. A survey of 1902 found
that about 50 per cent of the ironworkers employed in
seven large enterprises left their employment within a 
4 9year. This was because of an absolute shortage of 
skilled labour. There were a number of workers who
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acquired skills and better pay by moving from one 
factory to another. In addition, in the depression after 
the first World War, large-scale strikes occurred 
frequently and most of them were led by these "mobile" 
workers.
Accordingly, companies started establishing their 
own training institutes, improving welfare systems and 
introducing seniority-based pay systems in order to 
encourage employees to stay longer as well as to
C  1
eliminate the harmful influence of mobile workers. 
These institutions and systems gradually became rooted in 
Japanese industry. This happened partly because trade 
unions of skilled workers had not developed sufficiently
c p
by that time. This also led Japanese industry to 
establish the practice of lifetime employment and forced 
trade unions to reorganize along the lines of enterprise 
unions.
As described above, employees were bound to their 
employment by legal sanctions outside their contract 
until the 1860s in Britain and the United States, and 
until 1898 in Japan. Since then, at least in legal 
theory, the employment relationship has been regarded as 
purely contractual, and has not been enforceable other
than by civil suit under a contract of employment. In
other words, unless otherwise agreed, both parties became 
entitled to unilaterally terminate the contract of
employment with due notice in Britain and Japan, and at
will in the United States around the end of the 19th
century. This legal theory is based on the idea of
equality between the employer and the employee as a legal
entity. However, this in fact operates in favour of the
employer since, in the real world, termination of
employment generally has much harsher effect on the
employee than the employer.
This state of law remained basically unchanged in
all of the above three countries up to the end of World
War II. The only exception concerned dismissal of an
employee for union membership or union activities. In the
United States, the unions started to seek both statutory
protection against discriminatory dismissals and
contractual restraints on dismissal through collective
54agreements around the end of the nineteenth century. In
fact, laws outlawing discrimination against union
membership were enacted by many states but were outlawed
by the courts. ^  In 1889, the Congress also enacted the
Erdman Act which made it a misdemeanor for a railway
56company to discharge an employee for union membership.
The Supreme Court however held that this was
unconstitutional on the grounds that personal liberty as
well as the right of property were invaded without due
process of law in violation of the Const itut ion, 5th 
57Amendment.
However, following a strike by railway shopmen, 
Congress enacted the Railway Labor Act in 1926 which was
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designed to protect the rights of the workers to 
organize, to establish governmental machinery for 
determining whether a union had the support of the 
majority of the workers, and to require the union and 
management to negotiate the terms and conditions of
c p
employment. The Act was also challenged but the US 
Supreme Court rejected its unconstitutionality. Mr. Chief 
Justice Hughes, delivering the opinion of the court, 
stated that:
"We entertain no doubt of the constitutional 
authority of Congress to enact the prohibition. The 
power to regulate commerce is the power to enact 
'all appropriate legislation' for its 'protection 
and advancement’ . . .Exercising this authority, 
Congress may facilitate the amicable settlement of 
disputes which threaten the service of the necessary 
agencies of interstate transportation....The Railway 
Labor Act of 1926 does not interfere with the normal 
exercise of the right of the carrier to select its 
employees or to discharge them. The statute is not 
aimed at this right of the employers but at the 
interference with the right of employees to have 
representatives of their own choosing. As the 
carriers subject to the Act have no constitutional 
right to interfere with the freedom of the employees 
in making their selections, they cannot complain of
Q
the statute on constitutional grounds."
In the circumstances of severe economic depression,
Section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act was
also passed by the Congress in 1933 in order to promote
employees’ right to organize and bargain collectively but
it did not provide any substantial power to enforce these
rights. However, in 1935 the Congress finally enacted the
National Labor Relations Act which provided the right to
organize, the right to bargain collectively, and the
right to engage in strikes, picketing, and other
concerted activities. It should be pointed out that
American economists at this period claimed that it was
necessary to strengthen employees’ spending power in
r norder to overcome the depression. In fact, Section 1 of 
the Act provides that ’the inequality of bargaining power 
between employees’ and employers ’tends to aggravate 
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates 
and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and 
by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates 
and working conditions within and between industry.’
The NLRA made an employer’s discriminatory discharge 
for union membership and activities an unfair labor 
practice and established the National Labor Relations 
Board to issue an order requiring him to cease and desist 
from such unfair labor practices and to take appropriate 
affirmative action. The NLRA was challenged again based 
on the due process clause of the Constitution but the US 
Supreme Court held it to be constitutional. In NLRB v .
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., Mr.Hughes, C.J., delivering
the opinion of the Court, stated: "Respondent asserts its
right (under the Due Process Clause) to conduct its
business in an orderly manner without being subjected to
arbitrary restraints. What we have said points to the
fallacy in the argument. Employees have their correlative
right to organize for the purpose of securing the redress
of grievances and to promote agreements with employers
relating to rates of pay and conditions of
work.... restraint for the purpose of preventing an unjust
interference with that right cannot be considered
arbitrary or capricious." The Court held that the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution gave Congress the
power to regulate the industrial relations of employers
R 1whose activities affected interstate commerce.
1.3. AFTER WORLD WAR II 
United States
The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 amending 
the NLRA was based on a policy of encouraging dispute 
settlement through arbitration. Section 203 of the LMRA 
declares: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by
the parties is declared to be the desirable method for 
settlement of grievance disputes arising over the 
application or interpretation of an existing collective 
bargaining agreement." Furthermore, Section 301(a) of the 
LMRA authorized suits in the federal courts for violation
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of collective bargaining agreements. The US Supreme Court 
ruled that this section authorized the federal courts to 
fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of 
collective bargaining agreements. The Court stated as 
follows:
"Other courts-- the overwhelming number of them--
hold s. 301(a) is more than jurisdictional-- that it
authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of
federal law for the enforcement of these collective
bargaining agreements and includes within that
federal law specific performance of promises to
arbitrate grievances under collective bargaining
agreement......  That is our construction of
s.301(a), which means that the agreement to
arbitrate grievance disputes, contained in this
collective bargaining agreement, should be
R ?specifically enforced."
There are a series of leading cases in 1960 in which
the US Supreme Court decided on labor arbitration
disputes involving the United Steelworkers and which are
accordingly called the "Steelworkers Trilogy". The first
R ^and second cases of the Trilogy are those in which the 
Court decided on the enforcement of labor arbitration. 
The opinion of the Court may be summarized as follows: 
labor arbitration is the heart of the collective 
bargaining agreement in the sense that it is expected by 
the parties to settle all disputes arising from the
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meaning and content of the agreement through the 
arbitrator who is believed to have reliable knowledge of 
the common law of the shop. Moreover, labor arbitration 
is the substitute for industrial strife and therefore 
congressional policy in favor of settlement of disputes 
through arbitration. Accordingly, the judicial inquiry 
must be strictly confined to whether the party agreed to 
arbitrate the grievance or agreed to give the arbitrator 
power to make the award he made. In the third case of 
Tr i1o g y , the US Supreme Court decided on the 
enforceability of the arbitration award. The statement of 
the Court can be summarized as follows: so long as the
arbitrator’s award draws its essence from the collective 
bargaining agreement, the courts have to enforce the 
award even if their interpretation of the agreement is 
different from his.
In the United States, the law of discriminatory 
dismissal based on race, colour, national origin, sex, 
religion, age, physical or mental handicap, and the like 
has also developed considerably especially since the 
enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964. 
Besides Title VII, the main federal legislation includes 
the Civil Rights Act 1866, the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act 1967, the Executive Order 11246, and the 
American With Disabilities Act 1990. More recently, the 
Civil Rights Act 1991 was enacted to extensively amend 
the Civil Rights Act 1964.
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Japan
Immediately after World War II, Japan established a
new democratic Constitution in 1946 which declared the
R Rpeople’s right to work and w o r k e r s ’ rights to 
R Rorganize. Accordingly, the Labor Standards Law (L.S.L.) 
was enacted in 1947 in order to regulate the minimum 
standards of major working conditions and it prohibited
R 7dismissal without thirty days notice , dismissal of
R ftemployees under special physical conditions , and
R 9retaliatory dismissal. On the other hand, the Labor
Unions Law (L.U.L.) enacted in 1947 provided for an
unfair labor practice scheme modelled on the American one
although its legal mechanism was substantially different
from the latter. The L.U.L. also provided for the
normative power of collective agreement between the union
7f)and the employer. u Therefore, the employer’s right to
dismiss can be regulated by the stipulations in
collective agreement.
Furthermore, the courts have vigorously developed
the rule making unjust dismissal void based on the abuse
of the employer’s right provided under the Civil Code
after World War II. This rule is closely related to the
lifetime employment practice in Japan which developed in
large enterprises after the first World War and was
established as an industrial rule between employers and
71the enterprise unions after World War II. In Japan, a 
company generally employs those who have just left
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school, and educates and trains them by transferring and 
promoting them within the company according to business 
needs. The employees generally continue to work for the 
same company typically until their company’s mandatory 
retirement age. This is generally called, the lifetime 
employment practice. The lifetime employment practice is 
supported by seniority-based pay and promotion systems. 
Employees’ wages and other benefits are regularly 
increased with the length of their employment in the same 
company. Employees are generally promoted according to 
their service years. Although the lifetime employment 
practice is in effect workable only in larger companies, 
the courts generally developed the law of employment on 
the basis of this practice. However, it has been recently 
argued that the lifetme employment practice is losing its 
significance as a dominant employment practice.
Britain
In Britain, trade unions and employers developed
dispute procedures in collective agreements in many
industries after the beginning of the twentieth 
72century. These procedures were sometimes utilized to 
deal with the problems of discriminatory dismissals and 
redundancies. However, although the provisions of the 
collective agreements may be absorbed into the individual 
contract of employment, collective agreements themselves 
have not been legally enforceable, except for when the
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Industrial Relations Act 1971 (IRA) was effective.^  In
practice, they were not legally enforceable even in this
period because all collective agreements stated that they
were not legally enforceable agreements. Thus, such
dispute procedures could not provide any basis for legal
protection against unjust dismissal.
Therefore, until relatively recently, the trade
unions' strength has been the only restraint on unjust
dismissals. Partly because of this, dismissals for
redundancy and discriminatory dismissals have become one
74of the major causes of strikes. In 1971, the IRA
established the right of employees not to be unfairly 
7 Rdismissed and gave the industrial tribunals the power
to determine whether a dismissal was fair or unfair and
to make a remedial order to the unfairly dismissed 
7 Remployee. The Consultative Document on The Industrial 
Relations Bill suggested that one of the major reasons 
for unfair dismissal legislation was to remove a 
significant cause of industrial disputes in Britain. It 
stated as follows:
"Britain is one of the few countries where 
dismissals are a frequent cause of strike action. It 
seems reasonable to link this with the fact that in 
this country, unlike most others, the law provides 
no redress for the employee who suffers unfair or
arbitrary dismissal, if the employer has met the
terms of the contract, e.g. with regard to giving
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notice... Both on grounds of principle and as a means
of removing a significant cause of industrial
disputes, the Government proposes to include
provisions in the Industrial Relations Bill to give
77statutory safeguards against unfair dismissal." 
Although the Industrial Relations Act was repealed 
by the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act in 1974, the 
unfair dismissal legislation was re-enacted by the latter 
with modification. The 1974 Act was amended by both the 
Employment Protection Act 1975 and the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations Amendment Act 1976. The latter two Acts 
were then consolidated into the Employment Protection 
(Consolidation) Act 1978, but the Employment Acts 1980, 
1982, 1988, 1989, and 1990 and the Trade Union Reform and 
Employment Right Act 1995 further amended the 1978 Act.
Another development in Britain is the law of 
discriminatory dismissal based on sex, marital status, 
colour, race, nationality, or ethnic or national origin. 
A Race Relations Act was the first enacted in 1968. The 
Sex Discrimination Act was enacted in 1975. It is to some 
extent based on the American experience with Title VII. 
Subsequently, the Race Relations Act 1968 was replaced by 
a new Act in 1976 which has a structure which is 
substantially the same as the Sex Discrimination A c t . 
There are now similar provisions in the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995, whichi is not yet enforce.
As described above, the introduction of legal
42
restraints on dismissal is a relatively new development 
in Japan, Britain and the United States. Especially in 
the United States, there has not been what can be called 
a general law of dismissal. However, in the United 
States, the courts have recently started to develop 
various exceptions of the traditional rule of employment- 
at-will at common law. In Britain, partly because of the 
defects of unfair dismissal legislation, the courts have 
similarly started to reconsider contractual rights of 
procedural justice for dismissal at common law.
Like these three countries, most of the advanced
market economies also started to create legal protection
against unjust dismissal after World War II (although
7ftsome countries had done so even before then). The trend
towards regulating dismissal has been further facilitated
by the increase in the number of mass dismissals for
economic, technical or organizational reasons in the
period of lower or even negative economic growth after
the oil crisis of 1973. Thus, an ILO report in 1981 found
that there had been a widespread introduction of specific
rules applicable to termination of employment in the
7 Qcontext of a workforce reduction. These include 
procedural obligations, measures to minimize workforce 
reduction, criteria for the selection of workers to be 
redundant, measures of compensation, retraining and 
placement. However, under the circumstances of severe 
international trade competition, many western European
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countries recently have started to remove employers ' 
legal obligations concerning dismissal, especially for
o n
workforce reduction. In addition, economists have been 
vigorously discussing what effect legal regulation of 
dismissal has on job security from the view-point of
O 1
economics.
1.4. THE THREE COUNTRIES TO BE STUDIED
In these circumstances, it is increasingly necessary 
to evaluate the legal regulation of dismissal in each
country, to find its policy implications and to discuss
-f'
the perspectives or legal regulation based on its policy 
implications. This will be done in this thesis by 
comparing the laws on dismissal in Britain, Japan and the 
United States. Such a comparison may be justified for the 
following reasons:
Firstly, comparison of the laws of the three 
countries may enable us to make a fair evaluation of each 
country's legal regulation while it would be difficult 
for us to compare a greater number of countries in depth. 
Secondly, the United States is the biggest market economy 
in the world. Britain is the first industrialized but 
presently rather declining market economy while Japan is 
rather lately industrialized but the most influential and 
expanding one. Thus, the three countries can fairly be 
said to represent different types of industrialized 
market economies. Thirdly, in the 1980's Britain has
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tended to move towards deregulation of dismissal while 
the trend of the United States has been increasingly 
towards regulation. Compared to them, Japan has been more 
or less settled. Finally, although Japan adopted a civil 
law system under the influence of French and German laws, 
as far as labour law is concerned, since World War II it 
has been much influenced by American law. Although 
Britain shares a common law system with the United 
States, these two countries surprisingly have not been 
influenced by each other at the level of common law. 
American labour law has had very little influence on 
British labour law except for the 1971-4 period. Britain 
has more recently been influenced by other E .C .countries 
which have civil law systems.
It should be made clear here that this thesis will 
not extend its review and analysis to the special legal 
regulation of the dismissal of civil servants and other 
public employees who have special status, although it 
cannot be denied that such regulation is important. They 
are not included for two reasons. First, they are 
generally much better protected from dismissal and its 
adverse effects. Secondly, their inclusion would make 
this review and analysis too complicated.
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CHAPTER 2 
DEFINITION OF DISMISSAL
2.1. INTRODUCTION
It can be said that employment protection has been 
only applied to dismissal, and therefore the concept of 
dismissal is crucial for employment protection. However, 
the concept of dismissal has been interpreted and 
extended in various ways in Britain, Japan and the United 
States. This chapter will discuss the concept of 
dismissal and the relationship between the concept and 
employment protection.
Contracts of employment can be classified broadly 
into two types: contracts for a fixed term, and contracts 
of indefinite duration. In common law in Britain and the 
United States, as well as under the Civil Code in Japan, 
a contract of employment for a fixed term comes to an end 
at the expiration of the term. While a fixed term 
contract cannot be terminated unilaterally by either 
party without just cause before the end of the term, a 
contract of indefinite duration can be terminated 
unilaterally at any time by either party with due notice 
as in Britain and Japan or even at will as in the United 
States.
Contracts of employment can also be terminated by 
agreement of both parties, or through frustration {or 
impossibility). Such agreement can be mai&e the
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formation of the contract or at any time after. For 
example, the agreement may be that the contract 
terminates on the completion of a specific task. In 
Japan, an agreement to compulsory retirement at a certain 
age can also be seen as an example of an agreement to 
terminate a contract -- more precisely, as an agreement 
on a condition subsequent. Indeed, termination of a 
contract on the expiry of a fixed term can also be viewed 
as example of a termination by agreement.
Frustration occurs where events supervening after 
formation of the contract make performance of the 
contract impossible. An example of this is the death of 
either party to a contract of employment. Frustration 
automatically terminates the contract without any further 
action by the parties.
Until relatively recently, an employee has had legal 
redress for the termination of employment only in two 
types of circumstances: where his employment is
terminated by the employer before the end of the duration 
of his fixed-term contract or where a contract of 
indefinite duration was terminated without due notice. 
There have however been important developments in the law 
of dismissal in most of the industrialized market 
economies especially since World War II, and dismissal is 
now regulated in a variety of different ways.
Traditionally, 'dismissal' has been defined as ''the 
unilateral termination of a contract of employment by the
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employer." If this definition were exhaustive, it could 
be said that the employee is legally protected only from 
unilateral termination of his contract by the employer. 
There has however been an expansion of the legal concept 
of dismissal, particularly in recent years. I will now 
examine the present situation concerning the concept of 
dismissal in Britain, Japan and the United States.
2.2. FRUSTRATION
In Britain, an expansion of the concept of dismissal 
was introduced for the purposes of the law of unfair 
dismissal and redundancy pay as well as for the purpose 
of the employee’s right to a written statement of reasons 
for dismissal. At present the concept of dismissal for 
those purposes is defined in Section 55(2) and Section 
83(2) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 
1978:
"An employee shall be treated as dismissed by his 
employer if, but only if, - (a) the contract under 
which he is employed by the employer is terminated 
by the employer, whether it is terminated by notice 
or without notice, or (b) where under that contract 
he is employed for a fixed term, that term expires 
without being renewed under the same contract, or 
(c) the employee terminates that contract, with or 
without notice, in circumstances such that he is 
entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of 
the employer’s conduct."
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S.55(2)(a) is roughly equivalent to the traditional 
concept of dismissal in all of the three countries. With 
regard to this type of dismissal, the problem has 
sometimes arisen whether termination of the contract of 
employment resulted from frustration, mutual agreement or 
dismissal.
In Britain, the doctrine of frustration of contract 
has been applied to the contract of employment as well.* 
One of the effects of the doctrine of frustration is an 
automatic termination of contract. Thus, if the contract 
of employment is frustrated, it is not regarded as 
terminated by dismissal under the EP(C)A, ss.55(2)(a) and 
83(2)(a) as well as at common law. In practice, the 
employer has often alleged that the contract is 
frustrated by illness of the employee. In Marshall v. 
Harland and Wolf Ltd. where the employee was dismissed 
with four weeks' notice because of his illness after his 
absence from work for 18 months, the National Industrial 
Relations Court (the NIRC) instructed the tribunal to 
take account of the following factors in deciding whether 
a contract was frustrated by illness: (1) The terms of
the contract, including the provisions as to sickness 
pay; (2) how long the employment was likely to last in 
the absence of sickness; (3) the nature of the 
employment; (4) the nature of the illness or injury and 
how long it has already continued and the prospects of 
recovery; (5) the period of past employment.
Another case in which the doctrine of frustration 
has been applied is one relating to imprisonment of the 
employee. As a matter of fact, there has been 
disagreement between different EATs about whether the 
doctrine of frustration should apply to imprisonment 
cases. However, such disagreement was finally resolved by 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal in F.C.Shepherd & Co. 
Ltd. v. Jerrom.4 In that case, when the apprentice was 
some 21 months into his four-year apprenticeship with the 
company, he was convicted of offences arising out of his 
involvement in a motor cycle gang fight and sentenced to 
Borstal training for an unspecified period, but one of 
not less than six months or more than two years. He was 
released after minimum sentence, but the company refused 
to take him back. The Court of Appeal held that the 
training service agreement had been frustrated by the 
apprentice's conviction and custodial sentence. The 
Court laid down two essential factors to constitute 
frustration of contract. First, there must be some event 
capable of rendering performance of the contract 
impossible or something radically different from what the 
parties contemplated when they entered into it. Secondly, 
that event must occur without the fault or default of 
either party. The Court further held that the party 
against whom frustration is asserted cannot plead his own 
fault or default to avoid frustration.
From the above observation, it can be seen that, in
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Britain, the doctrine of frustration is applied to 
employment contracts in some circumstances such as 
sickness or inprisonment and it leaves complainants 
fettered at the starting line for statutory protection. 
However, it should be noted here that the EP(C)A 
specifically provides that where any event affecting an 
employer (including his death) operates so as to 
terminate the contract, it is to be treated as a 
termination of the contract by the employer for the 
purpose of the law of redundancy pay.
In the United States, the courts have cited with 
approval and generally followed the decisions of the 
British courts on the doctrine of frustration. The 
doctrine of frustration has been applied to contracts of
C*
employment as well. Thus, the contract of employment has 
been held to be terminated where either the employer or 
the employee has died or has become incapacitated by 
insanity. It has also been held that the contract of 
employment is terminated by the employee's sickness or 
permanent disability which renders him unable to perform 
his duty. One of the most popular American legal 
encyclopedias explains that this is because the 
employee's illness or injury for all or a substantial 
part of the term frustrates the purpose of the contract 
of employment or because substantial performance becomes
7
impossible.
However, the courts have ordinarily held that the
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illness of the employee does not automatically terminate 
the contract of employment but may afford the employer an
o
option to terminate it. In fact, in all or most cases in 
which the termination of employment for the employee’s 
illness was questioned, it was disputed whether the 
employer had just cause to discharge the contract and not 
whether the contract was terminated by frustrating event 
or by the employer. For example, in Citizen Home Ins. 
Co., Inc. v. Glisson, the plaintiff was employed by the 
defendant company from 18th April 1941 to solicit 
applications for industrial life insurance and collect 
the weekly premiums. During the autumn of 1946 he 
suffered a severe illness and for more than a year was 
unable to resume his work. In September 1947, the 
defendant advised him that all remuneration to him was to 
cease. He took action to recover damages for unlawful 
termination. The appellate court held that the 
plaintiff’s illness and inability to perform his duties 
under contract for more than one year constituted 
sufficient cause and justification for his employer to
q
terminate his contract.
Finally, one labour law academic wrote that the 
imprisonment of a worker for a substantial period of time 
was treated as making the performance of an employment 
contract impossible and thereby terminating that 
contract.1® However, it seems to be that courts do not 
easily apply the doctrine of frustration. In Leopold v.
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Salkeyt the employee agreed that he would continue to 
devote himself entirely the business of their firm for a 
period of three years from the commencement of his 
service. But about one and half years after the 
commencement, he was arrested under a court order and put 
in jail. When he was released on bail, the employers 
refused to receive him again into their employment. The 
Supreme Court of Illinois stated:
"Where neither party is at fault, the absence of the 
servant from the m a s t e r ’s employ, without his 
consent, (by whatever cause occasioned,) for an 
unreasonable length of time, we are of the opinion, 
authorizes the master to treat the contract as 
abandoned; and what, in such case, is an 
unreasonable length of time, depends upon the nature 
and necessities of the business in which the servant 
is employed."11
In Japan, frustration of the contract of employment 
has been discussed in cases of the death of the employer 
or the employee and the dissolution of the company. 
However, most academics consider that the death of the 
employer will rarely result in an automatic termination 
of the contract because his contractual status will
i p
ordinarily be inherited by his heirs. It is also 
considered that the contract of employment is not 
automatically terminated by the decision of dissolution 
but that it is terminated by a notice of dismissal given
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by the dissolved company which continues its existence as 
a juristic person during the liquidation procedure.
An incurable illness of the employee can be seen as 
an event similar to death with regard to termination of 
his employment contract. However, there can be found no 
case in which the court held that a prolonged illness 
itself automatically terminated the contract of 
employment. This is mainly because the employer generally 
provides in his shugyo kisoku that the employee who has 
been suspended from work due to illness will be regarded 
as retiring when his illness is prolonged beyond the 
stipulated period. As described in the next chapter, the 
shugyo kisoku is a form of works rules which the law 
requires the employer to draw up and to which it gives a 
special legal status. Accordingly, the question of a 
prolonged illness has very often been raised in the 
context of the legal effect of those provisions.
Most courts treated these provisions as stipulating 
a cause which terminates the contract of employment 
automatically. For example, in the Denkigakuen case, a 
high school teacher was terminated on the expiry of a 
one-year suspension period due to illness. When he was 
suspended due to illness, he had worked for two years and 
five months. The shugyo kisoku of the high school 
stipulated that the employee will be regarded as retiring 
when the period of suspension expires without the 
circumstance which caused the suspension coming to an
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end. The teacher took action for abusive dismissal. He 
alleged that the employer should give notice of dismissal 
on the expiry of the suspension period. The Tokyo 
District Court dismissed the complaint and held that the 
provision of the shugyo kisoku meant that the contract of 
employment would automatically terminate without the 
employer’s notice of dismissal on the expiry of the
1 •z
suspension period.
However, the courts also generally investigated 
whether the employer was entitled to suspend the employee 
for illness and whether the employee’s illness or injury 
had not been cured enough to perform his job. Moreover, 
some courts required the employer to prove that the 
employee’s illness or injury on the expiry of the 
suspension period was so serious that he might be 
consequently be dismissed for it. For example, in the Air 
France case, the Tokyo District Court held that: ”It is
not sufficient for the employer to prove that the 
employee’s injury has not healed enough for him to 
perform his previous work...The employer should prove 
that, taking into account all the circumstances such as 
the prospects of recovery, the existence of work to be 
reinstated, etc., his injury is so serious that they may 
consequently dismiss him for it."^
There are often provisions of shugyo kisokus which 
provide a similar suspension period (usually for one 
month) of employees for accidental events in general.
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Thus, sometimes the employer applies such a provision to
an employee who is arrested and imprisoned on suspicion
of having committed a crime, and then he regards the
contract with the employee as terminated on the expiry of
the fixed period of the suspension. The majority of
courts have treated the contract of the employment as
terminated automatically on the expiry of the suspension 
1 6period.
Termination of employment contracts on expiry of 
suspension periods for illness or imprisonment can be 
seen as realization of a condition subsequently 
stipulated in the shugyo kisoku. As described in the next 
chapter, the legal status of shugyo kisoku is an 
unsettled question. But if it is construed that the 
shugyo kisoku becomes binding through explicit or 
implicit agreement of employees, then it can be 
understood that termination of employment contracts on 
the expiry of suspension for illness or imprisonment is 
an example of termination on the basis of agreement. 
Termination of the contract of employment at the 
compulsory retirement age can be seen as the same.
It is considered that there are two different ways 
of providing termination on the grounds of compulsory 
retirement age. Some shugyo kisokus provide that the 
employee will be dismissed for the reason that the 
employee has reached the stipulated compulsory retirement 
age. Others provide that the employee will be regarded as
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retiring when the employee has reached the stipulated 
compulsory retirement age. The latter type is regarded as 
providing a cause for automatic termination of the 
contract of employment and therefore legal regulation of 
dismissal cannot apply to this type of compulsory 
retirement provision. This distinction between compulsory 
retirement provisions has been recognized by the Supreme
1 RCourt in Shuhoku Bus Company case. It is sometimes 
difficult to determine which type of compulsory 
retirement a particular shugyo kisoku intends to provide. 
However, even if the court finds it provides a cause for 
automatic termination, it further investigates whether 
that particular provision is not in violation of public 
policy.
In short, in Japan, the doctrine of frustration is 
not used frequently with regard to contracts of 
employment. But it has been sometimes held that the 
contract of employment is automatically terminated on the 
basis of provisions of shugyo kisoku. Another important 
example of automatic termination on the basis of shugyo 
kisoku can be seen in cases of termination caused by 
compulsory retirement age. These judicial practices 
relate closely to the statutory requirement that every 
cause of employment termination should be .written in the 
shugyo kisoku. British and American situations are
different from this. In common law cases, most cases 
concerning frustrating events are those in which
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contracts are for a fixed term or with a long notice 
period. The proportion of the period during which the 
employee is not able to perform his duty is a crucial 
factor as far as the contract is concerned. In many 
cases, the proportion will be smaller in Japanese cases 
than in British and American common law cases. In this 
sense, application of the doctrine of frustration is more 
difficult in the Japanese context. British unfair 
dismissal cases seem to be rather similar in nature to 
Japanese cases. Therefore, a distinction should also be 
made between common law cases and cases concerning 
statutory protection from dismissal.
2.5. TERMINATION BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT
It is sometimes questionable whether a contract has 
been terminated by dismissal or by mutual agreement; it 
is necessary to refer to termination by mutual agreement 
in relation to the concept of dismissal as defined by 
s.55(2)(a) as well as s .83(2)(a) of the EP(C)A in 
Britain.
Mutual agreement is constituted by one party’s offer 
and the other p a r t y ’s acceptance of it. Thus, 
difficulties may arise when an employee revokes his offer 
to resign before the employer accepts it. After the 
employee has successfully revoked his or her offer of 
resignation, the employer cannot insist that the contract 
has been terminated by mutual agreement.
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Mutual agreement to terminate the contract of
employment is void or voidable on the grounds of mistake,
mental reservation, fraud, duress, undue influence or the 
1 7like . In addition to the fact that the rule of undue
influence does not exist in Japan and nor does the rule
of mental reservation apply in Britain and the United
States, the precise legal definition of these terms is
also clearly different among the three countries.
In Japan, even where an employee agrees to resign
when he is told that he would be dismissed if he did not
agree, he may not rescind his agreement to resignation
unless there are special circumstances. There have been a
few cases in which courts found that an agreement to
resignation was void because of duress. All but one of
those cases were cases where either a female or minor
employee received severe threats, violent language and 
1 Rhumiliation.
There are also a few cases in which it was held that 
an agreement to resign was void on the grounds of 
mistake. It may be easier to allege mistake rather than 
duress in order to make an agreement to resign void. An 
example is found in the judgment of the District Court in
1 q
the Yamaichi Security Company Ltd. case. In that case, 
in the company there was a practice under which female 
employees had to resign when they got married. The court 
found that her agreement to resign was void because she 
had misunderstood the legal effect of the practice of
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resignation at marriage. When she submitted her 
resignation to the company, she believed that the 
company's practice was effective in law. The company was 
aware of her misunderstanding since she submitted her 
resignation in response to the company's demand that she 
should do so in compliance with that practice.
There are also a few cases where the court held that
an agreement to resign was void on the grounds of mental
reservation. Section 93 of the Civil Code provides that
a declaration of intent shall be void if the other party
was aware, or should have been aware, of the real
intention of the declarant. A typical case in which the
court applied this rule to an agreement of employment
2 0termination is the Amagasaki Steel Co. case . The 
company accepted a letter of resignation from employees 
who had committed a misdemeanor outside their working 
place. However, before submission of their letter, the 
employees were told by the manager that the letter would 
be handed to the company president only for the purpose 
of showing their ’sincere regret’ . The District Court 
held that the agreement was void on the grounds of mental 
reservation since the company knew that the employees did 
not intend to make an agreement for termination.
In the United States, it is not easy for an employee 
to claim that his agreement to resign is void on the 
grounds of fraud, mistake or duress. However, the 
doctrine of undue influence can be relatively easily
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utilized for this purpose. The judgment of the California
District Court of Appeal in Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School 
21District provides a good illustration. In that case, a 
schoolteacher submitted his resignation after he had been 
arrested on criminal charges of homosexual activity which 
were subsequently dismissed. He afterward took action 
against school district for rescission of his resignation 
on the grounds of duress, menace, fraud, undue influence, 
and mistake. The teacher alleged the following facts: the 
school officials came to his apartment just after he had 
undergone a long period of arrest, police questioning, 
booking and release on bail; he had gone 40 hours without 
sleep; at that time, they told him that he should resign 
immediately, that otherwise he would be suspended and 
dismissed, and that the resultant publicity would 
probably cause him extreme embarrassment and humiliation. 
The court found that the above facts were insufficient to 
state a cause of action for duress, menace, fraud, or 
mistake, but they did find sufficient elements to justify 
rescission of consent because of undue influence.
This case was not concerned with the question of 
whether the contract was terminated by resignation or 
dismissal since the employee’s complaint only asserted 
that his resignation was invalid on the grounds of 
duress, fraud, mistake, undue influence and incapacity. 
However, there is a case in which it was held that 
resignation under duress should be treated as dismissal
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where there was a contractual provision for dismissal
op
procedure. In that case, the employee was told that if 
he did not resign within two hours, he would be summarily 
discharged and if he was so discharged he would suffer a 
complete loss of all pension rights. The Appellate Court 
of Illinois cited the following statement made by 
Traynor, J. speaking for the California Supreme Court in 
Moreno v. Cairns:
"Whenever a person is severed from his employment by 
coercion the severance is effected not by his own 
will but by the will of a superior. A person who is 
forced to resign is thus in the position of one who 
is discharged, not of one who exercises his own will
p -z
to surrender his employment.”
In Britain, such cases have been treated somewhat 
inconsistently by tribunals for the purpose of the law of 
unfair dismissal and redundancy pay. Probably the first 
judgment made by an appellate court is that of the 
National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC) in East Sussex 
County Council v. Walker. In that case, a school cook was 
told that her contract was to be terminated and that she 
should resign. Accordingly, she wrote a letter of 
resignation but later claimed that she had been dismissed 
for redundancy. Sir John Brightman, giving the judgment 
of the court, stated as followed:
"In our judgment, if an employee is told that she is 
no longer required in her employment and is
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expressly invited to resign, a court of law is 
entitled to come to the conclusion that, as a matter 
of common sense, the employee was dismissed within 
the meaning of s. 3 of the (Redundancy Payment) 
Act.1,24
In this case, the NIRC treated the submission of 
resignation under threat as a dismissal in law. However, 
the employer’s threat in question need not amount to a 
coercion similar to that the California Supreme Court’s 
requirement in the Moreno case as described above. It can 
be said in fact that this is not a legalistic criterion 
for deciding if employment has been terminated by 
resignation or by dismissal. For, in theory, the employee 
could reject the employer’s invitation of resignation and 
wait to be dismissed since any clear harm was not shown 
against him to do so.
A later judgment of the EAT in Sheffield v. Oxford 
Controls Company Ltd. qualified this judgment to some 
extent. In that case, a company director and his wife 
were employed by the same company. One day the wife had a 
quarrel with the controlling shareholder and she was told 
that she would have to leave the company. Her husband 
became involved and he said ”1 go if she goes.” He was
then asked how much he wanted to go. He was later told
that if he did not resign he would be dismissed. He
resigned but later made a claim for unfair dismissal. The
EAT held that he had not been dismissed in law.
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Delivering the judgment of the court, Arnold, J. stated 
as follows:
"We find the principle to be one of causation. In 
cases such as that which we have just hypothesized 
and those reported, the causation is the threat. It 
is the existence of the threat which causes the 
employee to be willing to sign, and to sign, a 
resignation letter or to be willing to give, and to 
give, the oral resignation. But where that 
willingness is brought about by other considerations 
and the actual causation of the resignation is no 
longer the threat which has been made but is the 
state of mind of the resigning employee, that he is 
willing and content to resign on the terms which he 
has negotiated and which are satisfactory to him, 
then we think there is no room for the principle to
O R
be derived from the decided cases."
This decision, however, has received severe
? Rcriticism from some academics. They said that it 
allowed an employer to reject an employee’s statutory 
right for unfair dismissal by using a financial incentive 
to induce the employee to resign. A particular reason why 
this decision is criticized concerns Section 140 of the 
EP(C)A which imposes restrictions on contracting out of 
the Act. Sub-section (1) of that section provides as 
follows:
"Except as provided by the following provisions of
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this section, any provision in an agreement (whether 
a contract of employment or not) shall be void in so 
far as it purports - (a) to exclude or limit the
operation of any provision of this Act or ; (b) to
preclude any person from presenting a complaint to, 
or bringing any proceedings under this act before, 
an industrial tribunal."
A similar problem has occurred in a number of cases 
in which an employee signs a document which provides that 
if he fails to come back to work on a stated date, his 
contract will automatically terminate on that date. The 
question is if the employment should be regarded as 
terminated by mutual agreement where the employee fails 
to do so. In Igbo v. Johnson Matthey Chemicals Ltd., the 
Court of Appeal answered this question in the negative. 
In this case, the employee wanted extended holiday leave 
and signed a document prepared by the employer in which 
it was stipulated that: "You are required to work your
normal shift... immediately after the end of your 
holiday. . . . This has been explained to you and you have 
agreed to return to work on 28.9.83. If you fail to do 
this your contract of employment will automatically 
terminate on that date." She however failed to report for 
work on the 28th due to her illness. Both the tribunal 
and the EAT concluded that the employee was not 
dismissed. The Court of Appeal declared that the employee 
was dismissed and remitted the case to the industrial
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tribunal to decide whether the dismissal was unfair. 
Parker, LJ, presiding, stated as follows:
"Having signed the Holiday Agreement her position 
was, however, if the automatic termination is valid,
radically changed....... In such circumstances it is
impossible to avoid the conclusion that the 
proposition for automatic termination had the 
effect, if valid, of limiting the operation of the 
sections. It was therefore void by virtue of 
s.140.”27
According to the above review, it can be said that 
once the employee has some form of agreement of 
employment termination, it is difficult to make a claim 
that he is in fact dismissed in law in Britain as well as 
in Japan and the United States. However, in Britain, the 
existence of a special provision of Section 140 of the 
EP(C)A has sometimes played an important role in 
rejecting the effect of agreement to terminate 
employment. Moreover, in deciding whether the employee 
has voluntarily resigned, it seems to be that British 
tribunals and courts have more regard to the substance of 
the issue while Japanese courts take a more formalistic 
attitude.
2.4. TERMINATION BY EXPIRY OF A FIXED TERM
Under British laws of unfair dismissal and 
redundancy pay, the second part of the definition of 
dismissal is concerned with fixed term contracts of
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employment. According to Sections 55(2)(b) and 83(2)(b) 
of the EP(C)A, an employee is regarded as dismissed where 
he is employed under the fixed term of his contract which 
expires without being renewed under the same contract. 
Section 53(1)(c) also provides that if the term expires 
without being renewed under the same contract, the 
employee is entitled to be provided by his employer with 
a written statement of reasons for dismissal. These 
provisions intend to make it difficult for the employer 
to evade statutory protection by making a series of 
contracts of fixed duration on the basis of the common 
law principle that a fixed term contract automatically 
terminates at the end of the term.
However, this statutory rule is not quite rigid 
since employees with fixed term contracts can waive their 
statutory rights to claim redundancy pay and complain of 
unfair dismissal on the expiry of a fixed term. Section 
142 of the EP(C)A provides that where an employee is 
employed for a fixed term of a year or more he may agree 
in writing to exclude any complaint of unfair dismissal 
on the expiry of the term and, where employed for a term 
of two years or more, also any claim for redundancy pay.
If the phrase ’fixed term’ in Section 142 is read 
broadly the statutory rights for an employee may be 
excluded too widely. For this reason, the Court of Appeal 
read it narrowly in B.B.C. v. Ioannou. Lord Denning, MR 
stated as follows:
72
"In my opinion, a ’fixed term’ is one which cannot 
be unfixed by notice. To be a ’fixed term’, the 
parties must be bound for the term stated in the 
agreement: and unable to determine it by notice on 
either side. If it were only determinable for 
misconduct, it would, I think, be a 'fixed term' - 
because that is imported by common law anyway. But 
determination by notice is destructive of any 'fixed 
term'.”28
pq
However, in B.B.C. v. Dixon , the Court of Appeal 
did not follow its own decision in the Ioannou case to 
avoid coming to a decision which would have opened up a 
large gap in the context of statutory definition of 
dismissal. The Court held that a fixed term contract 
existed if it was for a specific term, even though it was 
terminable by notice on either side during that term.
However, a contract terminable on the completion of 
a specific task or some future event has been held not to 
be a 'fixed term’ contract. In Wiltshire County Council 
v. NATFHE and Guy.,^ Lord Denning, MR also stated that 
’It seems to me that if there is a contract by which a 
man is to do a particular task or purpose, then when that 
task or purpose comes to an end the contract is 
discharged by performance. Instances may be taken of a 
seaman who is employed for the duration of a voyage 
and it is completely uncertain how long the voyage will 
last....It is a contract which is discharged by
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performance. ’
Neither Japan nor the United States has any 
statutory provision which treats the expiration of an 
employment contract as a dismissal. However, in Japan, it 
has been held that a contract stated to be for a fixed 
term has been converted into a contract of indefinite 
duration after it has been renewed several times and 
therefore that the employer’s refusal to renew that 
contract at the expiration of its term was in fact
T O
dismissal.
Most cases, however, have not followed this decision 
but nevertheless have held that a contract stated to be 
for a fixed term should be subject to legal regulation
7 7
analogous to the law of dismissal. One of the leading 
cases of this is the Supreme Court in the Hitachi Medico 
Kashiwa Factory^4 case in the context of workforce 
reduction. In this case, the appellant was employed as a 
’temporary employee” under a written contract for a term 
of two months. The contract was renewed five times. The 
’temporary employees scheme” in the Kashiwa factory was 
made for the purpose of adjusting the workforce in 
response to the state of the demand for their products. 
The standards used to recruit ’temporary employees” were 
not very demanding, compared to those for regular 
employees. The company's policy was to engage "temporary 
employees” in simple work and in fact the appellant was 
engaged in relatively simple work.
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The Supreme Court addressed this question in the 
following way: The "temporary employees" in the Kashiwa 
factory were not employed for temporary work such as 
seasonal work or work for particular products. Thus, 
their employment was expected to continue to some extent. 
The appellant's contract was renewed five times. 
According to these facts, legal regulation on analogy of 
the law of dismissal should be applied to the refusal to 
renew his contract on the grounds of the expiry of its 
term.
It may be said that by using the analogy of the law 
of dismissal, the courts have imposed certain legal 
restrictions on the employer's refusal to renew a fixed 
term contract based on inference of a tacit agreement 
with his employee or the employee's reasonable 
expectation of continuous employment. In addition, some 
courts have also utilized particular statutory provisions 
to hold that a contract stated to be for a fixed term 
becomes a contract of indefinite duration and is subject 
to the law of dismissal.
Those provisions are Section 14 of the Labour 
Standard Law and Section 629 of the Civil Code. The 
former provides that a contract of employment shall not 
be made for a period longer than one year, except for the 
completion of a specific task. Thus, even if the parties 
made a contract stated to be for two years, the contract 
is only effective as being for the term of one year.
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Where the employee continued to render service after the 
expiration of the term for one year and the employer did 
not raise any objection to it, it should be considered 
that the parties entered into a new contract of
'z c
indefinite duration. The Civil Code, s.629 provides 
that "If, where the employee continued to render service 
after the expiration of the period of service, the 
employer fails to raise any objection thereto 
notwithstanding that he is aware thereof, he is presumed 
to have entered into a fresh contract of service on the 
same terms as before."
2.5. CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL
In Britain, the third type of dismissal occurs under 
Sections 55(2)(c) and 83(2)(c) of the EP(C)A where the 
employee terminates the contract under which he is 
employed by the employer, with or without notice, in 
circumstances such that he is entitled to terminate it 
without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct. This 
statutory concept of dismissal in Britain is generally 
called ’constructive dismissal’.
However, even at common law, there can be found some 
cases in which it was held that an employee could 
terminate his employment without notice due to his 
employer's conduct. These cases can be explained on the 
basis of the common-law rule of repudiatory breach. In 
fact, McCardie, J. stated in re Rubel Bronze Metal 
Company:
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"If the conduct of the employer amounts to a basic 
refusal to continue (to employ) the servant on the 
agreed terms of the employment, then there is at 
once a wrongful dismissal and a repudiation of the 
contract."
However, at common law, the application of 
repudiatory breach has traditionally been limited to 
those cases where an employer ordered his employee to do 
an unreasonably dangerous job, where an employer 
suspended his employee wrongfully, or where an employer 
did not provide his employee with actual work when he had
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a contractual duty to do so.
Most courts and tribunals interpreted the concept of 
’constructive dismissal' as based on the rule of 
repudiatory breach and in 1978 the Court of Appeal 
authoritatively endorsed this approach in Western 
Excavating Ltd. v. Sharp. Lord Denning, MR stated the law 
as follows:
"If the employer is guilty of conduct which is a 
significant breach going to the root of the contract 
of employment, or which shows that the employer no 
longer intends to be bound by one or more of the 
essential terms of the contract, then the employee 
is entitled to treat himself as discharged from any 
further performance. If he does so, then he 
terminates the contract by reason of the employer’s
•7 O
conduct. He is constructively dismissed."
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Thus, if an employer breaks a fundamental term of 
his contract of employment, the employee can terminate 
the contract and claim constructive dismissal. 
Accordingly, the employee’s resignation is usually 
treated as constructive dismissal where his employer has 
not paid him all or part of the remuneration to which he 
is entitled, such as wages, bonuses, overtime pay, 
holiday pay or fringe benefits due to him, or where his 
employer has unilaterally changed his contractually 
agreed status, working hours, place of work, or other 
important working conditions without either contractual 
right or the employee’s agreement to the change.
On the other hand, this approach could exclude cases 
where an employer subtil compels an employee to leave his 
job without breaking any term of the contract, because 
the employee cannot claim that he has been constructively 
dismissed unless the employer breaks a fundamental term
of the contract. However, courts and tribunals have been
willing to recognize a wider range of implied 
responsibilities on the part of an employer toward his 
employees than traditionally recognized in order to 
accommodate such subtle conduct by employers within the 
concept of 'constructive dismissal’. These are variously 
called the duty of support, duty of care, duty of 
courtesy and most importantly, the duty of mutual trust 
and confidence. The meaning of these duties is best
described by the following statement of Lord Denning, MR
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in Woods v. W.M.Car Services Ltd.: "The employer must be
good and considerate to his servants. Just as the servant 
must be good and faithful, so an employer must be good 
and considerate. Just as in the old days an employee 
could be guilty of misconduct justifying his dismissal, 
so in modern times an employer can be guilty of 
misconduct justifying the employee in leaving at once 
without notice."^®
Moreover, it is noticeable that the tribunals have 
repeated that the subjective motive or intention of an 
employer is irrelevant in determining whether he 
committed a fundamental breach.4® In Lewis v. Motorworld 
Garage Ltd.,41 the Court of Appeal endorsed this approach 
in stating that an employer’s subjective "intentions and 
their reasonable belief could not determine" whether 
their conduct amounted to a repudiatory breach.
In the United States, there have been some cases at 
common law where courts treated an employee’s resignation 
during the fixed term of his contract as an employer’s 
discharge in exceptional circumstances. Those cases are:
(i) where an employer ordered his employee to do work 
which the employee was not contractually obliged to do;
(ii) where an employer did not give his employee work
which he was contractually obliged to give; or (iii)
42where an employer failed to pay contractual wages.
In more recent years, it seems to be that the courts 
have become more willing to extend the concept of
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dismissal even at common law. For example, in Carlson v. 
Ewing where Ewing left the employment of the defendant 
and brought an action for breach of an employment 
contract, the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated as 
follows:
"We agree with the trial court that, 'the evidence 
shows that * * * Carlson resorted to various devices 
to disgust Ewing, to induce him to abandon his 
service, and to make performance by Ewing 
impossible; and that the actions of Carlson toward 
Ewing were tantamount to a discharge.'"4^
Moreover, in Beye v. Bureau of National Affairs, the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland adopted into common 
law the concept of 'constructive discharge' which had 
been originated by the National Labour Relations Board 
for the law of unfair labour practice. Although the Court 
affirmed the judgment of the lower court which sustained 
supervisor's demurrers, they stated:
"None of these cases involved actions for abusive 
discharge under Adler principles, but we see no 
reason why the basic concept and definition of 
constructive discharge established by them should 
not apply as well to an abusive discharge case. The 
ultimate facts necessary to establish an unfair 
labor practice under the Federal labor laws or an 
unlawful employment practice under the civil rights 
laws may differ from what is required for an abusive
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discharge under A d i e r , but the considerations
attendant to a determination of whether a
resignation is voluntary or involuntary would seem
to us to be essentially the same."44
In relation to unfair labour practices, it may be
said that the NLRB first used the concept of
4 *5'constructive discharge’ in Sterling Corset Inc. case 
where the Board ordered employees to be reinstated with 
back pay. However, it is much more recently that clear 
criteria were indicated by the NLRB and the courts. The 
NLRB stated in Cristal Princeton Refining Co.: "There are 
two elements which must be proved to establish a 
'constructive discharge1. First, the burdens imposed upon 
the employee must cause, and be intended to cause, a 
change in his working conditions so difficult or 
unpleasant as to force him to resign. Second, it must be 
shown that those burdens were imposed because of the
A O
employee’s union activities."
The second element described above is not required 
to prove ’constructive discharge' in particular but to 
prove an employer's unfair labour practice in general. 
Therefore, only the first element is necessary to proved 
’constructive d i s c h a r g e ’ itself. This element is 
satisfied only if it is proved both that an employer 
makes working conditions so intolerable that an employee 
is forced to quit, and that the employer intends to force 
the employee to quit.
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In fact, the courts have made much of an employer's 
intent to force an employee to resign. Thus, a finding of 
an employer's intent to force an employee to resign is 
crucial for the NLRB to conclude that the employee is 
constructively discharged. However, such intent can of 
course be proved not only by direct evidence but also by 
circumstantial evidence. Thus, the NLRB has adopted a 
''reasonably foreseeable" standard in determining whether 
an employer intended to force an employee to quit. For 
example, the NLRB stated in the Central Credit Collection 
Control Corp. case: "Where there is no direct evidence of 
motive, the presumption that ’a man is held to intend the 
foreseeable consequences of his conduct’ will supply that 
lack.
The doctrine of 'constructive discharge’ has been 
utilized in civil rights laws as well. However, in the 
context of those laws, there has been some disagreement 
between the courts about whether evidence of the 
employer's intent to make an employee resign is 
indispensable to establishing constructive discharge. The 
majority of courts do not require an employee to prove 
that the employer actually intended to compel the 
employee to resign. These courts only consider whether 
the working conditions are intolerable from the viewpoint 
of a reasonable person. For example, the US Court of 
Appeals (Third Circuit) in Goss v. Exxon Office Systems 
Company stated as follows:
"We hold that no finding of a specific intent on the
part of the employer to bring about a discharge is
required for the application of the constructive
discharge doctrine. The court need merely find that
the employer knowingly permitted conditions of
discrimination in employment so intolerable that a
4 8reasonable person subject to them would resign."
There are a small number of cases in which the
courts have required the employee to prove the employer’s
purpose of forcing him to resign in addition to his
4 Qimposition of intolerable working conditions. Although 
there does not seem to be any major difference between 
the result of applying 'the reasonable person test' and 
'the intent test' to a particular case, the former test 
is more favourable for the employee because it could lead 
to a favourable result to the employee where the intent 
test would not do so. This may be illustrated in Clark v. 
Marsh. In that case, the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court applied 'the reasonable person test' and affirmed 
the lower court's finding that the employee was 
constructively discharged. The following is an outline of 
the facts of the Clark case: Ms Clark was employed by the 
army as a clerk-typist and was subsequently promoted to 
the position of principal assistant to the director of 
the Office of Employment Policy and Grievance Review 
(OEPGR). Following the death of the then director of the 
OEPGR, she became the acting director. In that capacity
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her performance was rated as ’outstanding* and 
’satisfactory*. Despite her performance ratings and her 
substantial supervisory experience, she did not receive a 
permanent promotion to the director's position. After an 
employee of another office, who was a recent law school 
graduate with no supervisory experience was appointed to 
the post of director of the OEPGR, Ms Clark resigned.
If the court had applied ’the intent test’ instead 
of ’the reasonable person test’ to the Clark case, they 
could have come to a different conclusion. In fact, 
commenting on the Clark case, a law review article 
persuasively stated: ”A court applying a specific intent
test would have reached a contrary result. The employer 
in Clark had introduced evidence - which the appellate 
court dismissed as ’irrelevant’ under a reasonable person 
test - that the plaintiff had in fact been ’encouraged’ 
not to resign. Furthermore, the employer's actions 
reflected no consistent scheme: the promotional decisions 
were spread out over a period of many years and where 
made by a panel whose composition probably changed during 
that time. A court would thus have difficulty concluding
C 1
that the employer intended the plaintiff to resign.”
Compared to British and American courts, Japanese 
courts have been more reluctant to apply any similar 
concept to ’constructive dismissal’or ’constructive 
discharge’ in order to extend the concept of dismissal. 
In Japan, the shugyo kisoku generally stipulates that
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employees should submit a letter of resignation when they
resign, although such a stipulation can not be legally
enforced since employees are free to terminate their
employment by giving two weeks notice under Section 627
of the Civil Code; employers are very careful about the
difference in the legal effect between dismissal and
resignation and therefore they usually require the
employee to submit a letter of resignation. As a matter
of fact, there are few cases in which the employee left
his employment without submitting such a letter. Thus, in
most cases, the courts have easily rejected the
employee's claim that he was in fact dismissed by his
employer, on the grounds that a letter of resignation
evinces the employee's intention to resign or to agree to
his resignation. Thus, in such a case, the court
questions whether the employee’s resignation or agreement
of resignation is valid or not. 
a
There are^few cases where the employee left his 
employment without submitting a letter of resignation. 
Even in those cases, the courts have rarely found that 
the employee was dismissed instead of resigning. The
c p
Sugenuma Seisakujo case , for example, presents a 
striking contrast to the British and American cases 
examined above. In this case, the plaintiff was employed 
on the basis of a fixed-rate daily pay on 20.11.1972. At 
that time he agreed with the employer's proposal that the 
wage system would be changed to piece-rate pay when he
got used to the work. In 30.12.1972, the employer, 
however, informed him that he would be paid on piece-rate 
from 6.1.1973. On January 6, the employer said to him, 
"You will be paid on the basis of fixed-rate daily pay, 
only today” . The plaintiff was absent from work from 
January 7. After two weeks passed the employer treated 
him as having voluntarily quit. The plaintiff alleged 
that the employer’s notice to change unilaterally fixed- 
rate pay into piece-rate pay was a notice of dismissal. 
The Tokyo District Court held that the plaintiff was not 
dismissed by the employer. Turning down the plaintiff’s 
above allegation, the court stated that the question of 
the legal effects of change in the payment system was one 
thing and that the question of dismissal was another and
C  'Z
that he should not confuse different things.
However, it cannot be said that Japanese courts have 
not recognized any similar concept to ’constructive 
dismissal’ or ’constructive discharge’. There are some 
exceptional cases. Among them, the Namura Shipbuilding 
Co. case is a case where it is clear that the court, m  
practice, applied a similar concept to an American 
’constructive discharge’. The plaintiff was employed as a 
manual employee and was later promoted to a position of a 
low administrative grade. Just after promotion, he was 
ordered to operate an oil motor dynamo to generate 
electricity because of an electric power shortage. He had 
not done this before since there was an employee in
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charge of the dynamo operation and he subsequently failed 
to operate the dynamo well. On the morning of 28.1.1948, 
the company president told him, in front of many 
employees attending a morning gathering, "Can you walk 
around as an administrative staff as if nothing had 
happened? An irresponsible man such as you is never 
called a foreman or an assistant engineer!" After this 
incident, the praintiff left the workplace and never came 
back. About nine months later, he started to work in 
another shipbuilding company. The Osaka High Court found 
that the plaintiff was dismissed instead of resigning. 
The Court stated:
"An ordinary person in his position feels that he
was humiliated, his reputation was damaged, his
confidence was lost, and that, as a result, he 
cannot continue to work. Thus, it is reasonable to 
say that the company president forced him to resign,
and that the company dismissed the plaintiff for its
convenience at the end of January 1948."
In the context of unfair labour practices, labour 
relations commissions and courts, although these same 
labour relations commissions and courts have not 
established a concept of constructive dismissal, they 
have given the employee and his union the same remedies 
as when he is dismissed. That is, they generally hold 
that, when a series of actions by an employer with anti­
union motives had forced an employee to resign or to
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agree to resign, this agreement or resignation could not 
prevent the employees actions from constituting an 
unfair labor practice. In the Ii.jima Sangyo case, the 
Tokyo High Court^ stated that
’’When the employee reluctantly submitted a letter of 
resignation because he was wrongfully transferred, 
obstructed from work, and threatened in various ways 
on the grounds of his union activity, the employer 
cannot treat it as resignation because such 
treatment would constitute an unfair labour practice 
as an unfavourable treatment for the reason of union 
activity under Section (1) of The Labour Union Law. 
We consider that the employee’s offer of resignation 
is caused by the employer’s enmity to union activity 
because the offer would not be made but for the 
employer's enmity to the union. Unless the 
employee's resignation is nullified, the result of 
resignation is substantially equal to the one of 
punitive dismissal.”
2.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
On the basis of the above examination of the 
definitions of dismissal in Britain, Japan and the United 
States, it can be said that British law has been most 
eager to extend the concept of dismissal although it has 
recognized a concept of frustration most widely which 
excludes legal protection from dismissal. To recognize
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frustration in a wide range of circumstances reducing the 
width of concept of dismissal. It does not however follow 
that Japanese law indeed gives a wider coverage of 
protection through the concept of dismissal; Japanese 
courts very often hold that employment is automatically 
terminated in accordance with a shugyo kisoku provision. 
This leads to a similar legal result as when the doctrine 
of frustration is applied.
The Japanese and American laws are less eager to 
extend the concept of dismissal. Japanese courts are the 
most reluctant to find that the employee has been 
constructively dismissed. Compared with Japanese courts, 
American courts are more liberal in finding that the 
employee has been constructively dismissed. In order to 
evaluate the extension of the concept of dismissal in 
the context of employment protection, we should however 
consider what role an extended concept of dismissal plays 
in employment protection and if there are any other ways 
to protect workers' rights to employment.
In Britain, the concept of dismissal is applicable 
only for the purposes of the laws of unfair dismissal, 
redundancy pay and a written statement of reasons for 
dismissal. We should however note that in such a case 
where 'constructive dismissal' is found for the purposes 
of laws of unfair dismissal and redundancy pay, there may 
also be found a repudiation at common law for which the 
employee may claim for a common law remedy. Moreover,
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as we will see in the next chapter, these laws do not 
impose an excessive financial burden on the employer.
On the other hand, in Japan, the concept of 
dismissal is subject to strict judicial interpretation of 
the parties’ intent, since dismissal is usually 
questioned in the context of the Civil Code. Moreover, 
the concept is usually considered in the context of 
whether or not a dismissal is effective in law and is 
therefore an extension of a concept which would impose a 
great financial burden on the employer. Nevertheless, it 
is indisputably desirable that the employee whom the 
employer placed in an intolerable situation by 
unilaterally changing his working conditions or 
environments may quit and sue for damages for loss of 
employment. Furthermore, unlike British law, Japanese law 
as well as American law does not regard termination by 
expiry of a fixed term as dismissal; however, the 
Japanese courts have imposed certain legal restrictions 
on the employer’s refusal to renew a fixed term contract 
based on inference of a tacit agreement with his employee 
or the employee's reasonable expectation of continuous 
employment.
It is probably necessary to show a practical reason 
why Japanese courts have not positively established a 
clear concept similar to the British or American concept 
of ’constructive dismissal'. It is closely related to the 
lifetime employment practice prevailing among larger
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companies. With this practice, it is very difficult for a 
person to find another equivalent employment after he 
leaves his previous employment since many larger 
companies generally recruit few people other than new 
school leavers. In this situation, the employee tends not 
to leave his company because he is treated unfavourably 
to some extent. On the other hand, as we will see in the 
next chapter, dismissal is severely regulated by the 
legal doctrine of the abuse of the right to dismissal, 
and therefore the employer generally tries to get an 
agreement from the employee to terminate a contract of 
employment. Therefore, there are limited cases in which 
the court is not able to easily recognize that the 
employee is constructively dismissed. The type of remedy 
available for abusive dismissal is also closely related 
to this problem. Even if the court recognizes the concept 
of ’constructive dismissal’, the only remedy it may give 
the dismissed person will be its decision to affirm his 
status as an employee, and therefore it may be 
meaningless for the employee who does not want to be 
reinstated.
In the United States, the concept of ’constructive 
discharge’ has so far not been widely applied in wrongful 
discharge cases while it has been extensively applied in 
the context of anti-discrimination laws. Since anti- 
discrimination laws prohibit discriminatory treatment in 
general, it may be said that the concept of dismissal is
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not necessarily crucial for them. For instance, the 
Japanese Labour Commissions have made orders to 
reinstate employees who were forced to submit their 
resignation by various sorts of harassment by their 
employers for anti-union motives. To do this, the 
commissions have not used any special concept such as 
’constructive dismissal' but have merely found that the 
employer's conduct was discriminatory treatment and
c 7
therefore an unfair labour practice. This is because, 
in the context of unfair labour practice legislation, the 
effectiveness of dismissal is not questioned.
However, in the United States, the concept of 
'constructive discharge' is indeed considered to be very 
important in deciding what remedy should be given to the 
employee. Even if the employer's conduct constitutes 
unlawful discrimination, the employee will not obtain 
reinstatement with back pay if the discriminatory conduct 
was not a 'constructive discharge'. In this respect, it 
is noticeable that British laws of employment 
discrimination based on race and sex do not have any 
special provisions defining the concept of dismissal. 
There is a possibility that the courts will interpret the 
term 'dismissal' in those laws so widely as to cover an 
employer's wrongful repudiatory conduct. This would be 
consistent with the judgment of the Court of Appeal in
CO
Marriott v. Oxford and District Co-operative Society, 
where the employer's unilateral wage reduction was
92
treated as ’dismissal’. Even if it did not, which is 
unlikely, the same rights and remedies would apply for 
being subject to ’any other detriment”. Further, an 
employee in many cases could still seek redress under the 
law of unfair dismissal if the employee satisfied the the 
qualifying conditions.
Factors which are required to prove ’constructive 
dismissal’ or 'constructive discharge' are different 
between Britain and the United States. American courts 
require an employee to prove subjective factors, such as 
’deliberate" and "intolerable" in the United States, 
while British courts interpret the concept of 
'constructive d i s m i s s a l ’ as based on the rule of 
repudiatory breach and therefore determine on it on the 
basis of whether an employer’s conduct constitutes a 
breach of an express or implied contractual term.
Finally, it should be pointed out that termination 
by mutual agreement raises difficult problems in all 
three countries. Japanese courts often hold that the 
employee's resignation is void because of mistake, duress 
or mental reservation. American courts sometimes hold 
that an agreement to resign is void on the basis of the 
doctrine of undue influence. In this way, courts declare 
that the contract of employment subsists without finding 
dismissal. In Britain, Section 140 of EP(C)A sometimes 
plays an important role in rejecting the effect of an 
agreement to terminate employment. However, it is
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generally considered in these three countries that, once 
an agreement to terminate employment is proved to have 
been made, it is very difficult to deny the effect of 
such an agreement.
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- PART II -
CHAPTER 5
GENERAL LAW OF DISMISSAL(1): REGULATION
This chapter examines the general law of dismissal in 
Britain, the United States and Japan, and identifies what 
kind of regulation the law in each country provides. We 
will first examine British law, then Japanese law, and 
finally American law.
5.1. BRITAIN
3.1.1. WRONGFUL DISMISSAL1
At common law, if a contract of employment is for a 
fixed period, it will automatically terminate at the end 
of that period. Dismissal before the expiry of a fixed 
term constitutes a breach of contract, and therefore it
p
may be the subject of an action for wrongful dismissal 
By contrast, a contract of indefinite duration is usually 
presumed to be terminable by either party giving notice. 
There are exceptional cases, for example, where a 
contract was expressed to last indefinitely after the 
first three years, it was held that, in the absence of 
notice to terminate the employment at the end of the 
three years, the engagement of the employee was for his
7
life. Where a contract restricted the reasons for which 
it could be terminated by the employer giving notice, it 
was held that it could not be terminated by notice for 
some other reason.4 The length of the notice period
depends on the intention of the parties. If the contract 
of employment is silent on the period of notice to be 
given on either side, it has been held that a reasonable 
period of notice is required. In practice, the requisite 
notice has been determined in accordance with certain 
factors such as what is customary in that particular job, 
the status of the job and the period of payment.  ^ Usually 
it has been quite short for manual employees, i.e. one 
week for employees who were paid by the week.
However, the common law concept of "reasonable 
notice” is now subject to a statutory minimum period 
which was introduced by the Contracts of Employment Act 
1963 and is currently contained in Section 49 of the 
EP(C)A. After one month’s employment, an employee is 
entitled to receive, and required to give one w e e k ’s 
notice. An employee who has been employed for more than 
two years is entitled to one week for each year of 
continuous employment, subject to a maximum of twelve 
weeks’ notice. However, salaried employees are usually 
paid by the month or some longer period and therefore 
their contractual period of notice is normally much 
longer than the statutory minimum.
Where an employee has committed a repudiatory breach 
of contract, the employer is entitled to summarily dismiss 
him without contractual or statutory notice. In order to 
constitute a repudiatory breach an employee’s conduct 
must be such as to show that he disregarded the essential
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conditions of the contract of service, or be 
inconsistent with the continuance of confidence between
q
employer and employee.
At common law, the employer is entitled to summarily
dismiss the employee even though, at the time of the
dismissal, the employer was not aware of the repudiatory
breach in question.1  ^ The test for determining whether
the employee is guilty of the repudiatory breach is an
objective one, which means that it is not sufficient for
the employer to show a reasonable belief in the
employee’s repudiatory breach.*1
Where there is no reason to summarily dismiss an
employee, the employer may give the employee pay in lieu
of notice instead of giving proper notice. ”If a man is
dismissed without notice but with money in lieu, what he
receives is, as a matter of law, damages for breach of 
12contract." Therefore, the pay in lieu of notice should 
be the net pay which the employee would have received had 
he worked during the notice period. However, if there is 
an express or implied agreement that pay in lieu of
i **
notice is to be made gross, it should be paid gross.
Contracts of employment may contain express terms, or 
terms incorporated from external sources, which purport 
to guarantee job security. Examples include where the 
contract requires the employer to follow the contractual 
procedure, restricts the permissible grounds for 
dismissal or gives the decision to dismiss to an
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independent body. Such terms are often found especially
in public sector employment. In Gunton v. Richmond-upon-
Thames London Borough C o u n c i l , the Court of Appeal
granted more extensive damages for a failure to observe
the contractual disciplinary procedure than those which
would have been awarded for a failure to give due 
1 4notice.
Further, in McClelland v. Northern Ireland General 
Health Services Board, the House of Lords held that the 
employee’s contract was subject only to the possibility 
of dismissal for good cause and therefore granted her a 
declaration to the effect that her contact of employment 
was still subsisting. Moreover, in Jones v. Gwent 
County Council, in which the governors of a college 
decided to dismiss a college lecture who had been cleared 
of accusations of misconduct by an internal disciplinary 
committee after a hearing carried out in accordance with 
her contractual disciplinary procedure, a permanent 
injunction was granted preventing the Council from acting
1 Ron the governors' decision to dismiss her.
There is the separate but related question of the 
public law rights of some employees whose employment is 
subject to some degree of statutory underpinning. 
However, as stated in the first chapter, this thesis does 
not consider civil servants and certain other public 
employees' special rights, and therefore, these 
additional rights are not being considered.
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3.1.2. UNFAIR DISMISSAL17
Since the introduction of the law of unfair 
dismissal, every employee to whom the legislation applies 
has the right not to be unfairly dismissed by his 
employer. This law however excludes a number of
1 p
employees from its application. In particular it 
excludes those who have been continuously employed for 
less than two years and those who have reached either the 
normal retiring age as laid down in their contract of 
employment or the age of 65 where no alternative age is
i q
specified. However, these employees still qualify for 
the right not to be unfairly dismissed for a reason 
relating to membership or non-membership of a trade 
union, pregnancy or childbirth, health and safety 
complaints, or assertion of statutory rights.
The method of determining whether a person has been 
continuously employed is complex. The basic requirement 
for continuity of employment is the existence of an 
employment relationship based on a contract of employment 
or a series of contracts with the same employer or
p i
successors of that employer.
In order for the dismissal to be fair, at the first 
stage the employer has to prove what the reason, or 
principal reason, for the dismissal was. The reason must 
be related to the capacity, qualifications or conduct of 
the employee, that the employee is redundant, that the
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employee cannot continue to work in the position held 
without contravention of a duty or restriction imposed by 
or under a statute, or "some other substantial reason” of 
a kind such as to justify the dismissal.
The final category, "some other substantial reason", 
blurs the edges of the other specific reasons. For 
example, even when the employer does not have contractual 
authority to order the employee to do something, under 
certain conditions he may fairly dismiss the employee for 
refusal to obey his order. In Hollister v. National 
Farmer's Union, the Court of Appeal stated that the 
employer's offer of contractual changes had to be 
accepted by employee where there was some sound, good 
business reason for the reorganisation. The Court, 
therefore, held that the employee’s refusal to accept the 
new agreement based on reorganisation was "a substantial 
reason of a kind sufficient to justify this kind of 
dismissal.
The financial difficulties of the employer may also 
constitute "some other substantial reason". For example, 
in Wilson v. Underhill House School Ltd., the EAT held 
that "there may well be cases... where, when employers 
fall into financial difficulties and are obliged to 
dismiss employees, the employee is neither redundant nor 
unfairly dismissed; because there is no reason why the 
circumstances involving the financial difficulties of the 
employers should not constitute 'some other substantial
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24reason.'’
These cases indicate that the courts and tribunals
tend to make dismissal for economic or reorganizational
reasons (other than for "redundancy”) relevant for
dismissal as "some other substantial reason." However,
there are other diverse cases in which the courts and
tribunals apply "some other substantial reason" to
justify dismissal. For example, the dismissal of an
employee on grounds of character may be found fair. It
was held that a maintenance handyman at a children’s
holiday camp was fairly dismissed on the grounds of this
homosexual activities because the employer had a common
and not unreasonable belief that homosexuals were more
likely than heterosexuals to interfere with young 
2 Rchildren. It may also be found fair for an employer to 
dismiss an employee for refusing to sign a covenant 
restricting his operation in competition with the
p p
employer’s company, for concealing his personal history
27 28at hiring or for being sentenced for imprisonment.
It may be found fair for an employer to dismiss an
employee on the grounds of the temporary nature of his
work. The expiry and non-renewal of a fixed term contract
29may constitute "some other substantial reason."
It should be pointed out that there are cases in 
which a dismissal will be treated as automatically 
unfair. Those are where the employees are dismissed for a 
reason relating to (i) membership or non-membership of a
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trade union; (ii) pregnancy or childbirth; (iii) 
assertion of statutory rights; or (iv) health and safety 
complaints. The law of dismissal for (i) and (ii) will be 
examined in Chapter 7.1.3. and Chapter 7.2.2. As far as 
dismissal for (iii) is concerned, the EP(C)A, s.60A 
provides that it is automatically unfair if the employee 
is dismissed because he brought proceedings against the 
employer to enforce, or alleged the employer's 
infringement of, his statutory rights. These rights 
include those conferred by the EP(C)A, the Wages Act 1986 
under which the remedy for its infringement is achieved 
way of a complaint or reference to an industrial 
tribunal, the right to minimum notice for termination and 
the rights relating to deductions from pay, union 
activities and time off under the TULR(C)A.
The EP(C)A also makes dismissal for reasons relating 
to health and safety complaints automatically unfair 
(category iv above). The dismissal is regarded as unfair 
if the reason for it was that the employee was carrying 
out activities relating to his or her duties as a 
statutory health and safety representative, or in 
connection with their membership of a health and safety
t n
committee. The Act provides special remedies for an 
employee who is found to have been unfairly dismissed for 
this reason. They are interim relief, a special award and 
a set minimum for the basic award. The remedies are the 
same as those applicable to dismissal for union-related
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reasons. The dismissal is also regarded as unfair if 
the reason for it was that the employee advised his or 
her employer of dangers at work, stopped work or took 
other appropriate precautions because of imminent serious 
danger.^
The method and burden of proving the reason for 
dismissal required under unfair dismissal law contrasts 
with that of proving reason for summary dismissal at 
common law which has been described in Chapter 3.1. The 
reason for dismissal which has to be proved by an 
employer in an unfair dismissal case was described as "a 
set of facts known to the employer, or it may be of 
beliefs held by him, which cause him to dismiss the
*7 o
employee”. In deciding whether or not the employer has 
proved the reason for the dismissal, the tribunal, 
therefore, can take into consideration only matters which 
the employer knew of at the time of dismissal. This 
principle was laid down by the House of Lords in Devis & 
Sons Ltd. v. Atkins.
On the other hand, if an employer proves that he 
genuinely believed his employee to have committed gross 
misconduct, it does not matter whether his belief was
•z c
factually correct. This means that the law does not 
require the employer to prove the facts substantiating 
his reason for dismissal. Accordingly, in Taylor v. 
Alidair, the Court of Appeal held that "(wherever) a man 
is dismissed for incapacity or incompetence it is
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sufficient that the employer honestly believes on 
reasonable grounds that the man is incapable or 
incompetent. It is not necessary for the employer to
7 D
prove that he is in fact incapable or incompetent."
Moreover, a reason wrongly labeled by an employer at 
the time of dismissal is not fatal to his case if he can
77
prove the facts which actually caused him to dismiss. 
For example, in Abernethy v. Mott, Hay and Anderson where 
the employers honestly thought that the facts constituted 
redundancy but in law they did not, the Court of Appeal 
supported the tribunal's decision that the real reason 
for the dismissal related to the capacity of the employee
•T O
for work of the kind which he was employed to do. A 
further problem occurs when there are several reasons 
alleged and not all are proved. According to the judgment 
of the House of Lords in Smith v. City of Glasgow 
District Council, in such circumstances the employer has 
to show that what has not been proved did not form, or 
form part of, the reason or principal reason for
•z q
dismissal.
With regard to proof of the reason for dismissal, it 
should also be noted that an employee is entitled to 
request a written statement of the reasons for dismissal 
if he has been continuously employed for more than two 
years before the dismissal. It must be requested within 3 
months of the effective date of termination. The employer 
has to respond to the employee's request within 14 days.
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The employee may present a complaint to an industrial 
tribunal either that the employer has unreasonably 
refused to give a written statement or that the statement 
given by him is false or inadequate. If the complaint is 
sustained, the tribunal can, at its discretion, make a 
declaration as to what was the real reason and it must 
make an award of two weeks' pay. The written statement is 
admissible in evidence in any proceedings4  ^ and the 
employer may be estopped from denying the truth of the 
written statement in subsequent litigation. Accordingly, 
he is likely to be bound by his written statement.
The fairness of a dismissal does not only depend 
upon whether the employer provided a reason for it which 
is one of the potentially fair reasons in s.57(l)(b) and 
(2) of the EP(C)A. It is also subject to the application 
of S.57A to 61 and to ss.152, 153 and 238 of the Trade
Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, 
under which an industrial tribunal must consider "whether 
in the circumstances (including the size and 
administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) 
the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating 
it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the 
employee."(Emphasis added.)41
However, the burden of proof on this issue has 
changed several times. The Industrial Relation Act 1971, 
s.24(6) contained the same wording as s.57(3) of the 
EP(C)A as quoted above, except for the wording in
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parentheses. In construing s.24(6), the tribunal applied 
"the general principle that, in the absence of a contrary 
provision, he who makes a claim must prove it.” Therefore 
the burden of proving unreasonableness rested on the 
employee.
The Trade Unions and Labour Relations Act 1974
4 2placed the burden of proof on the employer. The 
Employment Act 1980 however removed an explicit burden on 
the employer to prove to the tribunal that he acted 
reasonably.4  ^ When introducing this amendment, the 
government explained that this was because the imposition 
of the burden of proof on the employer had resulted in a 
widespread feeling among employers that they were guilty 
until proved innocent.
It has been considered that "the tribunal, with its 
tripartite composition, is expected to act as ’industrial 
juries', drawing on the industrial experience of its lay 
members to reach a conclusion based on common sense and 
common fairness." However, the tribunal is not free to 
substitute its own view for those of the employer. Lord 
Denning, M.R. stated in British Leyland UK v. Swift: "If
no reasonable employer would have dismissed him, then the 
dismissal was unfair. But if a reasonable employer might 
reasonably have dismissed him, then dismissal was fair. 
It must be remembered that in all these cases there is a 
band of reasonableness, within which one employer might 
reasonably take one view: another quite reasonably take a
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different view.’^
As the fairness of dismissal is determined by
whether the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in
treating his reason as sufficient for dismissal, the
procedure followed in reaching the decision to dismiss is
one of the very important factors involved in deciding
whether the dismissal is fair or unfair. The ACAS Code of
Practice 1: Disciplinary Practice and Procedures in
Employment (1977) issued under s.199 of the Trade Union
Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 provides
guidelines on what constitutes a fair procedure for
dismissal. The Code is admissible in evidence in any
proceedings before an industrial tribunal and if any
provision of it appears to the tribunal to be relevant to
any question arising in the proceedings it must be taken
4 ^into account in determining that question.
According to the Code, a fair procedure should have 
several stages such as various warnings, investigation of 
the case, an opportunity for the employee to explain 
before making any decision to dismiss and the right of 
appeal against the decision. Where there are disciplinary 
rules and procedures and grievance procedures, the 
employer must give the employee written notice of them 
within two months of the commencement of his
4 Remployment. However, the code itself does not have the 
force of law, and the fairness of dismissal depends on 
whether in the circumstances the employer acted
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reasonably or unreasonably. Accordingly, failure to
comply with the code’s provisions will not necessarily
render the dismissal unfair since there may be good
reasons for not complying, according to the facts of a
47particular case.
Nevertheless, the employer cannot argue that failure
to comply with procedural requirements of the code would
have made no difference to the outcome. In Polkey v.
Dayton Services Ltd., the House of Lords reversed earlier
decisions of the Court of Appeal to the effect that the
failure to follow a fair procedure did not matter if he
would have dismissed and would have done so fairly in any 
4 8event. In this case, the company dismissed a van driver 
for redundancy without any consultation with employees or 
their representative or earlier warning to him. The 
Industrial Relations Code of Practice in force at that 
time under the Employment Protection Act 1975 required an 
employer to consult with employees or their 
representative before redundancies and to give as much 
warning as practicable. Lord Mackay stated the following: 
”(T)he subject matter for the t r i b u n a l ’s 
consideration is the employer’s action in treating 
the reason as a sufficient reason for dismissing the 
employee. It is that action and that action only 
that the tribunal is required to characterize as 
reasonable or unreasonable. That leaves no scope for 
the tribunal considering whether, if the employer
111
had acted differently, he might have dismissed the
employee. It is what the employer did that is to be
judged, not what he might have done. On the other
hand, in judging whether what the employer did was
reasonable it is right to consider what a reasonable
employer would have had in mind at the time he
decided to dismiss as the consequence of not
4Qconsulting or not warning.”
Apart from the procedural defects of dismissal, to 
determine whether the employer acted reasonably, the 
tribunal has to consider all the circumstances of the 
case including the employer's business needs, the nature 
and the size of the business on the one hand, and the 
employee’s length of service, previous behaviour, work 
performance, the possibilities of improvement or 
repetition, and the like. However, as mentioned above, 
the tribunals should determine the case under the so- 
called 'band of reasonableness’ test, which means that 
dismissal is unfair only if no reasonable employer would 
have dismissed the employee.
5.2. JAPAN
3.2.1. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
In Japan, a contract of employment for an indefinite 
term may be terminated at any time by either party’s with 
two w e e k s ’ notice under the C i v i 1 C o d e , s.627 ( 1 ). 
However, Section 20 of the Labour Standard Law 1947 
(L.S.L.) enacted under the new Constitut ion provides:
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"When the employer wants to dismiss the employee, he must 
give at least 30 days advance notice. The employer who 
does not give 30 days notice in advance shall pay money 
equivalent to 30 days average wages or more." Section 114 
also provides that, where an employer violates this 
provision, a court, pursuant to the request of an 
employee, may order the employer to pay, in addition to 
the unpaid portion of the amount owed, an additional 
payment of an identical amount. However, if the employer 
has paid that unpaid portion of the amount owed before 
the court makes its decision, the court cannot order an
CO
additional payment.
Exceptions to this notice requirement are where the 
continuance of the enterprise is made impossible by 
reason of some natural calamity or other inevitable 
cause, and where the employer dismisses the employee for 
reasons for which the employee is responsible. In both of 
these cases, the employer must obtain recognition from an 
administrative office regarding the reasons. The courts 
have held however, that the effectiveness of dismissal 
does not depend on the question of whether the employer 
has obtained such recognition from an administrative 
office.
The employer may be punished by penal servitude or 
with a fine where he has not given notice of 30 days or 
more, or where he has not obtained recognition from an 
administrative office for reasons which fall into the
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prescribed exceptions. However, the courts have generally- 
held that the effectiveness of dismissal does not depend 
on the question of whether the employer has obtained such 
recognition from an administrative office.
There was conflict between judicial decisions on the 
effectiveness of dismissal where the employer had not 
given 30 days notice. In the Hosoya Fukuso case, the 
Supreme Court however held that, unless the employer 
insisted on the summary effectiveness of the dismissal, 
the dismissal became effective either when the 30 days 
passed or when the employer paid money equivalent to 30
c 2
days average wages or more (i.e. wages in lieu). 
However, how the court determines whether an employer has 
insisted on the summary effectiveness of dismissal is not 
clear. After the Hosoya Fukuso case, there was at least 
one case in which a court regarded the employer's refusal 
to pay wages as his insistence on the summary
C  ’Z
effectiveness of dismissal. Most courts, however, have 
taken the view that the employer is not usually regarded 
as having insisted on the summary effectiveness of the 
dismissal.
Cases which fall into the two prescribed exceptions 
are very rare. The 'reason of some natural calamity or 
other inevitable cause' only includes, for example, 
factories destroyed by fire, factory collapse by 
earthquake, and the like. The 'reason for which the 
employee is responsible' only includes such grave or
114
wicked conduct that it is unreasonable for the employer 
to be required to give 30 days' notice to the employee.
Section 21 of the L.S.L. excludes the application of 
the minimum notice requirement of Section 20 from the 
following workers:(i) those employed on a daily basis;
(ii) those employed for a fixed term of not longer than 
two months (four months in the case of seasonal workers);
(iii) those working a probationary period. This means 
that the minimum notice period is required for dismissal 
from a fixed term contract intended to last longer than 
two months (four months in the case of seasonal workers).
Section 21 further provides that the application of 
the minimum notice requirement is not excluded where 
workers coming under (i) have been employed for more than 
one month, where workers coming under (ii) have been 
employed for longer than two months (four months in the 
case of seasonal workers) or where those under (iii) have 
been employed for more than 14 days. There are two 
conceivable cases in which workers coming under (ii) 
would have been employed for longer than the contract 
period originally envisaged: (a) where the worker
continues to work after the expiration of the contract 
period without the employer's objection; (b) where the 
worker and the employer agree to renew the contract. 
Section 20, rather than Section 21, applies in the case 
of (a) since the Civil Code, s.629 provides that the 
employer is presumed to have entered into a contract of
115
an indefinite term.
There is some disagreement among academics as to 
whether the minimum notice requirement applies to the 
expiration of the contract period after the renewal in 
the case of (b) . Academics of the negative view argue 
that Sections 20 and 21 deal only with dismissal and not 
with termination of a contract caused by the expiry of a 
fixed term. However, most academics agree with the view 
that the minimum notice requirement should apply to the 
expiry of a fixed term contract where such a contract has 
been maintained on the premise that they are to be 
automatically renewed unless either party gives notice of 
non-renewal.
Besides the L.S.L., ss. 20 and 21, several statutes 
prohibit dismissals for reasons relating to (i) 
membership of a labour union; (ii) pregnancy or 
childbirth, and child-care leave; (iii) assertion of 
statutory rights under the L.S.L. The prohibition of 
dismissal for (i) and (ii) will be examined in Chapter
7.1.2. and Chapter 7.2.3. As far as dismissal for (iii) 
is concerned, the L.S.L., s. 104 provides that an employer 
should not dismiss or otherwise treat in a 
disadvantageous manner a worker by reason of the worker 
having made a report to the administrative office or to a 
labour standards inspector on a violation of the L.S.L. 
or of an ordinance issued pursuant to it.
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3.2.2. ABUSIVE DISMISSAL
Japan has not enacted special statutory provisions 
requiring justification for dismissal although there 
have been demands for, and discussions concerning, the 
enactment of such provisions. The regulation of dismissal 
has, however, been developed by courts applying the 
principle of the abuse of rights as provided for by 
Section 1 of the Civil Code. However, it should be noted 
that although the asserting party should usually have to 
bear the burden of proving the other party’s abuse, this 
is not the case in the doctrine of the abuse of the 
employer’s right of dismissal. According to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in the Nihon Salt Company case, ”if 
dismissal is found to be without any rational reason and 
not to be permissible with regard to the common sense of 
society, such dismissal is void because of abuse of the 
employer's right of dismissal.”
The courts have also been very reluctant to find 
dismissal valid unless the reason for it is very serious 
with regard to all the circumstances. A leading case is 
the Supreme Court’s decision in the Kochi Broadcasting 
Company case. In this case, the company dismissed the 
plaintiff, an announcer, who overslept and missed his ten 
minute news programme on two occasions within two weeks. 
As a result, the news broadcast was canceled on one 
occasion and shortened on the other. The Supreme Court 
recognized: that the cancellation and shortening of the
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news broadcast caused by the plaintiff's oversleeping 
were, in their nature, damaging to the social credibility 
of the company; that the same kind of failure twice in 
two weeks showed his lack of responsibility as an 
announcer; that the plaintiff had not plainly 
acknowledged his failure in the second case. 
Nevertheless, the Court held that the plaintiff's 
dismissal was too harsh a measure for the following 
reasons: the plaintiff had not been intentionally or 
maliciously absent on the two occasions and had no other 
cases of misconduct; his work record was not particularly 
bad; the plaintiff apologized immediately after his first 
failure and eventually seriously apologized for his 
second failure. Moreover, a news writer also staying in 
the station's lodging house was merely reprimanded for 
oversleeping and failing in his duty to wake up the 
announcer. In view of these facts, the Supreme Court held 
that the appellate court was entitled to rule the 
dismissal void. The Court stated as follows:
"(The announcer's failure in his duty comes into the 
category of an 'ordinary dismissal' prescribed in 
the shugyo kisoku of the company)...But even where 
there is the reason of 'ordinary dismissal', the 
employer is not necessarily entitled to dismiss the 
employee for that reason. Even in such a case, the 
dismissal is void because of the abuse of the 
employer's right to dismiss where it is regarded to
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be considerably unreasonable in the circumstances of 
the case and therefore is not permissible with 
regard to social norms... In this case, it may well 
be considered that the dismissal is not permissible 
with regard to social justice.”
The Kochi Broadcasting Company case has been 
regarded as a leading case for judicial standards in 
determining whether a dismissal is abusive or not. The 
case is important not only in order to understand the 
Japanese standard for determining the abusiveness of 
dismissal but also to understand the position of the 
burden of proof in abusive dismissal litigation. 
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in the Kochi 
Broadcasting Company case, it is generally considered 
that unless the employer proves a permissible reason for 
dismissal, the dismissal will be held to be abusive and 
therefore void. Thus, the employer bears the burden of 
proving of a permissible reason for dismissal. Once the
c 7
employer discharges his burden, the employee will take 
on bear the burden of proving that the dismissal is still 
impermissible with regard to social norms according to 
the circumstances of the case.
Furthermore, the employer is required to prove the 
facts to substantiate his reasons for dismissal while 
British legislation only requires the employer to prove 
that he genuinely believed his reasons actually exist. 
Shugyo kisoku plays a very important role where the court
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has determined the effectiveness of dismissal. It is 
therefore necessary to explain shugyo kisoku and its 
legal status. Shugyo kisoku is a set of works rules which 
is given a special legal status. The L.S.L. requires the 
employer to draw up shugyo kisoku on specific items
c p
concerning conditions of employment, to consult a 
labour union organizing a majority of employees or a
c q
representative of a majority of employees, to submit
the shugyo kisoku to the administrative office along with
the union’s or representative's opinion, and to inform
the employees of it by displaying or posting it in
r nconspicuous places.
Shugyo kisoku is submitted to the administrative 
office which is authorized to order changes to it if it 
does not accord with laws and ordinances or any 
collective agreement between the union and the employer.
Section 93 further provides: "A contract of employment
which stipulates conditions inferior to the standard
fixed in shugyo kisoku is invalid as far as such
conditions are concerned. Conditions which become invalid 
are replaced by the standard fixed in the shugyo 
kisoku."
However, besides the legal effect given by Section 
93, there has been controversy over whether stipulations 
of shugyo kisoku generally have normative effects or only 
constitute contractual terms of employment. In the 
Shuhoku Bus case (in 1968), the Supreme Court stated as
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follows: "We think that the employer is usually not
entitled to deprive the employees of their vested rights 
or to impose unfavourable working conditions by 
unilaterally forming or changing shugyo kisoku. We think 
nevertheless that as long as the stipulations of shugyo 
kisoku are reasonable, employees are not entitled to 
refuse to comply with them on the grounds of their 
differences since shugyo kisoku aims to determine the 
terms and conditions of employment collectively and 
uniformly
This ruling is quite incomprehensible despite
stating that the contents of the shugyo kisoku are
binding if they are reasonable. Therefore, academic
opinion is still divided on the question of whether the
Supreme Court’s decision suggested that shugyo kisoku in
itself has normative effect. Some influential academics
argue that the Supreme Court in the Shuhoku Bus case
treated shugyo kisoku as a sort of standard form 
R ?contract. However, irrespective of whether it has 
normative effect or only becomes binding through the 
explicit or implicit agreement of employees, the courts 
have generally held that stipulations of shugyo kisoku 
concerning dismissal have a restrictive effect on 
dismissal.
It has to be pointed out that there are two 
different types of dismissal in Japanese industries: 
ordinary dismissal and ’punitive dismissal’. An ordinary
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dismissal is coincidental with 'dismissal* in usual
terms. But a 'punitive dismissal' is a special sort of
dismissal which is carried out as a punishment for the
employee's wrongdoing in order to maintain discipline
fi ^within an enterprise. An important characteristic of 
'punitive dismissal* is that the employee usually loses 
part or all of his retirement allowance along with his 
employment. This loss has a significant impact on the 
livelihood of both the employee himself and his family 
since the retirement allowance is usually quite a large 
sum.
Most Japanese companies provide for 'punitive 
dismissal* in their shugyo k i s o k u . The majority of 
employment contracts provide that the company will pay a 
fair amount of retirement allowance as an incentive for 
continuous service and good discipline. Thus, the amount 
of retirement allowance generally depends on the 
employee's base wage, length of employment and reason for 
retirement. In general, the longer the employee's 
duration of employment, the higher the amount of 
retirement allowance he is entitled to obtain. For 
example, in a chemical manufacturing company employing 
about 1,500 workers, the Regulations for Retirement 
Allowances drawn up under the shugyo kisoku provide that 
a retirement allowance will be paid to an employee in the 
following cases: (i)where he retired at the mandatory 
retirement age; (ii) where he retires or is dismissed
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because he becomes unfit for work due to mental 
disability, injury or illness; (iii) where he died; (iv) 
where he retires for his own personal reasons; (v) where 
he retires or is dismissed due to unavoidable 
circumstances. The sum payable as a retirement allowance 
is smaller under reason (iv) than in other cases. The 
Regulations for Retirement Allowances provide the 
following table indicating how retirement allowances are 
calculated.
TABLE 1. AN EXAMPLE OF A COMPANY1S RETIREMENT
ALLOWANCES SCHEME
Duration of Service Figures to be multiplied
by monthly base wage
[reason (iv)] [other reasons]
more than 3 years 1.9 3.1
more than 4 years 2.5 4.2
more than 10 years 6.7 11.1
more than 20 years 19.5 24.4
more than 25 years 28.7 31.9
more than 30 years 40.0 40.0
What is most important here is that the Regulations 
for Retirement Allowances clearly provide that an 
employee who is subject to a ’punitive dismissal’ action 
is not entitled to a retirement allowance. In fact, most 
companies have similar provisions under the shugyo kisoku 
or collective agreements. These provisions have generally
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been accepted by the courts, who maintain that the right
to retirement allowance does not accrue bit by bit
throughout the period of employment but accrues at the
time of termination of employment. The amount is
determined by the standard stipulated in the shugyo
ki soku according to the degree of the e m p l o y e e ’s
contribution to the company which is squarely calculated
by the employee’s duration of service, the manner of
termination, and the cause of termination. Thus, a
reduction in the level of retirement allowance because of
’punitive dismissal’ is not the same as a reduction of
the acquired right. Reduction of the retirement allowance
for ’punitive dismissal' is therefore permissible except
where the consequences of the reduction are so harsh that
they constitute violation of ’public policy and good 
fi Rmorals’. In comparison with British and American 
employers, Japanese employers have a very effective 
additional disciplinary measure in ’punitive dismissal’.
The causes behind an ordinary dismissal are normally 
to be stipulated in shugyo kisoku since matters 
concerning termination of employment are among those 
which the L.S.L. requires the employer to state in 
shugyo kisoku. There have been two different judicial 
views on the effectiveness of an ordinary dismissal made 
for a reason which is not specifically mentioned in 
shugyo kisoku. A small number have held that stipulated 
causes for dismissal should not be construed to be
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exclusive. For example, in the Hitachi Seisaku.jo case,
the Mito District Court stated that "generally speaking,
it is rather exceptional that the employer himself
restricts causes of dismissal to those listed in shugyo
kisoku. It should be construed that the employer can
still dismiss the employee where the employee has
committed such serious misconduct that the employer is
entitled to ’punitive dismissal' action against him for 
fi fiit." However, the Supreme Court made it clear that 
causes of dismissal should be restricted to those listed 
in shugyo kisoku. In the Toshiba Yanagimachi case, the 
Supreme Court stated as follow:
"Where causes of dismissal are explicitly listed in 
shugyo kisoku, dismissal of an employee is regarded 
as an application of the rules provided by shugyo 
ki soku. Therefore, the effectiveness of the 
dismissal should be judged on whether the employer 
has one of the reasons for dismissal listed in
fi Vshugyo kisoku."
However, a clause in shugyo kisoku stipulating 
causes for dismissal usually provides that any matter as 
serious as those stipulated shall be a cause for 
dismissal. Therefore, even if the stipulated matters are 
construed as the only causes for which the employer can 
lawfully dismiss the employee, it loses much importance 
if a court widely construes the meaning of such an 
additional clause. However, even if such a clause is
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widely construed, a court may have difficulty in 
concluding that dismissal is not abusive according to the 
standard adopted by the Supreme Court in the Kochi 
Broadcasting Company case (Supra.).
In addition, some shugyo kisoku require advance 
consultation with or consent from the union about 
dismissal. In such cases, the courts have denied the 
legal effectiveness of dismissal carried out without
fi fiadvance consultation with or consent from the union. It 
should be pointed out that procedural aspects are also 
taken into consideration in determining whether a 
dismissal is an abuse of the employer's right to dismiss.
As far as 'punitive dismissal' is concerned, it is 
totally unreasonable that the employer, without any 
justification, should have the power to deprive the 
employee of his retirement allowance. Thus, it is 
generally considered that, unless there is clear 
authorization for 'punitive dismissal' in some form, no 
'punitive dismissal' may take place. The Tokyo High Court 
held in the Yosho Centre case that "the employer is 
entitled to dismiss the employee on a 'punitive 
dismissal' only where a statutory provision, a shugyo 
kisoku or an agreement between the employer and the 
employee, provides for what types of conduct on the part 
of employees can be subject to a 'punitive dismissal.' 
Thus, it is not acceptable that when an employer employs 
a worker the employer automatically obtains the power to
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CQ
order a ’punitive dismissal’ against him.’
In practice, most enterprises have stipulations 
concerning ’punitive dismissal’ in their shugyo kisoku or 
collective agreements. Those stipulations prescribe 
'punitive dismissal' as only one of several disciplinary 
actions. Other disciplinary actions usually include 
reprimand, reduction of earnings, cancellation of 
regular pay rises, and suspension and demotion. Sometimes 
the reasons for 'punitive dismissal’ are not stated 
independently of those for other disciplinary actions. 
Even if the reasons for 'punitive d i s m i s s a l ’ are 
independently specified, there is often a stipulation 
such as "the action may be reduced to suspension in 
certain circumstances.’ In addition to a list of causes 
for ’punitive dismissal’, there is often a general clause 
stating that ’disciplinary action shall be taken against 
the employee where he has committed conduct similar to 
the above-listed conduct in nature.”
The courts have been very careful in considering 
whether a particular type of conduct of the employee 
falls into the category of conduct which shugyo kisoku 
intended to include as a cause for a 'punitive 
dismissal’. For example, the Tokyo High Court held in the 
Mine Kogyo case that "even where there is a type of 
conduct which could lead to 'punitive dismissal', 
'punitive dismissal' can be justified only if there are 
no mitigating circumstances and no prospects of the
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employee’s repentance, or if the conduct is so grave or
vicious that it would be difficult to maintain the
discipline of the enterprise without exercising ’punitive
dismissal.’”^
Even if there is a type of conduct which constitutes
one of those stipulated by shugyo kisoku as a cause for
’punitive dismissal’, the courts have further determined
whether the ’punitive dismissal’ is abusive in certain
circumstances. Thus, the Supreme Court held in the
Daihatsu Kogyo case that, "We think that the employer's
disciplinary action is void because of abuse of the
employer's right, where it is found to be without any
rational basis and not to be permissible with regard to
social norms, having regard to the circumstances of the 
71case." This ruling is basically the same as that of the
Supreme Court on the effectiveness of an ordinary
dismissal as described above.
It should be examined whether the employer is
entitled to allege any reason other than the one which he
indicated to the employee at the time of dismissal. There
are several cases in which the courts have considered
whether the employer was obliged to give the employee a
reason for 'punitive d i s m i s s a l ’ (or an ordinary
dismissal) at the time of the dismissal. For an ordinary
dismissal, many courts stated that it was not essential
for the employer to give the employee a reason for 
7 ?dismissal and, therefore, that the employer was
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entitled to allege a reason other than that indicated to
7the employee at the time of dismissal. Some courts
further stated that the employer was entitled to rely on
a reason of which he was not aware at the time of the
7 4dismissal, if it existed at the time. However, some
courts stated that the court should determine whether the
reason for the dismissal alleged by the employer actually
existed based only on the facts of which the employer was
7 Raware when the dismissal took place. Some courts also
stated that a reason undisclosed at the time of the
dismissal was prima facie one which the employer himself
was not aware of, and, therefore, that it may not be an
effective means of defence against the e m p l o y e e ’s
7 fiallegation of abuse of the employer’s right to dismiss.
It has been held that ’punitive dismissal'
constituted abuse of the employer’s right when he did not
give any reason to the employee at the time of the 
7 7dismissal. However, it is generally considered that,
even in a case of ’punitive dismissal', non-disclosure of
the reason for it does not automatically make ’punitive
dismissal' void by reason of abuse of the employer's 
78right. However, many courts considered that, in order
to determine the abusiveness of ’punitive dismissal', the
court could take into consideration only matters which
7Qthe employer knew of at the time of dismissal.
Provisions in shugyo kisoku often not only prescribe 
causes for disciplinary action but also the proper
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procedures which the employer should follow in taking 
disciplinary action. Shugyo kisoku sometimes stipulates 
as follows: "Disciplinary action shall be decided through 
consultation with the Reward and Punishment Committee"; 
"Disciplinary action shall be decided through the 
decision of the Reward and Punishment Committee"; "The 
employee shall be given an opportunity to explain his 
case before the Committee for Discipline"; "The employee 
shall be given an opportunity to appeal against the 
decision of the Committee for Discipline".
The court has generally held that if there is a 
grave departure from the prescribed procedure, it makes 
the 'punitive dismissal' void. For example, in the Tohoku 
Nissan Electronics case in which the employer exercised 
'punitive dismissal' against an employee without giving 
him the opportunity to explain his case as was required 
by the shugyo kisoku, the district court stated that "the 
'punitive dismissal', with regard to the employer's 
failure in complying with the procedure prescribed by the 
shugyo kisoku, was void unless the failure was so 
trifling that it would make no difference to the 
result.
In the Osawa Seisaku.jo case, where the employer 
decided upon 'punitive dismissal' without allowing the 
Reward and Punishment Committee to reach any conclusions, 
the court held as follows: "The Reward and Punishment 
Committee is not a consultative committee but decision
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making machinery... It is clear that the Committee has 
been established to prevent the company from making an 
arbitrary decision and to make a just decision on reward 
and punishment. Thus, where disciplinary action, 
especially ’punitive dismissal’ which deprives a worker 
of his status as an employee, is not based on the 
decision of the Committee, it is void unless there is an
O 1
exceptional circumstance.”
There are, however, many cases where the court has 
held that ’punitive dismissal' is not void because of the 
existence of an exceptional circumstance. In the Nihon 
Tanko case, for example, the 'punitive dismissal’ was 
held not to be void since the committee members from the 
union did not attend the disciplinary committee and had
o 2
it postponed without giving any reason. Moreover, there 
are several cases where the court has held that the 
Reward and Punishment Committee was only a consultative 
committee which required the employer to make careful 
decisions on disciplinary matters and therefore that the 
employer might decide on a ’punitive dismissal' without
O  "Z
abiding by the Committee’s decision. These cases seem 
to suggest that it depends on the courts' interpretation 
of a particular shugyo kisoku as to whether compliance 
with a particular procedure is a necessary condition of 
making a ’punitive dismissal’ valid.
Even if there is no special provision about 
disciplinary procedures in shugyo k i s o k u , it is
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conceivable that a ’punitive dismissal’, ordered without
giving an employee an opportunity to explain his case,
may be invalid because the lack of fundamental procedural
fairness in determining a disciplinary action constituted
abuse of the employer's right to discipline. Yet, there
are no reported cases where a court found a 'punitive
dismissal' to be abusive on the basis of lack of
procedural fairness alone. One court held that 'punitive
dismissal' was abusive where an employer dismissed his
employee without giving him an opportunity to defend
84himself on the day following his act of violence. In 
this case, the court however considered that procedural 
defect to be only one of many factors combining to make 
the dismissal abusive. Indeed, the court found that the 
employer had intentionally harassed the employee by 
frequently ordering him on unnecessary business trips in 
order to compel him to resign, and that the employee’s 
act of violence was merely a pretext for dismissal.
The legal situation is very similar in cases of an 
ordinary dismissal. However, many shugyo kisoku provide 
for prior consultation or an employee's opportunity to 
defend his case as a requirement only for 'punitive 
dismissal’ but not for ordinary dismissal. Accordingly, 
there are cases in which the court has held that ordinary 
dismissal action should not be used as a means of evading 
the procedural requirements of ’punitive dismissal’
p c
action. It is noticeable that there have been no
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reported cases in which the court held that a dismissal 
was abusive solely because an employee was not given a 
warning against his misconduct.
As was seen in the Kochi Broadcasting Company case, 
in order to hold dismissal valid, the court has to find 
that there was a rational basis for dismissal and also 
that it was reasonable for the employer to have dismissed 
the employee with regard to the circumstances of the 
case. The courts have generally taken into consideration 
the following factors: the size and type of the company, 
the position which the company occupies in the economic 
community, the nature and extent of damages, the nature 
of the employee’s misconduct, the extent of the 
employee’s repentance after committing misconduct, the 
employee’s history of misconduct or work-performance, the 
employee’s occupation and position in the company and a 
comparison with disciplinary measures taken against other 
employees for the same and similar misconduct. In doing 
so, it is fair to say that the court has taken into 
consideration every aspect which may favour dismissed
O  Cj
workers.
In addition a court may also consider the employee’s 
general prospects of finding equivalent employment when 
determining abusiveness of dismissal. Thus, in the 
Margaret Beauty Parlor case, the court stated as follows: 
’The principle of abuse of the employer’s right to 
dismiss is established for the purpose of the employee's
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protection. Even if the beauty specialist is dismissed, 
she usually will not have difficulty in finding a job at 
another parlor because of an absolute shortage of beauty 
specialists. Therefore, from the point of view of the 
employee’s protection, a beauty specialist should not
o 7
treated in the same way as other sorts of employee.”
5.3. The UNITED STATES88
Most courts in the United States began to adopt the 
rule of employment-at-will by the last quarter of the 
19th century. Under this rule, indefinite employment is
o q
prima facie employment-at-will. The employer can 
terminate the employment at any time, without incurring 
liability, ’for any cause, good or bad, or without
q n
cause." This harsh common law rule had not been 
challenged in any state until relatively recently, but it 
has gradually been eroded by judicial decisions in 
several states (especially California) since the 1950s. 
As a result, in most states, a discharged employee can 
recover damages in certain circumstances based on various 
theories. In this section, therefore, we will examine 
judicial decisions in several states to see how the 
courts have reformed the rule of employment-at-wi 11 . 
Judicial decisions concerning the contract theory of 
wrongful discharge will first be considered.
Contract Theory
As employment-at-will rule became prevalent, many
134
courts started to hold that, even if an employer promised
that he would permanently employ an employee or would not
discharge him without reasonable cause, such a promise
was not legally binding because permanent employment was
also indefinite employment. The courts, however, have
ruled that a promise of permanent employment is
enforceable where an employee had given independent
q i
consideration for that promise.
The legitimacy of such a requirement became 
questionable since the principles of American contract 
law do not require consideration to be economically
q o
adequate for a promise. It cannot be said that it is
only a promise to pay a wage but not a promise both to
pay a wage and to refrain from arbitrary discharge that
q -z
can be bargained for a promise to render service. 
Moreover, the proposition that employment without 
independent consideration is employment-at-wi 11 is 
contrary to the essence of contract theory that the 
contents of a contract are determined by the free 
agreement of its parties.
In California, an appellate court has held that a 
contract for permanent employment, even without 
independent consideration, cannot be terminated at the 
will of the employer if it contains an express or implied 
condition to the contrary.^ An implied condition that 
the employer would not discharge at will was found by an 
appellate court in a later case in California. In Pugh v.
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q c
See's Candies, Inc., Pugh who began working for the 
company washing pots and pans, became a vice president in 
1971 following several promotions and was appointed to 
the board of directors of a subsidiary to the company "in 
recognition of his accomplishments". The following year 
he received a gold watch from the company "in 
appreciation of 31 years of loyal service". However, in 
1973, Pugh was suddenly discharged without reason. When 
Pugh first went to work for the company, the then 
president frequently told him : "If you are loyal to the 
company and do a good job, your future is secure." Since 
then, the company has operated a policy of not 
terminating the employment of administrative personnel 
except for good cause. The trial court granted the 
defendant's motion for nonsuit.
The appellate court reversed this ruling: "The
presumption that an employment contract is intended to be 
terminated at will is subject, like any presumption, to 
contrary evidence.... 11 is settled that contracts of 
employment in California are terminable only for good 
cause if....the parties agreed, expressly or implicitly, 
that the employee could be terminated only for good 
cause....In determining whether there exists an implied- 
in-fact promise for some form of continued employment 
courts have considered a variety of factors in addition 
to the existence of independent consideration. These have 
included, for example, the personnel policies or
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practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of 
service, actions or communications by the employer 
reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the 
practices of the industry in which the employee is 
engaged.
Finally, the implied contract theory was confirmed 
by the Supreme Court of California in Foley v . 
Interactive Data Corp. The Supreme Court held that a 
presumption of at-will employment was rebuttable, 
stating: "This presumption may, however, be overcome by
evidence that despite the absence of a specific term, the 
parties agreed that the employer's power to terminate 
would be limited in some way, e.g., by a requirement that 
termination be based only on 'good cause'." Responding to 
the defendant's argument that evidential factors were 
inadequate as a matter of law in this case, the court 
then stated: "Length of employment is a relevant
consideration but six years and nine months is sufficient 
time for conduct to occur in which a judge could find the 
existence of an implied contract...(The) plaintiff here 
alleged repeated oral assurances of job security and 
consistent promotions, salary increases and bonuses 
during the term of his employment contributing to his 
reasonable expectation that he would not be discharged 
except for good cause. ...(A)n allegation of breach of 
written "termination guidelines" implying self-imposed 
limitations on the employer's power to discharge at will
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may be sufficient to state a cause of action for breach
Q7of an employment contract.”
After the Pugh case, courts in many states started 
to recognize some form of implied contract exception to 
the well-established rule of employment-at-will. It was 
reported that forty-one states had recognized such an
q p
exception by 1992. u However, most of the cases where 
courts found that there was an implied contract of 
employment security were those where an employee manual 
stated that just cause or a proper procedure should be 
required for discharge. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
qq
Shield of Michigan in the state of Michigan was one of 
these cases.
The plaintiff was employed by the defendant company 
in a middle management position for five years before he 
was discharged. In the course of a conversation during 
which he inquired about job security, he was handed a 
manual of Blue Cross personnel policies which reinforced 
the oral assurance of job security. It stated that the 
disciplinary procedures applied to all Blue Cross 
employees who had completed their probationary period and 
that it was the "policy” of the company to release 
employees "for just cause only". He brought an action 
against the defendant company claiming that the discharge 
violated their employment agreements which permitted 
discharge only with cause. A verdict awarding damages was 
rendered in favour of the plaintiff by the jury but was
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reversed by the Court of Appeals. Finally, the Supreme 
Court of Michigan reinstated the jury verdict.
The Court's statement in Blue Cross indicates that a 
policy statement of employment security may be 
enforceable as part of an employment contract if it 
becomes known to the employee before discharge. The Court 
reasoned this by stating: "While an employer need not 
establish personnel policies or practices, where an 
employer chooses to establish such policies and practices 
and makes them known to its employees, the employment 
relationship is presumably enhanced."100 This means that 
the employer's representation is an offer of a unilateral 
contract which becomes enforceable upon continuation of 
regular employment duties by the employee.*^1
In addition to the unilateral contract analysis, it 
should be pointed out that there are some courts which 
have made personnel policy manuals binding through the 
use of promissory estoppel. In Jones v. East Center for 
Community Mental Health, after hiring, the employee was 
given a personnel manual which provided for just cause 
for termination and termination procedure. The Court of 
Appeals of Ohio held that the promise contained in the 
manual was not an enforceable contract because there was 
no consideration or mutuality of obligation. The Court 
however stated: "Applying the doctrine of promissory
estoppel to this case, I find that reasonable minds could 
conclude only that [the employer's] personnel manual,
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when coupled with the suspension memo which [the
employee] received, constituted a set of promises (or
promissory representations) which [the company] should
have reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance
on [the employee’s] part, and which did so induce action
1 f i?or forbearance. ’
Therefore, it can be said that in most states the 
courts may construe the policies for job security which 
are declared in personnel manuals or employees' handbooks 
as having binding force. Accordingly, employers started 
to insert into their personnel manuals a disclaimer that 
the policies spelled out in the manual did not have
1 fi T
binding force. Yet, in Dalton v. Herbruck Egg Sales 
Corporation, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated: ’Where 
a policy manual provides both a 'for cause’ termination 
policy and a terminable at will policy, the question 
whether an employment contract with a just cause 
termination policy has been formed is a question of fact 
to be resolved by the jury.”1^4
Many employers also began to include disclaimers in 
the employment application, but the California Court of
1 fi c
Appeal, in McLain v. Great American Insurance C o . , 
allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of an implied 
contract whereby the employment could only be terminated 
for just cause. The Court held that an employment 
application form which provided that employment could be 
terminated with or without cause was not an integrated
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agreement because the application was a standardized 
form. It did not cover either the employee's salary or 
position, it did not contain an integration clause and it 
stated that the terms and conditions could be changed at
any time by the employer.
Under contract theory, once the court has found that
there is an express or implied contract that dismissal
will only occur for just cause, it will examine whether
the employer has just cause for dismissing the employee.
Where personnel policy manual has provisions on
termination of employment, the language of the manual
will be referred to to construe what constitutes just
cause. However, even then, the provisions can not be
expected to define just cause unambiguously. Therefore,
it is necessary for courts to develop standards for what
constitutes just cause. In order to understand the
meaning of just cause, W.J.Holloway and M . J .Leech
examined recent cases that explore the nuances of each
part of the definition under the following categories of
just cause: reduction in workforce; failure to satisfy
agreed standards of performance; conduct reflecting
unfavourably upon the employer; intoxication; personality
problems and disruptive conduct; a crime against the
employer; punctuality and unauthorized absence;
insubordination; disloyalty; false information given on
1 n  fiemployment application form. Obviously, however,
whether these actually justify dismissal or not will
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depend on the circumstances of each case.
Theory of Public Policy
Even where there is not an explicit or implicit
promise that an employee shall not be discharged except
for just cause, many courts have held that the employee
may sue the employer. These claims may be based on
violations of public policy, the implied-covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of mental
distress and so on. According to the Individual
1 07Employment Rights Manual, it was reported that thirty- 
four states had recognized the public policy exception. A 
pioneer decision for the public policy exception was made 
by the appellate court of California in Peterman v.
1 no
International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Even though 
this decision was concerned only with California state 
law, it has been cited by courts in many other states as 
a leading case. It was held in Peterman that discharge 
from employment because of the employee's refusal to 
commit a crime prohibited by the penal code was contrary 
to public policy and therefore that the discharged 
employee might seek accrued salary from the time of his 
discharge.
However, Californian courts in later cases have 
interpreted the ruling in the Pet e rman case as 
establishing a general principle that the employer's 
right to discharge the employee shall be limited by
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1 DQconsideration of public policy. . Thus, even if there 
is no explicit declaration of public policy, the public 
policy exception may still be applied to a discharge if 
allowing such a discharge would substantially undermine 
the public policy arguments behind certain statutory 
provisions. For example, in Hentzel v. Singer Co., the 
appellate court stated: " It required little analysis to 
perceive that the legislative purpose underlying these 
provisions (concerning occupational safety and health 
standard in the California Labor Code) would be 
substantially undermined if employers were permitted to 
discharge employees simply for protesting about working 
conditions which they reasonably believe constitute a 
hazard to their own health or safety, or health or safety 
of others."1
Laws of wrongful discharge based on public policy 
have been recognized in many states other than 
California. Most of these states are unwilling to affirm 
the existence of public policies without statutory 
support. However, in Illinois, the Supreme Court stated: 
"There is no public policy more important or more 
fundamental than the one favoring the effective 
protection of the lives and property of citizens. ...Nor 
specific constitutional or statutory provision requires a 
citizen to take an active part in the ferreting out and 
prosecution of crime, but public policy nevertheless 
favors citizen crime-fighters....Public policy favors
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Palmateerrs conduct in volunteering information to the 
law-enforcement agency. Once the possibility of crime was 
reported, Palmateer was under a statutory duty to 
further assist officials when requested to do so. Public 
policy thus also favors Palmateerfs agreement to assist 
in the investigation and prosecution of the suspected 
crime. The foundation of the tort of retaliatory 
discharge lies in the protection of public policy, and 
there is a clear public policy favoring investigation and 
prosecution of criminal offenses."***
As seen above, the law of wrongful discharge based 
on public policy has been recognized in many other 
states. However, there are still states where the courts 
are not willing to recognize the public policy exception 
to the traditional rule of employment-at-wi 11 . For 
example, in Martin v. Platt, the appellate court of 
Indiana explained the reason why they would not recognize 
the public policy exception as follows: "Normally, of
course, the determination of what constitutes public 
policies or which of competing public policies should be 
given precedence, is a function of the legislature. Even 
if we were to exercise our power in this regard, what 
would be the measure of actual damages? If the employment 
could be truly terminated at any time for no reason at 
all, how would one carry the burden of proving more than 
nominal damages? It appears to us that the practical 
remedy would come, then, from recovering punitive
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damages. Such damages are allowable for reasons of public 
policy. We would thus create an action based upon an 
undeclared public policy where the measure of damages was 
governed only by the same source. We decline the 
opportunity to do so. Such broad determinations should be 
left for the legislature."11^
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that 
regulation of dismissal through the theory of public 
policy is widespread in most state jurisdictions. 
However, there is some disagreement among states as to 
how widely the public policy exception to dismissal at 
will should be applied, since the application of a public 
policy exception may result in awards of punitive 
damages.
Theory of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
In addition to implied contract and public policy 
exceptions, Californian courts have recognized the 
implied covenant exception. This exception had been
1 1 7
recognized by thirteen states by 1988. However, there 
has been disagreement over the nature and effect of the 
implied covenant exception among these states. California 
is not the first state to recognize breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a cause of 
action for wrongful discharge. The pioneer case for that 
was Monge v. Beebe Rubber Company in which the plaintiff 
requested a transfer to a press machine at a higher wage. 
The foreman suggested that she would have to be nice to
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him if she wanted the job. She was transferred to a 
degreaser machine at a much lower wage after she refused 
to go out with him. She testified that the foreman also 
harassed and ridiculed her in other ways. She was finally 
discharged. She sued for breach of an employment contract 
for an indefinite period of time. Trial by jury resulted 
in a verdict for the plaintiff and a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the fact that the verdict was denied. On 
appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court sustained the 
trial court's denial of the motion.
The Supreme Court stated: "In all employment
contracts, whether at will or for a definite term, the 
employer's interest in running his business as he sees 
fit must be balanced against the interest of the employee 
in maintaining his employment, and the public's interest 
in maintaining a proper balance between the two. ...We 
hold that a termination by the employer of a contract of 
employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or 
malice or based on retaliation is not in the best 
interest of the economic system or the public good and 
constitutes a breach of the employment contract."114
This ruling has potential to displace the rule of 
employment-at-will depending on how widely "bad faith" is 
defined. However, within the jurisdiction on New 
Hampshire, no cases have ever been reported in which the 
possibility has become reality. Monge is an example of a 
case in which the court recognized a breach of the
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implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a 
cause of action in contract. However, some courts in 
Montana and California have instead recognized it as a 
cause of action in tort.
In Montana, the leading case is Gates v. Life Mont. 
Ins. Co. . In this case, the plaintiff was employed as a 
cashier under an oral contract of indefinite duration. 
About three years later, she was suddenly given the 
option of resigning or being discharged by her 
supervisor, Mr. S. In a distraught condition and under 
duress she signed a letter of resignation. The plaintiff 
brought an action to recover damages for breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in an 
at-will employment contract. The Supreme Court reversed 
the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and returned the 
case to the trial court with directions to reinstate the 
award of punitive damages. The Supreme Court stated: "An
action for breach of an implied covenant of fair dealing, 
at first blush, may sound both in contract and tort. The 
duty arises out of the employment relationship yet the 
duty exists apart from, and in addition to, any terms 
agreed to by the parties.... Breach of the duty owed to 
deal fairly and in good faith in the employment 
relationship is a tort for which punitive damages can be 
recovered if the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently 
culpable . ’1
In California, the breach of the implied duty of
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good faith and fair dealing in the context of discharge
has been regarded as cause of action in tort as well as a
breach of contract, and therefore the employee might be
awarded punitive damages in addition to compensatory 
1 1 Rdamages. However, in Foley v. Interactive Data
Corporation, the California Supreme Court declared that
tortious damages were not available for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment contracts. Nevertheless, the Court went on to
consider whether the potential effects on an individual
caused by termination of employment justified additional
remedies for certain improper discharges. The Court
stated: " (T)he employment relationship is fundamentally
contractual, and several factors combine to persuade us
that in the absence of legislative direction to the
contrary contractual remedies should remain the sole
available relief for breaches of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in the employment context.
Initially, predictability of the consequences of actions
related to employment contracts is important to
commercial stability. In order to achieve such stability,
it is also important that employers should not be unduly
deprived of discretion to dismiss an employee by the fear
that doing so will give rise to potential tort recovery
in every case. Moreover, it would be difficult if not
impossible to formulate a rule that would assure that
117only ’deserving* cases give rise to tort relief."
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In Montana, the newly-enacted Wrongful Discharge
From Employment Act 1987 has overtaken the remedy under
the theory of an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
118dealing. These movements in California and Montana may 
affect judicial attitudes in other states and if so the 
theory of an implied covenant will be less attractive as 
the source of a possible remedy for employees. Also, some 
states have recently made it clear that an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing only protects an 
employee from a discharge based on an employer's desire
i 1 q
to avoid payment already earned by the employee.
It has become clear that the application of the 
theory of good faith and fair dealing in the setting of 
contracts of employment is narrower than might be 
expected. The decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
in Monge had the potential to substantially negate the 
doctrine of employment-at-will and, as a result, to 
establish legal regulation similar to that under the 
Japanese law of abusive dismissal. It may be thought that 
the court should balance the employer’s interest in 
business and the employee’s interest in employment in 
order to promote the public interest. However, such a 
view has not become popular in subsequent judicial 
pronouncements, even those in the State of New Hampshire. 
Neither has the view that a breach of the duty of good 
faith and fair dealings constitutes a tort been negated 
in most states. Therefore, the significance of the theory
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of good faith and fair dealings in regulating dismissal 
does not seem to carry much weight in comparison with the 
implied contract theory. Nevertheless, it is very 
interesting that an implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealings has been recognized in the United States as 
placing a restraint on the employer’s ability to dismiss 
in bad faith.
Theory of Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress
Some courts recognize a claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress as a cause of action in 
cases of discharge. Until comparatively recently, the 
courts have not recognized such a claim as the basis of 
an action independent of another tort. It had been 
considered that recognizing damages for mental anguish 
itself may ”be open, not only to fictitious claims, but 
to litigation in the field of trivialities and mere bad
1 pn
manners.” However, judicial attitude have changed, 
and the Restatement of Torts (Second) provided as 
follows: "one who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional 
distress to another is subject to liability for such 
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other 
results, for such bodily harm."
An exemplary case is Agis v. Howard Johnson Co.. The 
plaintiff here was employed by the defendant company as a 
waitress in a restaurant. Thefts were taking place at the
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restaurant and the manager told all of the waitresses
that he would be firing them in alphabetical order until
the person responsible was discovered. Accordingly, the
plaintiff was the first to be discharged. Although the
complaint alleged that the defendants' actions had been
intended to cause emotional distress and anguish, the
trial court allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss.
However, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
reversed the judgment and stated as follows: "(W)e hold
that one who, by extreme and outrageous conduct and
without privilege, causes severe emotional distress to
another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress even though no bodily harm may result. However,
in order for a plaintiff to prevail in a case for
liability under this tort, four elements must be
established. It must be shown (l)that the actor intended
to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should
have known that emotional distress was the likely result
of his conduct...; (2)that the conduct was 'extreme and
outrageous', was 'beyond all possible bounds of decency'
and was 'utterly intolerable in a civilized
community',...; (3) that the actions of the defendant
were the cause of the plaintiff's distress,...; and (4)
that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff
was 'severe' and of a nature 'that no reasonable man
121could be expected to endure it.'"
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5.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Before concluding this chapter, it may be convenient 
to identify briefly the different techniques for 
regulating dismissal in the three countries. In Britain, 
dismissal is mainly regulated by tribunals under the 
unfair dismissal legislation, and it is also subject to 
the common law rule of due notice. In addition, the 
contracts contain terms to guarantee job security, the 
courts are increasingly willing to enforce those terms. 
In the United States, there is no general law of 
dismissal at federal level. At state level, Montana is 
the only State which has statutory regulation of 
wrongful dismissal (See Chapter 4.2.2.). Dismissal is 
chiefly regulated by state courts applying common law. 
The courts have relatively recently developed a law of 
wrongful discharge on the basis of various contract or 
tort theories. In Japan, there are no special statutory 
provisions requiring justification for dismissal. 
However, the courts have developed regulation of 
dismissal by applying the principle of abuse of rights 
under the Civil Code on the basis of people's right to 
life and right to work as manifested by the Constitution 
(Arts.25 and 27).
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CHAPTER 4
GENERAL LAW OF DISMISSALS): PROCEDURES AND REMEDIES
This chapter will examine the procedures and 
remedies applicable to dismissals in each country. 
British law will be examined first, followed by Japanese 
law and finally American law.
4.1. BRITAIN
4.1.1. WRONGFUL DISMISSAL1
Remedies for wrongful dismissal are usually limited 
to damages. When an employer dismisses an employee, who 
is employed under a contract of indefinite duration, 
without giving due notice the employee is entitled to the 
net wage which he would have earned if he had been given 
the requisite period of notice. It is assumed that the 
employer would have terminated the contract at the
p
earliest date at which he could properly do so If the 
procedure laid down in employee's contract entitles him 
to a period of consultation or an appeal, the employee is 
entitled to his net wage or salary for such a period, 
beyond the period of notice, during which the procedure 
could have been completed. Where an employer dismissed an 
employee, who is employed under a fixed term contract, 
before the expiry of the term, the employee is entitled 
to the net salary which he would have earned from the 
remaining portion of the contract.^
The courts have looked at the specific contractual
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liabilities of the employer when assessing damages, and 
therefore a discretionary bonus which an employee might 
have received during the notice period is not 
recoverable. However, any commission which an employer 
was contractually obliged to pay to an employee in return
p
for his performance is recoverable. Damages for injured 
feelings caused by the dismissal are not recoverable, 
although damages may exceptionally be awarded for loss of
o
reputation (e.g. to an actor) and for diminished future
q
prospects (e.g. to apprentice).
Damages for loss of income are calculated according
to net income subject to deductions for tax and the
social security contributions which would have been
paid.1  ^ Thus, jobseekers allowance (i.e. previously
unemployment benefit) and income support (i.e. previously
supplementary benefit) are deductible.11 The compensatory
award for unfair dismissal is deductable because it is
1 2designed to replace future earnings. No deductions may 
not be made for statutory redundancy payments, long-term 
occupational sickness or pension benefits, or the basic 
award and additional award available for unfair dismissal 
because non of these is designed to cover for loss of 
future earnings.
The employee is under an obligation to mitigate his 
losses. If he did not take reasonable steps to find 
alternative employment, damages would be reduced to take 
account of this. It is normally unreasonable for an
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employee to refuse an offer of re-employment from the 
empl oyer who has just been guilty of wrongful 
dismissal.14 It is not considered unreasonable for a 
dismissed employee to refuse an offer of re-employment 
involving a reduction in status or to seek employment at
i k
a level comparable to that of his previous salary. If 
the employee earns a salary or fees from work found after 
the dismissal, these earnings will reduce the employer's
1 Robligation to pay damages.
Although the ordinary remedy for the employee is 
only damages as stated above, equitable remedies such as 
injunctions or declarations may be awarded by courts in 
exceptional cases on a discretionary basis. The Court of 
Appeal made this clear in Hill v. Parsons. In that case, 
the employee who refused to join a trade union under a 
new closed shop agreement was given one month’s notice to 
terminate employment. The Court of Appeal granted an 
interlocutory injunction restraining the employer from 
terminating his employment. The Court’s decision was 
based on the following special circumstances of the case: 
Firstly, if proper notice had been given to the employee 
his employment would probably have continued until unfair 
dismissal provisions in the Industrial Relations Act 1971 
came into force, in which case his rights would 
thereafter have been safeguarded and he would not 
necessarily have been obliged to join the union. This 
fact renders damages an inadequate remedy. Secondly, the
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employee had the full confidence of his employers in his
work and they dismissed him solely because he would not
1 7join a trade union.
As seen in Chapter 3.1.3., the courts have recently 
become willing to allow an action for wrongful dismissal 
in cases where the contract requires the employer to 
follow a contractual procedure, restricts the permissible 
grounds or gives the decision to dismiss to an 
independent body. There has been a noticeable 
development in that the court will grant an equitable 
remedy to an employee where the employer failed to follow 
the contractual procedure. This is closely related to the 
right to natural justice. Traditionally the right to 
natural justice has been applied to rather limited cases
1 o
of dismissal (i.e. office-holders).
In R. v. BBC ex parte Lavelle, one of the key issues 
was whether the court had jurisdiction to restrain a 
disciplinary tribunal set up by an employer to 
investigate alleged misconduct by an employee which would 
justify her dismissal, from proceeding with its 
investigations. The High Court finally refused the 
application but Woolf, J. stated the following:
"The existence of (an industrial tribunal’s power to 
order the reinstatement of an employee) indicates 
that even the ordinary contract of master and 
servant now has many of the attributes of an office, 
and the distinction which previously existed between
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pure cases of master and servant and cases where a
person holds a office are no longer clear...In this
case it seems clear to me that Miss Lavelle had a
right to be heard and that there was a restriction
as to the circumstances in which she could be
dismissed. Although the restriction was largely
procedural, it did alter her rights substantially
different from what they would have been in common
law... I have therefore come to the conclusion that
in the appropriate circumstances, in the case of
employment of the nature here being considered...the
court can if necessary intervene by way of
1 Qinjunction, and certainly by way of declaration."
Following the ex part Lavelle case, some court
granted injunction or declarations to protect the
contractual rights of employees dismissed in breach of a
procedure specified in their contract. In most of these
cases, the courts have made much of the above second
reason as well as the first reason as stated in Hill when
they determined whether the injunction should be granted:
i.e. inadequacy of damages as the remedy and the
20continuance of mutual confidence.
However, A lack of mutual confidence does not 
necessarily preclude the possibility that the court will 
grant an injunction. Powell v. Brent London Borough 
Council provides a good example although it is not a case 
of dismissal. In this case, the Council attempted to
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revoke Mrs Powell's promotion for reasons relating to an
alleged procedural impropriety concerning her
appointment. No complaint was made concerning her ability
to do the job to which she had been appointed, and which
she was carrying out at the time of the legal
proceedings. The High Court refused to grant an
interlocutory injunction on the grounds that mutual trust
and confidence were lacking. However, the Court of Appeal
allowed an appeal. According to the Appeal Court, the
relevant test of confidence is to "be judged by reference
to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of
the work, the people with whom the work must be done and
the likely effect upon the employer and the employer's
operations if the employer is required by injunction to
2 1suffer the plaintiff to continue in the work."
This ruling appears to be consistent with the 
decision of the House of Lords in American Cyanamid Co. 
v. Ethicon L t d . According to the House of Lords, 
providing that the plaintiff has shown that there is a 
"serious issue to be tried" the decision whether or not 
to grant an interlocutory injunction should not normally 
depend on the substantive merits but on the balance of 
convenience. Lord Diplock said that "unless the material 
available to the court at the hearing of the application 
for a interlocutory injunction fails to disclose that the 
plaintiff has any prospect of succeeding in his claim for 
a permanent injunction at the trial, the court should go
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on to consider whether the balance of convenience lies in 
favour of granting or refusing the interlocutory relief 
that is sought.’^
In determining where the balance of convenience 
lies, the court will consider primarily the extent to 
which damages would provide adequate compensation for the
employee and the loss which would be suffered by the
2employer while awaiting. Equitable relief may not be
granted where the employee accepted the employer’s
repudiatory breach of contract, for example, by looking
24for or taking work elsewhere.
Besides the above-examined employer's breach of the 
contractual procedures, the possibility has emerged that 
an injunction may be granted to restrain a substantive 
breach of contract in an appropriate case. In Jones v. 
Gwent County Council, Mrs Jones who was employed by the 
Council as a lecturer had been subjected to two 
disciplinary hearings which were decided in her favour. 
The Council however brought further disciplinary 
proceedings on the ground that her return to the college 
would cause an irrevocable breakdown in relations between 
management and staff. The hearing was carried out without 
Mrs Jones's attendance and it was decided that she should 
be dismissed. The Council then issued a letter of 
dismissal. The court declared that the letter of 
dismissal was not valid, and they also granted a 
permanent injunction restraining the Council from
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dismissing her pursuant to the dismissal letter. They 
also granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the 
Council from dismissing Mrs Jones without proper grounds 
and until a proper procedure had been carried out, both
OR
in accordance with her contract.
Gwent County Council is also important in that it 
decided that the issue of mutual trust and confidence 
between the parties was not relevant in determining 
whether to issue of an injunction under the Rules of the 
Supreme Court, Order 14A, rule 1 (introduced in 1991), 
which does not require trust and mutual confidence.
Finally, it should be mentioned when and how an 
action for wrongful dismissal may be brought. A claim for 
wrongful dismissal may be made in an ordinary court. A 
claim of up to £.50,000 may be brought in the County 
Court, and claims of £50,000 and above should be brought
O £»
in the High Court. A claim for wrongful dismissal in
either court is subject to the limitation period for all
contractuals claim - six years from the date of the
breach of contract.
Industrial tribunals have recently gained
jurisdiction to hear any employee’s money claim arising
out of the contract of employment, subject to specified 
27exceptions. The maximum payment which a tribunal can 
award for a contract claim, or for a number of claims 
relating to the same contract, is £25,000. The time limit 
for bringing a claim for wrongful dismissal is the three
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months, beginning with the effective date of termination 
of the contract, or in the absence of such a date, with 
the last day of work. However, if the employee satisfies 
the tribunal that it was not reasonably practicable to 
bring the claim within the above-stated period, the 
tribunal may extend the time available for such further 
period as it considers reasonable.
4.1.2. UNFAIR DISMISSAL
(1) PROCEDURES
An employee should submit an application to the
Central Office of the Industrial Tribunal within 3
months from the effective date of termination of 
P Remployment. A copy of the application will also be sent
to an ACAS conciliation officer, who should make an
effort to promote a settlement of the complaint without
resort to an industrial tribunal either where he is
requested to do so by the parties or, in the absence of
such a request, where he considers that he could act with
P qa reasonable prospect of success. In doing so, the
conciliation officer should seek to promote reinstatement
or re-engagement, or to promote agreement on compensation
where the applicant does not wish to be reinstated or re-
30engaged, or where it would not be practicable.
A tribunal usually consists of three members, a
legally qualified chairman and two lay members. The
tribunal may consist of a chairman alone in certain 
3 1cases. No application fees or court fees are payable
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and costs are not usually awarded by the tribunal, 
although an order for costs may be made if one party, in 
bringing or conducting the proceedings, has acted 
frivolously, vexatiously or otherwise unreasonably. If 
it appears to a tribunal that a case has little prospect 
of success, the tribunal may order the party concerned 
to pay a deposit of up to £150 as a condition for 
proceeding with the case. If the party subsequently 
loses and has costs awarded against him, the deposit will
“Z  •z
go towards payment of those costs. Tribunal proceedings 
are designed to be informal compared to ordinary court 
proceedings.34 A tribunal decision is subject to appeal 
on points of law to the EAT.33 The EAT consists of a 
judge with either two or four lay members giving equal 
representation to both sides of industry. D
(2) REMEDIES FOR UNFAIR DISMISSAL37 
(iReinstatement or Re-engagement
The primary remedy is intended to be an order for 
reinstatement or re-e n g a g e m e n t , with monetary 
compensation designed as a secondary remedy where re-
7 O
employment is not practicable. An order of 
"reinstatement" means that the employer must treat the 
dismissed employee -in all respects- as if he had not 
been dismissed. In ordering reinstatement, the tribunal 
must specify any amount payable by the employer for the 
period between the date of dismissal and the date of
169
reinstatement, any rights and privileges which must be 
restored to the employee and the date by which the order 
must be complied with. The employee must receive the 
benefit of any improvement in his terms and conditions of 
employment which would have occurred but for the
■zq
dismissal.
When the tribunal decides whether or not it will 
make an order for reinstatement, it has to consider
(i)whether the employee wishes to be reinstated, (ii) 
whether it is practicable for the employer to comply with 
an order for reinstatement, and (iii) where the employee 
caused or contributed to his dismissal to some extent, 
whether it would be just to order reinstatement.4  ^ An 
order of re-engagement will be considered in cases where 
the tribunal decides not to make an order for 
reinstatement. Re-engagement involves that the employer, 
his successor or an associated employer engaging the 
dismissed employee in employment comparable to that 
enjoyed previously, or other suitable employment. When 
ordering re-engagement, the tribunal must specify the 
terms on which re-employment is to take p l a c e . E x c e p t  
in cases where the tribunal takes account of the 
employee’s contributory fault in dismissal, the order of 
re-engagement must be made on terms which are, so far as 
is reasonably practicable, as favourable as an order for 
reinstatement. Re-engagement is intended as an almost 
comparable alternative remedy to reinstatement. When the
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tribunal decides whether or not to make an order for re­
engagement, it has to consider the same three basic
4 9criteria as when making an order for reinstatement.
Where an order of reinstatement or re-engagement has 
been made, but the terms of the order have not been fully 
complied with, the tribunal must make an award of 
compensation of such amount as it thinks fit, having 
regard to the loss sustained by the dismissed employee as 
a consequence of the failure of the employer to fully 
comply. Where the dismissed employee has not been 
reinstated or re-engaged despite the relevant order, the 
tribunal must award compensation for unfair dismissal. In 
cases other than those where the employer satisfies the 
tribunal that it was not reasonably practicable to comply 
with the order, the tribunal has to make an additional 
award of compensation. The amount is not less than 13 
nor more than 26 weeks’ pay in ordinary cases, and not 
less than 26 nor more than 52 weeks’ pay in cases of 
discriminatory dismissals on the basis of race and sex.4  ^
The maximum amount in an ordinary case has been 52 x £210 
since September 1995.
As far as the practicability of re-employment is 
concerned, the courts and tribunals have not construed 
’practicable’ widely. In Coleman v. Magnet Joinery Ltd. , 
the NIRC stated: ’If the job has not been filled by the
time of the tribunal hearing there will be no room for a 
finding that it was not practicable to make the
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recommendation. Such a narrow construction would lead to
unfortunate results....When considering whether a
recommendation is 'practicable*, the tribunal ought to
consider the consequences of re-engagement in the
industrial relations scene in which it will take
place.’44 The Court of Appeal agreed with the NIRC.
Stephenson, LJ. stated that ”1 would agree entirely with
what the Industrial Court said about the meaning of
4 *5’practicable* and indeed ’in accordance with equity**’.
In deciding whether an order for re-employment is 
practicable, the tribunals have taken the following 
factors into consideration: non-existence of the
employee’s previous job or other suitable job, the 
likelihood of personal friction between the employee and 
supervisors or other employees, the size of the company, 
distrust between employee and employer, and the 
employee’s ability or health.4®
Even where the employer refuses to comply with an 
order of re-employment, the tribunal cannnot make an 
additional award of compensation if the employer 
satisfies them that it was not practicable to comply. The 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in Port of London 
Authority v. Payne makes it difficult for tribunals to 
deny the accuracy of an employer’s commercial judgment 
that it is not practicable to comply with the order of 
re-employment. The Court of Appeal has stated that: ’the 
tribunal should give due weight to the commercial
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judgment of the management... The standard must not be set 
too high. The employer cannot be expected to explore 
every possible avenue which ingenuity might suggest. The 
employer does not have to show that reinstatement or re­
engagement was impossible. It is a matter of what is 
practicable in the circustances of the employer's 
business at the relevant time.”47
(ii Compensation 
Basic Award
Where the tribunal decides not to order r e ­
employment, it has to make an award of compensation under 
two separate heads: a basic award and a compensatory
award. It may be said that the basic award is designed to 
compensate the employee for loss of seniority or job. 
This is calculated according to three factors: the
employee's age, the number of years of service, and
4 8weekly earnings. The sum, however, has been subject to
a maximum of 30 x i.210 since September 1995. The
following types of reduction mmay be made to the basic
award: (i)reduction by a proportion which the tribunal
considers just and equitable having regard to the
4 9employee's conduct prior to the dismissal.
(ii)reduction for the amount of any redundancy payment 
paid to the e m p l o y e e . (iii)reduction for any money paid 
by the employer expressly or implicitly referable to the 
basic a w a r d . (iv)reduction by a proportion which the 
tribunal considers just and equitable with regard to the
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finding that the employee has unreasonably refused an
COoffer by the employer.
Compensatory Award
The compensatory award is designed to compensate the 
employee for any financial loss which has been sustained. 
This loss includes any expenses reasonably incurred by 
the employee as a consequence of the dismissal and the 
loss of any benefit which he might reasonably have
C  ' Z
expected to have but for the dismissal. The measure of 
compensation for unfair dismissal is itself ’the creature 
of statute... and the amount has a discretionary element.’ 
Therefore, for its calculation, ’the common law rules and
C4
authorities on wrongful dismissal are irrelevant” and 
the compensatory award is not limited by the application 
of the notice rule at common law. The total amount of the 
compensatory award is limited by statute and cannot 
exceed til,300 since September 1995.
The employee is entitled to any lost earnings, net 
of tax and other deductions, from the date of dismissal 
to the date of the tribunal hearing. Deduction are made 
for income from other employment and from some other 
sources, plus any payment from the former employer. Where 
the employee receives earnings from new employment during 
what should have been his notice period with the former 
employer, the amount earned will not normally be deducted 
from compensation.^ Receipt of jibseekers allowance is
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ignored for this calculation because the Department of 
Employment can recoup such benefits from a successful
KG
applicant.
The employee is entitled to compensation for the 
loss of expected earnings for a reasonable period after 
the hearing. The crucial factors in ascertaining the 
loss, in a case where the dismissed employee is still 
unemployed at the date of hearing are, how long the 
dismissed worker is likely to be unemployed and whether 
he will have to take new employment at a lower rate of
C7
pay than his previous one. In doing so, tribunals have 
taken account of the employee's ability and health, the
CO
local conditions of employment, and so on. Where the 
dismissed employee has already obtained other employment 
by the date of the hearing, the tribunal ordinarily 
calculates the difference between the net earnings from 
the new employment and the former employment, and 
estimates how long such a differnce in pay will
c q
continue. Tribunals take account of the likelihood of
changes in levels of earnings and the possibility of
r ndismissal or voluntary retirement in both jobs.
Lost benefits which the employee might reasonably
have expected to have but for the dismissal are
recoverable, such as benefits under a share participation
scheme, travel allowances, the use of a company, car,
R 1telephone, and free housing. The loss of pension rights 
is recoverable. The method of calculating the loss of
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non-pension rights is very technical. "There are two
distinct types of loss to which dismissal from
pensionable employment can give rise. The first is the
loss of the pension position...The second is the loss of
future pension opportunity”: that is the opportunity of
improving his position until the time at which pension
R ?becomes payable. The Government's Actuary Department
R ^provides some guidance. The amount of compensation for 
the loss of pension entitlement can in some cases be very 
large.
Compensation for loss of statutory rights concerning
employment is also recoverable. Since the dismissed
employee will need two years in the new employment to
build up continuous employment sufficient to found a
claim for unfair dismissal and a redundancy payment, a
tribunal will normally award nominal compensation for
R4loss of this protection. Expenses are also recoverable
if they are reasonably incurred by the employee as a
R 6consequence of the dismissal. Only financial loss may
be recovered as injury to feeling or pride caused by
R Rdismissal is not subject to compensation. The manner of
the dismissal will be taken into account when assessing
compensation where the manner of the dismissal caused
financial loss as, for example, by making it more
R 7difficult to find future employment."
Duty of Mitigation
In ascertaining the loss, the tribunal must apply the
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duty of mitigation which applies to damages recoverable
R ftat common law. Where the employee obtains a new
employment after dismissal, the net pay received from
that employment is deducted from the loss of net pay
which he would have been paid but for the dismissal. Even
if he has not obtained other employment, there may be a
deduction if he failed to make a reasonable effort to
find other employment. There is no obligation on the
employee to take a job "irrespective of what remuneration
is available in that job and of what are the job 
RQprospects".u
The dismissed employee's conduct in complying with
the duty of mitigation is not limited to seeking other
employment. The EAT stated in Gardiner-Hi11 v. Roland
Berger Technics Ltd.: "Indeed, in our view, it was at
least as prudent of him to seek to exploit his own
expertise by conducting his own business and gaining an
income from his own business to replace the income which
70he had previously received from his employment."
Contributory Fault
The amount of compensation will still be subject to 
two different types of reductions, reduction by a 
proportion which the tribunal considers just and 
equitable having regard to the employee’s contribution to 
the dismissal and reduction by the value of any 
redundancy payment paid by the employer which exceeds the
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71amount of the employee’s basic award. The former type
of reduction is particularly significant because the rate
of reduction may be very large. The amount of the
reduction from compensation for this kind of contributory
fault is a discretionary matter for the tribunal.
Deductions for contributory fault are made from the total
72loss suffered before the statutory limit is applied.
In Nelson v. BBC (No.2), ^  the Court of Appeal held 
that the tribunal must make several findings when 
determining whether to make a reduction under s.74(6). 
Firstly, there must be a finding that there was conduct 
on the part of the employee in connection with his unfair 
dismissal which was culpable or blameworthy. Secondly, it 
must be found that the unfair dismissal was caused or 
contributed to to some extent by action that was culpable 
or blameworthy. Thirdly, it must be found to be just and 
equitable to reduce the assessment of the employee’s loss 
by the amount specified.
Brandon, L J . in N e 1 son defined the concept of 
’culpability or blameworthiness’ in wide terms. ’The 
concept does not, in my view, necessarily involve any 
conduct of the complainant amounting to a breach of 
contract or a tort. It includes, no doubt, conduct of 
that kind. But it also includes conduct which, while not 
amounting to a breach of contract or a tort, is 
nevertheless perverse or foolish, or, if I may use the 
colloquialism, bloody-minded. It may also include action
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which, though not meriting any of those more perjorative 
epithets, is nevertheless unreasonable in all the 
circumstances. I should not, however, go as far as to say 
that all unreasonable conduct is necessarily culpable or 
blameworthy; it must depend upon the degree of 
unreasonableness involved.”74
The employee’s 'culpable or blameworthy’ conduct must
7 Rbe causally linked to his dismissal. Subsequently 
discovered conduct cannot be relied upon to render the 
dismissal fair and therefore cannot constitute 
’contributory fault’. However, it does not follow that 
the tribunal cannot take such subsequently discovered 
conduct into account when determining the amount of 
compensation. In Devis & Sons, Ltd. v. Atkins, Viscount 
Dilhorn stated: "(I)t is in my opinion clear that in
assessing compensation the Tribunal is entitled to have 
regard to subsequently discovered misconduct and, if
7 Rthey think, to award nominal or nil compensation.’ This 
is justified by s.74(1) of the EP(C)A which clearly 
provides that ’the amount of the compensation award shall 
be such amount as the tribunal considers just and 
equitable in all the circumstances having regard to the 
loss sustained by the complainant.”
4.2. THE UNITED STATES72
In the United States, as seen in Chapter 3.3., 
several causes of action for wrongful discharge have been 
recognized in many states. In addition, several states
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have enacted laws making discharge for particular reasons 
a wrongful act. Montana is, however, the only state that 
requires the employer to justify discharge in general. 
This section will first examine the remedies for wrongful 
discharge and then look at the statutory regulations, 
procedures and remedies for wrongful discharge in 
Montana. As seen in Chapter 3.3., the main causes of 
action for wrongful discharge in the United States are
(i) breach of express or implied promise of discharge 
only for just cause, (ii) breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, (iii) violation of public 
policy, and (iv) intentional infliction of mental 
distress. At present, wrongful discharge constituting
(ii) is recognized only as breach of contract in most 
states although California and Montana have recognized it 
as a tort. Therefore, the remedies for wrongful discharge 
constituting (i) and (ii) will be examined under the 
heading of ’wrongful discharge in breach of contract” and 
those constituting (iii) and (iv) will be examined under 
the heading of "wrongful discharge in tort".
4.2.1. COMMON LAW REMEDIES
(1) WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN BREACH OF CONTRACT
The procedures which apply to wrongful discharge are 
conventional civil procedures, and therefore they are not 
cheap, accessible or flexible. The only remedy for an 
employee who brings a successful action for wrongful
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discharge is damages. This is because of the general rule 
that a court cannot grant specific performance of an 
employment contract. According to Professor D.B.Dobbs, 
four main reasons have been given for this rule: (1)
Equitable intervention is not required because damages 
provide an adequate remedy. (2) Cooperation between 
employer and employee is crucial for an employment 
contract but it is so intangible a thing that it could 
hardly be enforced. (3) It is impracticable to supervise 
the employee’s work in order to ensure good performance. 
(4) Granting specific performance to the employer would 
result in involuntary servitude, which is prohibited 
under the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution, so 
therefore specific performance cannot be granted to the 
employee based on the principle of remedial mutuality.^® 
Although several scholars have discredited these 
rationales of the general rule, the courts have adhered 
to it in private employment cases except where a statute 
specifically authorizes the courts to make an order of 
reinstatement.
Due to the non-availability of equitable remedies 
such as injunction or declaration, damages are the only 
remedy for wrongful discharge. Damages for breach of an 
employment contract terminable only for good cause 
usually equal to the employee’s lost earnings (for a 
reasonable period) minus earnings from any work obtained 
after the dismissal, plus any expenses reasonably
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incurred in seeking work. In calculating lost earnings
for a reasonable period, the trial court may take account
of the value of fringe benefits as well as wages,
7 Qbonuses and commissions. It is very important to 
determine a reasonable period during which the employee 
would have remained in the same employment but for 
wrongful discharge. For example, the Supreme Court of 
Wyoming stated: "The trial judge here determined that it
would be reasonable to infer that a person who had 
already worked eight years for a company, enjoyed 
favorable working conditions and benefits, and intended 
to stay until retirement, would be employed for a longer 
period than the average period of seniority. He decided 
that a figure of eight years of continued employment 
would be reasonable. ...(W)e think that the eight-year
o n
figure was reasonable in light of the evidence.”
In Diggs v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., an 
employee was discharged in violation of a "dismissal only 
for just cause" agreement. The district court entered a 
judgment for the employee and awarded backpay and advance 
pay until his retirement. The Sixth Circuit Court, 
applying Michigan law, rejected the company’s argument 
that the award of 26.5 years’ front pay award was wholly 
speculative, and stated Michigan law as the district 
court judge observed: "While the cases cited by (the) 
defendant may be accurate statements of the law in 
certain jurisdictions, they do not appear to reflect the
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position of the Michigan courts. As long ago as 1897, the 
Michigan Supreme Court held that the measure of damages 
for breach of an agreement to employ a person for life or 
during his ability to work included the present worth of 
what he would have been able to earn in the future less 
any amounts he would be able to earn from other
O 1
employment during that same time.”
In ascertaining damages, the court applies almost 
the same rules of the duty of mitigation as British 
courts and tribunals apply to determine the employee's 
loss in cases of wrongful and unfair dismissal. The court 
will reduce the award by the amount which could have been 
avoided by reasonable action by the employee to minimize
op
the loss. In the context of a breach of an employment 
contract, the measure of damages due to the employee is 
the amount of salary agreed upon for the period of 
service, less the amount which the employer affirmatively 
proves the employee has earned or with reasonable effort 
might have earned from other employment. The definition 
of "reasonable effort" is therefore very important.
The decision of the Supreme Court of California in 
Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., provides one 
such definition. It was held that: "(B)efore projected
earnings from other employment opportunities not sought 
or accepted by the discharged employee can be applied in 
mitigation, the employer must show that the other 
employment was comparable, or substantially similar, to
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that of which the employee has been deprived; the 
employee's rejection of or failure to seek other 
available employment of a different or inferior kind may
O  "I
not be resorted to in order to mitigate damages." In 
California, unemployment payments which the wrongfully 
discharged employee received may not be deducted from the
04
amount of damages.
(2) WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN TORT
In cases of the tort of wrongful discharge, the 
courts have similarly awarded compensatory damages which 
included lost earnings and expenses involved in finding
Q  C
new employment. Courts have also awarded damages for
O D
the employee's emotional distress and anguish. Some 
courts have awarded further damages for loss of
o n
professional reputation. In addition to compensatory 
damages, the courts have often awarded punitive or 
exemplary damages in tort suits for wrongful discharge. 
In order to award punitive or exemplary damages, the 
courts generally require "circumstances of aggravation or 
outrage, such as spite or 'malice', or a fraudulent or 
evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a 
conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of 
others that the conduct may be called wilful or 
wanton".®® In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., the Supreme Court 
of Illinois stated: "It has long been established in this 
State that punitive or exemplary damages may be awarded 
when torts are committed with fraud, actual malice,
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deliberate violence or oppression, or when the defendant 
acts wilfully or with such gross negligence as to
oq
indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others.”
Damages both for breach of contract and for tort are 
usually assessed by the jury and the appellate courts 
will not normally interfere. Also, the question of 
whether to award punitive damages is left to the jury, 
although the court will say whether the plaintiff has
q n
sufficient proof of aggravated misconduct. This has 
frequently led to erratic jury awards of large damages 
against highly visible corporations in cases of tortious
q i
wrongful discharge.
Finally it should be pointed out that attorneys’ 
fees will not ordinarily be recoverable in cases of tort
q p
or breach of contract. In the absence of a state
q*z
statute, this also true for wrongful discharge claims.
4.2.2. STATUTORY REMEDIES
As discussed above, in many states the courts have 
recognized various legal theories in order to allow a 
wrongfully discharged employee to recover his damages. 
The theory of wrongful discharge based on an explicit or 
implied promise of dismissal only for cause enables the 
employee to recover his damages only if he can rebut the 
presumption of employment at will. The public policy 
theory of wrongful discharge can result in a recovery of 
damages for the employee only if it is necessary to do so
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in order to maintain public policy. The theory of 
intentional infliction of mental distress is clearly to 
be applied only in extraordinary cases. In comparison, 
the theory of an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing seems to provide more general grounds for 
action. Unlike public policy grounds, it does not require 
the employee to prove that there is a clear mandatory 
public policy whose existence is not easily proved except 
where a statute implies it. However, in reality, many 
courts have not recognized the theory of an implied 
covenant and the courts which have recognized it have 
applied it in rather limited circumstances.
Juries have a wide measure of discretion when 
awarding punitive damages in tortious wrongful discharge 
cases and they often award a far larger sum of punitive 
damages than compensatory damages. Many of the reported 
cases of wrongful discharge have been actions by 
employees who had held management positions which also
04
lead to rather large amounts of compensatory damages.
In response, many states considered the introduction of 
some form of statute for wrongful discharge which not 
only limits the general protection available to the 
employee but also limits types and amounts of remedies. 
By the end of 1987, three wrongful discharge statutes 
had been enacted in Montana, the Virgin Islands and 
Puerto Rico under which the discharge of an employee for 
reasons other than those specifically prescribed is
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considered to be wrongful.
The Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDFEA)^
was enacted in Montana in 1987. It provides an exclusive
remedy for wrongful discharge. Under the WDFEA, a
discharge is wrongful if:”(l) it was in retaliation for
the employee’s refusal to violate public policy or for
reporting a violation of public policy; (2) the discharge
was not for good cause after the employee had completed
the employer’s probationary period of employment; or (3)
the employer violated the express provisions of its own
QRwritten personnel policy.’
The employee must file his action within one year 
following the date of discharge. If the employer 
maintains written internal procedures, the employee has 
to exhaust these prior to filing such an action. 
However, the internal procedures are automatically 
considered exhausted if they are not completed within 90 
days after the employee initiates them. The one year 
limitation period may be extended until the internal 
procedures are exhausted, but the provisions of the 
internal procedures may not extend the limitation period 
by more than 120 days in any one case. The employee need 
not comply with these requirements concerning the 
employer’s written internal procedure unless the employer 
notifies him of the existence of such procedures and 
supplies him with a copy of them within 7 days of the 
date of the discharge.^7
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A dispute may be resolved through final and binding 
arbitration under a written agreement between the 
parties. An offer to arbitrate must be in writing and 
must contain certain provisions because it may be so 
decisive. If a complaint is filed, the offer to arbitrate 
must be made within 60 days after the complaint is served 
and must be accepted in writing within 30 days of the 
date of the offer. If a valid offer is accepted, 
arbitration is the exclusive remedy for the wrongful
qo
discharge dispute.
As a remedy for wrongful discharge, an employee may 
be awarded lost wages and fringe benefits for a period 
not exceeding four years from the date of discharge, 
together with interest payable thereon. The employee may 
recover punitive damages if it is established by clear 
and convincing evidence that the employer engaged in 
actual fraud or actual malice in discharging the employee 
in violation of public policy. The employee is not 
entitled to damages for pain and suffering, emotional 
distress, compensatory or punitive damages, or other
qq
similar damages. Consequently, neither damages for lost 
future earnings nor non-economic damages for pain and 
emotional distress nor damages for injury to professional 
reputation will be awarded.
The WDFEA does not apply to a discharge which is 
subject to any other state or federal statute which 
provides a procedure or remedy for the dispute, or to the
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discharge of an employee who is covered by a written 
collective bargaining agreement or a written contract of 
employment for a specific term. The WDFEA, does 
though, pre-empt common-law r e m e d i e s . B y  way of this 
pre-emption, the theory of breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing finished its significant role in 
providing the basis for suits for wrongful discharge in 
Montana.
4.5. JAPAN
As Japanese courts have developed the law of abusive
dismissal on the basis of the abuse of right provision
which is contained within the Civil Code, there is no
particular limitation to the coverage of the Japanese law
of abusive dismissal. When the courts find that the
employee’s case for abusive dismissal has merit, they
usually deliver a judgment affirming his status as an
employee in the d e f e n d a n t ’s company, and order the
defendant to pay the unpaid wages, plus interest, between
the date of dismissal and the date of judgment. A
declaration of provisional execution of the order for
10 5payment is also usually made because without such a 
declaration the court's judgment ordering the employer 
to pay wages is not enforceable on appeal to the higher 
court. The court also usually orders the employer to pay 
wages accruing after the time of the judgment. Wages 
include the wages, salary, allowances, bonus and every
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other payment to the worker from the employer under the 
contract of employment as remuneration of labour under 
whatever name they may be called. The unpaid wages are 
those wages which the employee would have been paid but 
for being dismissed and therefore they include any pay 
increases which would have occurred after the time of the 
dismissal, but for the dismissal.
The sum of unpaid wages is subject to reduction for 
earnings from other employment in the period between the 
plaintiff's dismissal and the court's judgment. This is 
because Section 536(2) of the Civil Code applies to 
benefits resulting from the dismissal. Section 536(2) 
provides: "If performance becomes impossible for any
reason for which the obligee (i.e. the employer) is 
responsible, the obligor (i.e. the employee) shall not 
lose his right to demand counter-performance (i.e. the 
paying of compensation) ; however, if he has received any 
benefit through being relieved of his own obligation, he 
shall return such benefit to the obligee.”
It is noticable that the principle of Section 536(2) 
clearly differs from the principle of mitigation found in 
Britain and in the United States. First, Section 536(2) 
does not require the employee to make a reasonable effort 
to reduce the amount of damages. Secondly, because of the 
L.S.L., s.26, any reduction for interim earnings from 
other employment is limited to 40% of the unpaid wages. 
According to the Supreme Court, Section 26 of the L.S.L.
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should apply in cases where the employee could not work
for the employer as a result of the employer's abusive 
1 ordismissal.
Section 26 provides that: "In the event of a
suspension of business for reasons attributable to the
employer, the employer shall pay an allowance equal to at
least 60 per cent of the worker’s average wage to each
worker concerned during the period of business
suspension." In the Akebono Taxi case, the Supreme Court
held later that the 60 per cent limit only applied to the
unpaid average wages which were calculated according to
Section 12 of the L.S.L. Section 12(1) provides that:
"According to this section, the average wage is defined
as the quotient obtained by dividing the total amount of
wages for a period of three months preceding the day on
which the calculation of the average wage became
necessary by the total number of days during the 
1 n rperiod." However, Section 12(4) excludes extraordinary 
allowances, wages which are paid periodically during a 
period longer than three months and wages which do not 
fall within certain categories. Therefore, for example, 
an unpaid bonus may be reduced by 100 % due to earnings
1 07from other employment.
The court has often refused to issue an order to the 
employer to compensate the employee for mental distress 
or injured feelings where the employee has sought such a 
decision in a case of abusive dismissal. The court
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usually concludes that the employee's injured feelings
will be consoled by the decision to affirm his status as
108an employee and the payment of wages which are due. 
However, in cases where the employer publicizes the non­
existent reason for the employee's 'punitive dismissal' 
to other employees, the court may issue an order to the 
employer to pay damages for the employee's injured
1 nq
feelings. Even where the employer's dismissal does not
constitute defamation, there have been an increasing
number of cases in which courts have held that dismissal
without just cause may constitute a tort and therefore
that the employee may seek damages for injured feelings.
It may be inferred in such cases that the employer failed
to prove the existence of just cause.
The greatest difficulty with the Japanese remedy
arises from the fact that abusive dismissal is held to be
automatically void. This problem was first addressed in
1 1 1the Yoshimura Company case. The plaintiff had been 
with the defendant employer for 23 years in their 
business sections and his work performance had been 
highly evaluated, but he was condemned to 'punitive 
dismissal' on the grounds of his criticism of the 
defendants. He was due to retire in 5 years, when he 
became 55. He brought an action against the defendant for 
damages on the grounds that the dismissal was abusive and 
constituted a tort. He claimed that he would have 
continued to work for the defendant for at least another
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year but for the dismissal and therefore that he was 
entitled to damages for one year’s wages. He also claimed 
that he would have remained with the defendant until the 
age of compulsory retirement but for the dismissal and 
therefore that he was entitled to a retirement allowance 
calculated on the basis of 28 years’ employment according 
to the defendants’ shugyo kisoku. He also claimed damages 
for injured feelings and for the lawyer’s fees which he 
had incurred. However, it was found that he had been 
hired by another company about one month after his 
dismissal and that he had no intention to return to the 
employment of the defendant.
The Tokyo District Court held that, in relation to 
the provisions of the shugyo kisoku concerning retirement 
allowances, his dismissal was construed as being for 
business reasons and therefore that his retirement 
allowance should be calculated on the basis of 23 years’ 
employment. The Court also held that the dismissal 
constituted a tort and awarded damages for injured 
feelings and for lawyer’s fees. As to the reason why he 
was not entitled either to an allowance calculated on the 
basis of 28 years’ employment or to wages accruing after 
dismissal, the Court stated that, as abusive dismissal is 
void, the dismissed employee may not lose his right to 
wages accruing from his employment after dismissal if he 
is ready to work for the employer; that, since a wage is 
remuneration for work, if an employee is not ready to
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work for his employer, the tortious dismissal does not 
constitute the cause of the non-payment of wages. In 
short, this decision means that if the dismissed employee 
wants to gain the maximum amount of compensation, he must 
clearly indicate his intention to continue to work, and 
quit only after he is awarded a judgment of voidance of 
dismissal. It is advisable to only take temporary work 
for another company during the court’s proceedings for 
unjust dismissal, for if he takes a regular job with 
another company, he will not be entitled to claim damages 
for ’wages which would have accrued but for dismissal’ 
even if the level of pay for the new job is far lower 
than that of the former job. The same applies to 'any 
retirement allowance accrued but for dismissal’.
If this ruling is correct, it follows that the 
employee will choose litigation for affirmation of 
employee status rather than litigation for damages, as 
even where the dismissed employee has no intention of 
returning to the company, he may be awarded amounts of 
money equivalent to the unpaid wages, minus that part of 
his interim earnings which exceeds 60 % of the employee's 
"average wages" as defined in the L.S.L., s.12. In the 
Akebono Taxi case (Supra.), it was not questioned whether 
the dismissed taxi-drivers who were employed in the same 
capacity by another company after dismissal actually had 
the intention of returning to their previous company. 
Where the dismissed employee sues for affirmation of his
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employee status, it is almost impossible for the employer 
to prove that the employee has no intention of returning 
to him. The taxi-drivers who were dismissed by the 
defendant company were also employed by another company 
during the litigation following their dismissal.
The remedy for abusive dismissal is fixed 
exclusively by the courts. Litigation involves many 
technicalities, so although the law does not require the 
employee to be represented by a lawyer in the court 
proceedings, in reality the employee needs the assistance 
of a lawyer. This means that litigation is time-consuming 
and expensive.
Provisional dispositions have been used widely in 
disputes arising from labour and employment relations. 
The provisional disposition procedure is subordinate one 
to the formal litigation procedure for the purpose of 
preserving the enforceability of the alleged right. In 
order to obtain a provisional disposition order, the 
applicant must show that his case is likely to have 
merits and that his rights are likely to be abused 
without such an order. The standard of proof required in 
the provisional disposition procedure is lower than that 
in the formal litigation procedure. It is enough for the 
applicant to convince the judge of his allegation that 
his claim is likely to be real; it is not necessary to 
convince the judge that it is real. A case may be 
conducted on the basis of ex parte testimony.
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The court fee for the provisional disposition 
procedure is much smaller than that for the formal 
litigation procedure. The order of provisional 
disposition takes immediate effect and it is difficult 
for an employer to get the court’s order suspended. The 
merits of provisional dispositions mean that there are 
some cases where the dispute has been settled by the 
provisional disposition order and has not gone through 
the the formal litigation procedure. For example, in 
1994, the district courts received 576 applications from 
employees for provisional disposition orders to preserve 
their status as employees while they received only 326 
applications from employees for the formal judgment to 
affirm their status as employees. (TABLE 2.)
TABLE 2. THE NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL RELIEF
IN JAPAN
Years
Number of 
Applications for
1 1989 
1 
1 
1
1 1990 1 1991 
1 
1 
1
1 1992 
1 
1 
1
1 1993 
1 
1 
1
11994 I 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1
Provisional
disposition
1 267
1
i
1 241 1 257
1
I
1 385
1
i
1 506
1
i
1 576 1 
1 1 
i i
Formal judgment
I
1 158 
1
1 164
1
1 147 
1
l
1 194 
1
l
1 272 
1
i i
1 326 1 
1 1
Sources: Hoso-Jiho, Vol.45, No.7 (1994); Vol.46, No.7
(1995).
In provisional disposition procedures concerning
dismissal, the employee usually applies to the court for 
both an order to temporarily preserve his status as an 
employee in the defendant’s company and an order that
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the employer must make a provisional payment of some
portion of the wages owed, between the period of his
dismissal and the final judgment of the court. In
practice, where courts have found that an employee’s case
is likely to be meritorious, they have issued an order of
provisional disposition including an order for
provisional payment of the employee’s full wages from the
time of dismissal to the time when the judgment is
finalized in the formal litigation procedure. This is
because the courts have generally considered that a
worker whose only source of income is his job would
otherwise be reduced to a state of poverty. However,
since 1970, some courts have criticized earlier 
112decisions. This criticism stems from the length of 
proceedings for provisional disposition.
Of the 39 provisional disposition claims for
preservation of employee status dealt with by the Tokyo
District Court in 1967, only 6 cases took three months
or less, 5 cases took between 3 months and one year, 16
cases took one to two years, and 17 cases took more than 
113two years. Many courts started to believe that 
prolonged procedings severely damaged the significance of 
provisional disposition as a temporary relief. These 
courts rigidly applied Section 760 of the The Code of 
Civil Procedure, which has now been replaced by a similar 
provision of Section 23 of the Civil Preservation Law of 
1989. That section provides that the provisional
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disposition "shall be made only in cases where it is 
necessary in order to prevent considerable damage to the 
lasting relation of (the employee’s) right or to prevent 
an imminent danger thereon or any other reasons.”
The Tokyo District Court made the following
statement in the Toa Sekyu case. "The order requiring the
employer to provisionally pay wages to the dismissed
employee is neither designed to enforce the employee’s 
right to be kept in employment nor to guarantee him the 
same standard of living as the other employees enjoy." In 
deciding whether the employer should be ordered to pay
the whole amount of the employee’s wages, the court
should carefully consider what proportion of the wages 
can prevent both his and his family’s livelihood from 
being endangered. Similarly, in deciding how long the 
employer is to be ordered to provisionally pay the
employee a certain proportion of his wages, the court 
should take account of the period of time which the 
employee needs in order to find alternative resources to 
maintain both his and his family’s livelihood.*14
We can now see the variety of terms in which the
courts may make provisional disposition orders. With 
regard to the cessation of provisional payment of wages, 
the courts state, for example, "until the judgment is 
finalized in the formal litigation procedure", "until a 
formal judgment is delivered by the court of first 
instance", "until one year after the order of provisional
198
disposition", "until one year after his dismissal", or 
"until one year after the end of the hearing in the 
provisional disposition order". The starting date of the 
payment is sometimes fixed, for example, "from the time 
of dismissal", "from the time of the issuance of the 
order of provisional disposition" and "from the time of 
the end of the hearing in the provisional disposition
lie
procedure".
In many cases the court still orders the employer to
provisionally pay the whole amount of wages to the
dismissed employee for a specified period of time, but in
more and more cases it reduces the amount to a proportion
of the total. The court sometimes holds that all or part
of the wages are not to be paid to the employee for the
purpose of protecting his or his family’s livelihood
either because he has enough income from other sources
or he has income from alternative employment, or because
his earnings are very high. It is sometimes ruled that it
is not necessary for the employee to be provisionally
paid all or part of his bonus in addition to his wages.
Similarly, the court sometimes rules that it is not
necessary to take account of pay increases which would
have occurred but for the dismissal when making these 
1 1 fipayments. As a result of these efforts, the prolonged
117procedure has been improved upon to some extent. It is 
presumed that, in recent years, the proceedings for 
provisional disposition to preserve the status of an
199
employee have been reduced to less than one year in most 
cases.
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CHAPTER 5
GENERAL LAW OF DISMISSALS3): COMPARATIVE CRITIQUE
The two preceding chapters have examined and
summarized the statutory provisions and case law relating 
to dismissal in each of the three countries in order to 
ascertain whether there is a general law of requiring 
justification for dismissal and what general regulations, 
procedures and remedies apply to dismissal. On the basis 
of the above examination, we can identify the following 
features of the laws of dismissal in the three countries.
5.1. REGULATION
In the United States, there is no federal statute 
requiring justification for dismissal. The state of
Montana alone has enacted a statute which affords general 
protection to employees from dismissal without just 
cause. No other state has enacted a statute which 
requires justification for dismissal. In contrast, there 
is a general law of dismissal in Britain as well as in<\^  
Japan, which generally requires justification for 
dismissal. There is statutory regulation of unfair 
dismissal in Britain.
In Britain, there is also a separate contractual 
right against wrongful dismissal at common law, but the 
extent of such protection is limited. At common law, an 
employee who is employed under a contract of indefinite
duration is generally only entitled to be given due
208
notice of dismissal. Only employees who have the status 
of office-holder, a special statutory status or a 
contractual right to procedural justice, may have the 
right to be dismissed only after the employer has 
complied with natural justice or a statutory or 
contractual procedure. This may cover a large and 
increasing number of employees.
The right to claim wrongful dismissal is still 
important for many employees because of the qualification 
period of employment, the inadequacy of compensation, and 
the infrequency of re-employment orders following on from 
unfair dismissal claims. It is particularly usefull for 
highly paid persons who are employed under a fixed term 
contract or who are entitled to a long period of notice, 
and for those who possess the right to natural justice or 
a statutory or contractual procedure.
Unlike Britain, Japan does not have special statutes 
designed to regulate dismissal. However, Japanese courts 
have developed the doctrine of the law of abusive 
dismissal on the basis of the ’abuse of right’ clause of 
the Civil Code. Accordingly, it can be said that, in 
Japan, there is a well-established law to regulate 
dismissal, i.e. the law of abusive dismissal.
In contrast to the limited functions of British 
common law regarding regulation of dismissal, American 
common law has been developed to protect the employee 
from unjust dismissal. American courts regulate unjust
209
dismissals on the basis of an implied promise that 
dismissal will only occur for just cause, an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealings, public policy 
and intentional infliction of mental distress.
It was once thought that an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealings might provide for a wide 
regulation of unjust dismissal similar to the Japanese 
doctrine of abusive dismissal. In most states, however, 
the application of that covenant so far has been limited 
to very exceptional cases. In some states it was made 
clear that the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing only protects an employee from discharge based on 
an employer’s desire to avoid payment already earned by 
the employee.
In the United States, the theory of public policy 
and the contract theory have been more frequently and 
effectively applied to provide a remedy for an employee 
who was unjustly dismissed. Most courts construed "public 
policy" a less strictly. In Japan, cases in which 
dismissal is held to be illegal in violation of public 
policy are mostly limited to those in which dismissal 
infringes the employee’s constitutional rights. Since 
the legal effect is the same in cases of dismissal 
violating public policy and those of abusive dismissal, 
the public policy argument is less important in Japan.
In Britain, it is an implied term of the contract 
that the employer may not compel an employee to act
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1
unlawfully. It is unclear, however, whether, at common
law, an employer's right to dismiss with due notice could
be restrained by reference to such an implied term.
Nevertheless, under unfair dismissal legislation, it
would be held unfair to dismiss an employee because of
2
his refusal to accept an order to act illegally. Section
60A of the EP(C)A now provides that it is automatically
unfair to dismiss an employee because he brought
proceedings against the employer to enforce, or alleged
the employer's infringement of, his statutory rights.
However, due to several defects, particularly with the
scope and remedy of that law, it is arguable that
dismissal against the public interest should be
3
permitted as a cause of action at common law.
Another cause of action in tort which has been
recognized in the United States with regard to dismissal
is intentional infliction of emotional distress. A
similar tort liability exists in British law. In
Wilkinson v. Downton. the defendant's intentional false
representation gave a violent nervous shock to the
plaintiff and rendered her ill. It was held that these
4
facts disclosed a good cause of action. This tort 
liability has developed very little since this case in 
1897 and there has been no attempt to invoke it in a 
dismissal case. However, where when dismissing an 
employee, the employer, actuated by malice, has made 
damaging and false statements about the employee to a
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third party, it constitutes defamation in tort.
Defamation has also been recognized in cases of dismissal
in Japan where it is also generally considered that such
extraordinary speech and action that can injure a
6
person’s health constitutes a tort, although there is no 
relevant case concerning dismissal. What is clear in 
Japanese law is that dismissal without just cause is 
considered to be a tort if the employer dismisses his
employee in spite of being aware (or unaware due to 
negligence) that he has no just cause for dismissal.
In the United States, the contract theory is 
another judicial method of providing a remedy for
unjustly dismissed employees. Where the employer has 
expressly or impliedly promised job-security, the
employee may rely on the contract theory if he feels that 
he has been dismissed without just cause. It is
reasonable to assume that many employers recognize the 
necessity of declaring job-security in written documents 
for morale and to attract employees. There is a 
possibility that courts may recognize the existence of a 
contractual promise of dismissal only for just cause on 
the basis of the employer’s written declaration of job- 
security. Under this theory, dismissal is regulated in a 
similar way to that in which dismissal is regulated under 
the Japanese law of abusive dismissal and the British law 
of unfair dismissal.
Unlike British common law, American common law does
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not require dismissal to be preceded by due notice. In 
Japan, a statutory provision requires the employer to 
give at least 30 days notice to the employee before 
dismissal. This requirement is similar to that of minimum 
notice for dismissal under British law, but there are the 
following differences between Japanese and British law 
regarding minimum notice for dismissal: (i) the minimum
notice is fixed at 30 days in Japan while in Britain it 
varies between one and twelve weeks depending on the 
employee's length of service; (ii) the minimum notice 
period should be given to workers employed on a daily 
basis or under a fixed term in Japan if contain 
conditions are satisfied, but there is no similar rule in 
Britain; (iii) in Japan, the employer may be exempt from 
the requirement to give notice only in the case of 
dismissal for very serious misconduct of the employee, 
while in Britain the employer may also be exempt in the 
case of dismissal because of a repudiatory breach by the 
employee; (iv) a court may order the employer to make an 
additional payment in Japan; (v) the employer's failure 
in his obligation to give notice may result in a criminal 
prosecution in Japan while in Britain the employer's 
failure to give notice only constitutes a breach of his 
contract. The Japanese rule of notice for dismissal is 
stricter than the British one, but the British may be 
better in that the minimum notice increases as the 
employee's length of service increases.
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In Japan, there is what is called 'punitive 
dismissal1, a special concept of dismissal. It is 
distinguishable from an ordinary dismissal which 
corresponds with 'dismissal' in the usual terms. A 
'punitive dismissal' is usually accompanied by a 
reduction of the retirement allowance. It is considered 
to be legally effective only if the shug.vo kisoku 
expressly provides that the employer can take 'punitive 
dismissal' action against the employee for the relevant 
sorts of wrongdoing. Since the consequences of 'punitive 
dismissal' upon the employee are harsh, the courts have 
generally required more serious misconduct for 'punitive 
dismissal' than for ordinary dismissal.
In both Japan and Britain, dismissal without a 
permissible reason is regarded as abusive or unfair. It 
can be said that the burden of proof under the Japanese 
law of abusive dismissal is identical to that under 
British unfair dismissal legislation. However, Japanese 
law requires the employer to prove the facts which 
substantiate his reason for dismissal while British 
unfair dismissal legislation only requires the employer 
to prove that he genuinely believes that he has reason to 
dismiss. On the other hand, British tribunals can only 
take into consideration matters which the employer knew 
of at the time of dismissal, while some Japanese courts 
permit the employer to allege a reason which he was not 
aware of at the time of the dismissal, provided that it
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existed at that time. British law requires the employer 
to provide a written statement of the reason for 
dismissal if the employee requests this. Japanese law and 
American law do not have such a requirement.
Even if the reason for dismissal is proved to be 
permissible, dismissal may still be held to be abusive in 
Japan and unfair in Britain. In Japan, "dismissal is 
abusive where it is regarded to be considerably 
unreasonable in the circumstances of the case." In 
Britain, the fairness of dismissal depends upon "whether, 
in the circumstances,...the employer acted reasonably or 
unreasonably in considering (a provided reason) as a 
sufficient reason for dismissing the employee." Thus, 
both in Japan and Britain, courts and tribunals have to 
take account of all the circumstances in addition to the 
facts directly connected to the alleged misconduct or 
incompetence. These include the employee's past record, 
type of work, duration of service, family circumstances, 
the employer's fault, treatment of similar cases, and 
type and size of business.
The standard which is applied to determine the 
reasonableness or admissibility of dismissal is clearly 
different in Japan and Britain. The British standard is 
what can be called the "no reasonable employer" test 
which has been expressed as "if no reasonable employer 
would have dismissed (the employee), then the dismissal 
was unfair". The Japanese Supreme Court uses a vague
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standard which has been expressed by the use of such 
phrases as "permissible with regard to social norms" or 
"permissible with regard to social justice." These 
phrases should be understood in the context of the facts 
and decision in the Kochi Broadcasting Company case. If 
the "no reasonable employer test" were applied to the 
facts of the Kochi Broadcasting Company case, it would be 
rather difficult to reach the same conclusion. The 
Japanese standard may be described as the "balancing 
interests" test under which the courts consider the 
degree to which the dismissal would have detrimental 
effects on the employee and his family and the degree to 
which the employee’s continued presence in the workplace 
would damage the employer’s business. In other words, the 
courts balance the employer’s right to business and the 
employee’s right to his livelihood and apply the 
doctrine of abuse of the right to dismiss. Therefore, as 
the Supreme Court’s decision in the Kochi Broadcasting 
Company case illustrates, the Japanese standard is 
generally far more favourable to the employee than the 
British one.
In determining whether or not dismissal is justified, 
the British tribunal takes a far more procedurally 
oriented approach than the Japanese court. In Japan, 
dismissal is void where it is held to be abusive. So, 
where the court holds that dismissal is abusive because 
of procedural defects, it cannot dispose of the case by
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awarding financial compensation. In Britain, even where 
the tribunal holds that dismissal is procedurally unfair, 
It can still decide not to award compensation. Another 
important factor which explains the different attitudes 
of Japanese courts and British tribunals results from 
the existence of a Code of Practice in Britain which is 
admissible in evidence in any proceedings before an 
industrial tribunal.
As far as dismissals for incompetence are
concerned, Japanese judicial decisions indicate that,
before dismissing an employee, the employer has to 
ascertain whether or not the employee’s work shows a 
total lack of working ability or an incurable working
attitude. In order to do so, the employer is usually
required to transfer the employee to a workplace which is 
more suitable to him or which may give him cause for 
reflection. The employer is generally required to give
the employee adequate advice on how to improve his
performance.
For example, the Tokyo District Court in the Rio 
Taint Jink case stated what an employer should be 
expected to do before dismissing an employee for
incompetence as follows: "Before an employer dismisses an 
employee for bad work performance or inefficiency, he
should make an effort to induce the employee to improve 
his performance or efficiency. The dismissal will only be 
permissible if the employer’s effort cannot bring about
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any substantial improvement in the employee's performance
and after it becomes clear that the discipline of the
workplace cannot be maintained unless the employee is
discharged from the workplace. In deciding on dismissal,
the employer has to consider whether the employee's bad
work performance shows a total lack of working ability or
7
a bad attitude to work."
These rules appear to resemble those set out in the
British decisions. However, the British decisions have
never indicated that the employer has to make sure that
the employee's work shows a total lack of working ability
or an "incurable" working attitude. They have also
allowed the employer to conclude that it would not be to
advantageous to his business to give the employee
alternative work even if it was available. Thus, in
Harris (Bevan) Ltd. v. Gair. the EAT stated as follows:
"The small scale of the appellants' business and the
circumstances of the respondent's proposed demotion were
such as would... entitle a reasonable employer to conclude
that even if he had a job to offer it would not be to
the advantage of his business that the employee should
continue in it. We certainly cannot accept the Tribunal’s
reasoning that the alternative job, if one was available,
8
should have been offered."
Japanese law prohibits employer from dismissing
employee for injury or illness incurred in the course of
9
duty for three years and 30 days, while British law does
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not provide any special consideration regarding dismissal
for injury or illness suffered while on duty. In Japan,
besides the above statutory regulation, there have been
many cases in which dismissal for health reasons was held
to be abusive. In Britain, there is also a body of case
law in which dismissal for heath reason was held to be
10
unfair. In Japan as well as in Britain, the employer is
required to discover the employee's true medical
condition, and therefore, must refer to medical reports
or certificates concerning the employee's physical
condition. The opinions of medical experts on an
employee's medical condition seem to be more decisive in
Japan than in Britain when determining whether or not
dismissal is permissible. Thus, in Japan, an employer
usually refers to many medical reports or certificates
before dismissing an employee and the credibility of
11
medical reports is often disputed in the courts. This
difference stems from the fact that British legislation
does not require the employer to prove the facts
substantiating his reason for dismissal.
In both Japan and Britain, the availability of
alternative employment is an important factor in
determining whether dismissal for ill health is
permissible. However, British tribunals look into whether
12
the employer considered the possibility of giving the 
employee an alternative job whereas the Japanese courts 
consider whether there was in fact no suitable job
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available for the employee. In the Nippo Service case,
the Tokyo District Court held that an employee who was
engaged to design and draw should have been transferred
to different work, or suspended when he became unable to
design and draw due to illness. The court further stated
that "it was not impossible for the employer to transfer
him to a suitable job, even if the employer could not
transfer him to the job to which the employee wanted to
13
be transferred." This is indicative of the degree to 
which Japanese courts and British tribunals will 
intervene in an employer’s decision to dismiss. It shows 
the difference between the "balancing interests" test and 
the "no reasonable employer" test. Unlike British 
tribunals, Japanese courts do not investigate the 
availability of a suitable alternative job for the 
employee from the view point of fair procedure but they 
do so to judge whether it is really necessary for the 
employer to resort to dismissal. The Japanese courts 
apply the "last resort" test to dismissals for 
incompetence or ill health. They also generally require 
the employer to retain the sick employee for much longer 
before dismissal than do the British tribunals.
The first question which the courts and tribunals 
look into when the reason for dismissal is disobedience, 
in both Japan and Britain, is whether or not the 
employer's order is lawful and within his contractual 
authority. To determine what authority was conferred on
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the employer, in Britain, it is usually necessary to
analyse the written statement of terms, custom and
14
practice and collective agreement. It has often been
held in cases involving workers in building and other
contracting industries that there is an implied mobility
15
clause because of the nature of the business. Japanese
courts tend to find an employer's authority to transfer
an employee to other jobs or working places more easily
by interpreting their contracts on the basis of
16
employment practices and provisions of shugyo kisoku.
If the order is unlawful, dismissal for the
employee’s refusal to obey it is not permissible in Japan
or in Britain. When an employer dismisses an employee for
his refusal to obey an order which was not within his
contractual duties, the means of determining the
unfairness or abusiveness of dismissal is strikingly
different between the two countries. Japanese courts
invariably hold the dismissal to be abusive, whereas
British courts further examine whether no reasonable
employer would have dismissed in that particular case. If
the employer has some sound, good business reason for
issuing his order, then the dismissal may be held to be 
17
fair. Japanese courts have a tendency to construe the 
employer's contractual authority to change an employee's 
work assignment more widely than the British tribunals. 
This is due to the Japanese lifetime employment practice 
under which the job descriptions of employees are
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generally very vague indeed.
In Britain, an employer is entitled to dismiss an
employee for dishonesty if he believes, on reasonable
grounds, that the employee has been dishonest. Thus, in
determining whether or not dismissal for dishonesty is
fair, it is very important to discover whether the
employer has carried out as thorough an investigation
into the matter as was reasonable in all the
18
circumstances of the case. In Japan, an employer is 
entitled to dismiss an employee for dishonesty only if 
the employee has in fact acted dishonestly. So, Japanese 
courts generally do not make much of whether the employer 
has made a formal investigation of the facts.
As far as dismissal for criminal conduct outside the
employment is concerned, the treatment of such a
dismissal is almost identical in Japan and Britain. The
most important factor is whether the offence is one that
makes the worker unsuitable for his type of work or
19
unacceptable to other employees. In Japan, however, the 
effect that the employee’s offence has on the reputation 
of the company is another crucial factor when the court 
has to determine whether or not the dismissal was 
abusive. In the Nihon Kokan Company case, the Supreme 
Court held that: "In order to hold that the employee’s 
disgraceful conduct (trespass on the premises of a US 
Forces base and confrontation with police officers 
defending the base) has damaged the reputation and image
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of the company, the court need not find that that conduct
resulted in a real disruption of business operations or
real disadvantages for the company. However, the court
may so rule, if the court considers that that kind of
conduct may have a serious influence on the reputation
and image of the company, having regard to all the
20
circumstances of the case."
In Japan, there have been many cases in which an
employer had taken ’punitive dismissal* action against an
employee for misrepresentation or concealment of his
personal history at the time of hiring. In many cases,
the court has affirmed the effectiveness of the action on
the grounds that the employee’s dishonesty not only leads
the employer to exercise misjudgment in deciding an
appointment, terms and conditions of employment or his
allocation but is also against mutual trust and therefore
that it has a harmful influence on the discipline of the 
21
workplace. This shows that Japanese courts make much of 
trust and the confidential relationship between employee 
and employer when deciding on the effectiveness of 
’punitive dismissal’. A common tendency may be found in 
the way the courts treat the employee’s uncooperative or 
inharmonious character in cases of dismissal. The 
attitude of the court towards an employee’s 
misrepresentation or concealment of personal history 
contrasts with its relatively tolerant attitude towards 
an employee’s physical assault on his fellow employee.
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This attitude of the courts may be said to reflect the 
necessity for a close relationship between the employee 
and the employer in order to maintain life-time 
employment practices.
Probably one of the greatest differences between 
Japanese law of abusive dismissal and British unfair 
dismissal law is that the latter often makes dismissal 
fair on the basis of "some other substantial reason" even 
if the employee does not breach his contractual duty. In 
Japan, the cases where the court allows dismissal without 
the employee’s breach of contract are strictly limited to 
those in which there is a union-shop agreement and where 
the employer satisfies the requirements of dismissal for 
economic reasons.
5.2. REMEDIES
Japanese law provides a declaration of voidance of
dismissal with an order of back-pay as a remedy for
abusive dismissal. American law awards for compensatory
damages for breach of contract and both compensatory and
punitive damages for tortious dismissal. In most cases,
British common law only provides for compensatory damages
equal to the remuneration which the employee would have 
e
rec^Leved if he had been given the requisite period of 
notice, although there are exceptions in respect of lost 
pension rights or other fringe benefits. It should be 
noted that if the employee’s contract entitles him to a 
period of consultation or appeal, the courts have
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recently become more willing to award damages for such a 
period beyond the period of notice. British unfair 
dismissal law provides for specially defined financial 
compensation subject to minimum and maximum amounts, 
and, in very few cases, reinstatement or re-engagement. 
The rule of mitigation applies to compensatory damages 
under both American and British common law and the 
British unfair dismissal compensation. Thus, the amount 
of compensation that a wrongfully or unfairly dismissed 
employee may actually obtain is very small. In the United 
States, if dismissal is held to constitute a tort, the 
amount of compensation may be very generous since the 
jury have discretion to decide the level of punitive 
damages. In comparison, in Japan, any reduction made due 
to earnings from other employment after dismissal is 
limited to those exceeding 60 % of the employee's
"average wages" as defined in the L.S.L., s.12. Unlike 
Britain and the United States, the employee is not 
required to make a reasonable effort to gain from other 
employment to minimize the loss.
The Japanese judicial declaration of voidance of 
dismissal is almost identical to declaratory judgments in 
Britain and the United States. In Britain, a declaratory 
judgment has, so far, been of relatively limited use in 
cases of dismissal. It is only available, in special 
circumstances, for an employee who has the status of 
office-holder, a special statutory status or a
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contractual right to procedural justice. The grant of a 
declaratory judgment in Britain is discretionary and the 
court may refuse it where the employer has lost trust and 
confidence in the employee. In the United States, 
declaratory judgments are not available in cases of 
termination of a private employment relationship.
In British dismissal cases, an injunction may also 
be available at common law. In practice, most injunctions 
which have been awarded are interlocutory, and final 
injunctions are rare. In the United States, the courts 
have never awarded an injunction in a case of termination 
of private employment. Nor do Japanese courts have the 
power to make an order to prevent a dismissal. However, 
they may issue a provisional disposition order. A 
provisional disposition is in fact very similar to a 
British interlocutory injunction. The employee may obtain 
a provisional disposition order on the basis of ex parte 
testimony. In Japan, non-compliance with a provisional 
disposition order cannot result in punishment whereas in 
Britain, failure to observe the requirements of an 
interlocutory injunction could be held to be contempt of 
court. A provisional disposition order usually not only 
preserves the employee’s status but also requires the 
employer to pay some or all of the employee's wages until 
the employee's rights have been decided finally by the 
court. The main problem with a provisional disposition 
orders is the time spent on the proceedings.
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The development of common law remedies for wrongful 
dismissal in Britain very much contrasts that for 
wrongful discharge in the United States. British courts 
have recently become willing to grant equitable remedies 
for breaches of the employee's contractual right to 
procedural justice. American courts, however, have 
recently become willing to award damages either for 
breach of contract or for tort. In Britain damages for 
wrongful dismissal are limited to compensatory damages, 
while in the United States punitive damages are also 
available in cases of tortious dismissal.
The Japanese declaratory judgment of voidance of 
dismissal is not itself enforceable. It is accompanied by 
a judgment ordering the company to pay the unpaid wages 
plus interest from the time of dismissal. The judgment 
usually also orders the employer to pay wages accruing 
after the time of the judgment and therefore the employer 
must continue to pay wages after the time of judgment his 
contract with the employee has not terminated for any 
cause. Thus, reinstatement of the employee may be 
realized by such a declaration.
This remedy is not always suitable. For example, 
those employees who do not expect their employment to 
last for long, such as part-time workers, workers after 
their attainment of a compulsory retirement age, etc. do 
not usually desire reinstatement. Even if the employee 
does not want to return to his company, in theory, he can
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use the litigation process in order to gain the court's 
affirmation of his status as an employee and quit the 
company just after winning his case, solely in order to 
get wages payable until that time. It is questionable 
whether an ordinary employee would have knowledge of such 
legal technicalities and even if he had, whether he would 
be ready to pursue his litigation while concealing his 
real intent. This litigation for affirmation of employee 
status cannot be entered in the summary court, which is 
designed to deal with litigation in a swifter way. Since 
an abusive dismissal is automatically void, it is not 
easy to recognize the concept of "constructive 
dismissal". It may therefore be better to allow the 
employee to claim damages for any future loss of wages on 
a tort basis. However, according to the Yoshimura case, 
the employee cannot be awarded such damages since abusive 
dismissal is void and he does not intend to return to the 
job. In other words, the employee is not expected to want 
to return to the job, and the consequences of voidance of 
dismissal are too severe for the employer. According to 
the Yoshimura case, the employee cannot be awarded 
damages for future loss of wages when his claim is based 
on the principle of tort.
In contrast, American remedies are limited to 
monetary compensation. Damages for breach of an 
employment contract terminable only for good cause 
usually equal the employee’s lost earnings for a
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reasonable period minus earnings from any work obtained 
since the dismissal. The length of a ’reasonable period’ 
during which the employee would have remained in the same 
employment but for wrongful discharge is determined by a 
trial judge. This has been held to be as long as eight 
years, ten years and even twenty-six years. This 
indicates that the dismissed employee should be paid a 
considerable amount of advance pay. This remedy is unable 
to relieve the unjustly dismissed employee of non­
economic difficulties which are caused by his exclusion 
from the workplace community such as loss of social 
status, self-esteem and friendship. Nor does it assist 
the employee in adjusting himself to a new job and 
workplace community. An order or judgment restraining 
dismissal is a more effective remedy against unjust 
dismissal, and therefore British injunctions or 
declaratory judgments at common law or Japanese 
declaratory judgments are more favourable remedies.
British unfair dismissal law offers a more flexible 
remedy compared with Japanese and American law since a 
tribunal determines which remedy, re-employment or 
monetary compensation, should be awarded to the employee 
in each case. Despite the statutory preference for re­
employment above compensation, tribunals rarely order re­
employment. Less than 2 % of the total number of
successful applications have resulted in orders for 
reinstatement or re-engagement in recent years. The vast
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majority of successful complainants only receive
compensation. Of the claims upheld between April 1994 and
March 1995, 1.6 % resulted in orders for re-employment,
62.1 % in awards of compensation, 33.9 % in remedies left
22
to the parties and 2.4 % in no award. The practice of
infrequently ordering re-employment seems to reflect on
the agreement of settlements at the stage of ACAS
conciliation. In most cases settled by ACAS conciliation,
the applicant obtains monetary compensation. In only 1.2
% of cases settled by ACAS conciliation between April
1995 and March 1996, could the applicant obtain re- 
23
employment.
It is reasonable that the tribunal must consider 
whether the employee wishes to be reinstated and whether 
it is practicable for the employer to comply with an 
order for reinstatement. However, from the view-point of 
the employee’s protection, it is not advantageous for 
tribunals to have construed the practicability of re­
employment in a very strict sense, since it should be the 
employer who bears the risk resulting from unfair 
dismissal. It may also be questioned whether it is for 
the tribunal to consider the employee’s contributory 
fault in determining whether the employee should be re­
employed. From the view-point of the employee’s 
protection, it is a quite unreasonable requirement, 
especially when taking account of the fact that the 
tribunal has to apply the "no reasonable employer’ test
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to determine on fairness of dismissal.
The order for re-employment under the unfair 
dismissal legislation has also been criticized for the 
following reasons. Firstly, it assumes that the contract 
of employment has already been broken by dismissal and 
therefore, the status quo is the dismissal which the 
tribunal's order must reverse. Secondly, unlike an 
equitable order restraining dismissal, the order for re­
employment may not be enforced by the sanction of
24
contempt of court proceedings.
Compared with monetary compensation under American 
common law, monetary compensation under unfair dismissal 
legislation is much more precisely structured. This is 
mainly due to the fact that a tribunal consists of two 
lay members as well as a lawyer. It appears to lead to 
smaller compensatory awards from tribunals especially as 
tribunals may reduce the amount of compensation by a 
proportion which they consider just and equitable having 
regard to the employee's conduct prior to the dismissal. 
Although it is reasonable to consider the employee’s 
contributory fault in order to calculate monetary 
compensation for unjust dismissal, tribunals should be 
very careful about establishing the employee’s 
contributory fault. Otherwise, monetary compensation 
might lose its influence as a means of protection for the 
employee against unjust dismissal. The concept of 
'culpability or blameworthiness’ as is necessary for
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contributory fault, which was defined by the Court of
Appeal in Nelson v. BBC (No.2)(supra.) appears to be too
wide and not defined with sufficient clarity to be able
to guide the tribunals’ discretionary powers.
Tribunals cannot make an award of damages for the
employee's injured feelings. They are also bound by the
maximum statutory level of compensation. According to
P.Lewis's investigation of successful complainants in
unfair dismissal hearings in one area of Britain between
1 June 1976 and 31 May 1978, about 44 % of those who
specified an amount of compensation felt that at least
25
treble the amount actually awarded was necessary. Since
then, the amount of compensation awarded has increased as
in 1978, the median award was £375, and by 1995 it had
26
risen to £3,289. This does not mean that the real value
of monetary compensation awarded had risen because weekly
earnings of employees also increased in monetary terms
27
during this period.
In order to evaluate the adequacy of compensation
awarded by tribunals, one should take into account how
long the dismissed employees are likely to take to find
new jobs and how much they are likely to spend on legal
costs. The latter question is important because, between
April 1990 and March 1991, 33 % of applicants sought
advice from solicitors or barristers and 24 % were
28
represented by them at industrial tribunal hearings.
An investigation carried out by L.Dickens et al. in 1978
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found that less than half of the successful complainants
29
had found a new job within three months. In the light
of the unemployment rates in 1978 and 1995, it cannot be
presumed that the duration has drastically changed. The
Justice Committeee’s information in 1987 indicated that
the legal costs of bringing a simple unfair dismissal
30
case to a hearing were between £2,000 and £3,000. It 
appears, therefore, the amount of compensation awarded is 
often neither enough to cover all the dismissed employees 
losses nor to have a deterrent effect on unjust 
dismissal.
5.3. PROCEDURES
Regarding the proceedings for unjust dismissal, only 
British unfair dismissal law has established a system 
which is expected to be a cheap, easily accessible, 
technicality-free and expert court system. Both Japan and 
the U.S. still make use of the conventional court system. 
In Britain, however, the above expectations have not been 
fully realised, as in reality, the tribunals are subject 
to the rules common in ordinary courts; legal oath, 
cross-examination, legal review by the higher courts and 
so on. The chairmen of tribunals are lawyers, and 44 % of 
the employers and 24 % of the employees are represented 
by lawyers at the tribunal hearings. As a result, it was 
reported that, in a quarter of all cases of unfair 
dismissal, the time taken to process cases was longer
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than 20 weeks. Also, the average time taken for a case to
go from the tribunals to a hearing by the EAT was two
31
years in England and Wales in 1992.
Britain is the only country that promotes an agreed
settlement through a well organized conciliation system.
In fact, a large proportion of applications for unfair
dismissal are disposed of at the stage of ACAS
conciliation. In 1995, 43.2 % of applications were
settled by ACAS, 28 % were withdrawn, and only 28.8 % of
32
the applications were heard by the tribunals. From the 
view-point of employees’ protection, swift settlement of 
a complaint is extremely crucial in a case of dismissal. 
In this sense, Japanese law is highly unsatisfactory, 
since proceedings for abusive dismissal take far too
long.
Finally, the range of employees intended to be
covered by the laws of dismissal is very important. As 
the Japanese law of dismissal has been developed on the 
basis of an application of the general rules of the Civil 
Code. there is no particular limitation to its
application, except that public employees alone subject 
to public law protection. British unfair dismissal 
legislation excludes a significant range of employees by 
excluding those who have not continuously worked for the 
same employer for more than two years, for example.
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- PART III -
CHAPTER 6 
LEGAL PROTECTION AGAINST DISMISSAL 
THROUGH COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
6.1. INTRODUCTION
We have reviewed the direct legal control of
dismissal by statutes or case-law and found that far less
direct control exists in the United States than in either
Japan or Britain. However, dismissal may also be
controlled indirectly, through collective agreements. The
United States has developed a unique system of grievance
arbitration for resolving disputes over dismissal which
provided for by collective agreements. Under this system,
it is not the court but the arbitrator who determines
whether a dismissal has been carried out in contravention
of the provisions of the agreement. In determining this,
the arbitrator examines both substantive and procedural
aspects of the dismissal. The court simply enforces the
arbitrator's award1 unless it clearly contradicts either
o
those provisions or explicit public policy.
Neither Japan nor Britain has any equivalent 
procedures operating within a similar legal framework. In 
these two countries, it is for the court or the tribunal 
to determine whether dismissal is unjust, although there 
are substantial differences between Japanese and British 
laws. In Japan, most collective agreements have just
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cause provisions as well as provisions requiring certain 
procedures for dismissal. Violation of these provisions 
often makes the dismissal void. In comparison, just cause 
provisions are not prevalent in Britain. Moreover, 
British tribunals require the employer to take rather 
formal procedural steps when dismissing an employee 
whether or not they are collectively agreed. Thus, in 
practice, collectively agreed procedures appear to be 
less important in Britain than in Japan in determining 
whether dismissal is just. There are, however, 
arbitration clauses in some collective agreements in 
Britain, but no such clauses in Japan are rare.
In this chapter, we will first discuss grievance 
arbitration in American collective agreements, and then 
we will examine dismissal provisions of collective 
agreements and their effects in Japan and Britain.
6.2. GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION IN AMERICAN COLLECTIVE 
AGREEMENTS
6.2.1. COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS AND ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 
Employees in unionized sectors are protected against 
unjust discharge by grievance and arbitration provisions 
in collective agreements. BNA found discharge and 
discipline provisions to be present in 98 % of the 400 
sample collective agreements. "Cause" or "just cause" is 
stipulated as a reason for discharge in 86 % of these
7
agreements. Many agreements provide for the procedure to 
be followed on discharge.4
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Most collective bargaining agreements contain 
arbitration provisions which provide that an arbitrator, 
or arbitrators, agreed upon by both parties shall decide 
on any difference involving the meaning and application 
of any provision of the agreement that has not been 
satisfactorily settled in the grievance procedure. 
Arbitrators are selected by the mutual agreement of both 
parties. Where the contracts stipulate selection of 
arbitrators on a case-by-case basis, many of them provide 
that, if the parties are unable to agree on an 
arbitrator, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service or the American Arbitration Association may 
select the arbitrator or present a list of arbitrators to 
the parties.
Formal pre-hearing discovery procedures are very 
limited in arbitration. However, since grievance and 
arbitration procedures can only be maintained properly on 
the basis of the mutual good faith of both parties, facts 
are normally disclosed on an informal basis.
The location and timing of an arbitration hearing is 
in principle determined by the parties but, if they 
cannot agree on this, the arbitrator is usually given the
n
power to decide. The parties have to be notified of the 
time and location of the hearing under many state 
statutes. The arbitration hearing is not open to the 
public. The parties in arbitration proceedings are 
entitled to be represented by their counsel. The
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arbitrator can issue a subpoena for the attendance of a 
witness which is enforceable by a federal court under 
Section 301 of LMRA.8
A party’s choice of witnesses and the order of their 
appearance in arbitration hearings is subject to few 
restriction. A witness may refuse to attend before an 
arbitration hearing for fear of reprisal and therefore 
some arbitrators accept statements from an informer whose 
identity is kept secret. Reprisals against witnesses may 
be held to be an unfair labor practice under Section 
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations A c t . An 
arbitration hearing may be held not to have been 
conducted where witnesses were subjected to the threat of
q
retaliation.°
Some state statutes require all witnesses to be 
under oath. This is often preferred by the parties even 
if it is not required by statute. The parties are 
entitled to cross-examine witnesses and the cross- 
examination need not be limited to the scope of direct 
examination. The arbitrator normally has authority to 
decide whether an adjournment of the hearing may be 
granted. Failure to grant an adjournment for good cause 
may make the proceedings vulnerable to court challenge.1  ^
It has long been understood that strict legal rules 
of evidence do not have to be observed in arbitration 
proceedings. A federal district court has stated: "In an 
arbitration the parties have submitted the matter to
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persons whose judgment they trust, and it is for the
arbitrators to determine the weight and credibility of
evidence presented to them without restrictions as to the
rules of admissibility which would apply in a court of 
11law". For example, the strict rules of hearsay evidence
applied in the courts are not necessarily applicable to 
1 ?arbitration.
The general rule is that the burden of proof is on
the party who presented the claim. However, in
disciplinary cases, it is a well-established principle
that the burden is on the employer both to proceed first
with its evidence and to prove the employee guilty of
wrongdoing. 14 The degree of proof required in the
arbitration of discharge cases is still unsettled. Some
arbitrators have required proof beyond a reasonable doubt
but others a lesser degree of proof such as a
preponderance of the evidence, or clear and convincing
evidence, or evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable
1 6mind of guilt. As far as the evidential burden is 
concerned, once the employer has introduced sufficient 
’just cause’ for discharge, the burden passes to the 
union which must then successfully rebut the employer’s 
case.
6.2.2. "JUST CAUSE" FOR DISCHARGE
It can be said that arbitrators generally are 
liberal in finding discharge. They tend to find that the
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employee was discharged unless it is shown clearly that 
he intended to resign. Even where a statement of intent 
to resign is shown, the arbitrators look into whether the 
statement was made after reasonable consideration and not 
while under unreasonable threatening or severe emotional 
stress. They do not easily conclude that the employee 
resigned voluntarily.
With regard to "just cause" for discharge, certain 
standards have become established through accumulated 
arbitration decisions. The following are widely accepted 
factors which arbitrators have taken into account in 
deciding whether the employer discharged the employee 
with just cause.
A fair balance between the offence and the severity
of the penalty is always regarded as an important factor
1 7to be considered. Many arbitrators refuse to uphold the
discharge where the employer fails to fulfill procedural
requirements specified in collective agreements, such as
giving written notice of the charge, warnings, making
investigations, having a hearing or joint discussion of
assessment of punishment. However, in many other cases,
compliance with the spirit of such procedural
requirements suffices where the employee has not been
adversely affected by the employer's failure to fully
1 8comply with the procedure.
Many arbitrators hold that the existence of a just 
cause must be proven objectively and that the employer's
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genuine belief in its existence is not sufficient to
justify discharge. They maintain that only evidence
bearing on the charges made at the time of discharge
should be taken into consideration when determining the
1 Qexistence of cause.
Particularly in cases of discharge for incompetence, 
arbitrators generally expect the employer to demote, 
transfer, retrain, and supervise, resorting to discharge
O Q
only when there is no alternative. In cases of 
discharge for lack of work, arbitrators sometimes state 
that layoff is the appropriate action. Arbitrators 
ordinarily examine all circumstances relevant to a 
discharge and endeavour to find anything relevant to 
reduce discharge to an appropriate lighter disciplinary 
measure.
6.2.3. REMEDIES
It is common practice for an arbitrator who finds 
that a discharge was not for "just cause", to award 
reinstatement with or without back pay. An essential part 
of the remedy is therefore reinstatement of the 
discharged employee.
Arbitrators sometimes make awards of reinstatement 
conditional. Elkouri & Elkouri list some examples of 
cases where reinstatement was conditional upon an 
employee taking specific action. "Reinstatement has been 
ordered on condition that the employee resign his outside 
job, that he furnish an indemnity bond required by the
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employer, that he sign an agreement by which he promises 
to apply, and comply conscientiously with, company safety 
rules, that he reduce his weight from 340 to 215 pounds 
and quit smoking cigarettes, and that he accept 
counselling from his pastor or some competent social
ppagency”.
Other types of conditional reinstatement award may
be ordered. If discharge was based on a defect in the
employee’s mental or physical capacity, the arbitrator
often makes reinstatement conditional on proof of mental
or physical fitness. Where the arbitrator considers
discharge is too harsh a penalty against the employee for
certain misconduct, he often orders reinstatement which
23is conditional on the non-recurrence of the misconduct.
The arbitrator sometimes orders reinstatement of the
employee to a job different to the original. The reason
may be the employee’s physical condition, incompetence or
disqualification from continuing his former job, a need
to screen him from contacts with the public, personality
24conflicts, sexual harassment or similar problems.
Arbitrators usually award reinstatement with or 
without back pay to an employee who has been improperly 
discharged. However, arbitrators may award back pay 
without granting reinstatement. This has occurred where 
the employee’s behaviour is considered to be incapable of 
improvement, where a minor procedural requirement is 
violated prior to discharge, and where the discharged
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employee has already secured employment elsewhere and
O R
does not desire to be reinstated.
Arbitrators may reduce the amount of back pay in the 
following circumstances; ” (i) the grievant or the union 
was guilty of unusual delay in seeking arbitration or in 
selecting the arbitrator, (ii) the grievant had outside 
wage earnings which should be deducted, (iii) the 
grievant 'failed to seek other employment which would 
have mitigated the amount of back pay', and (iv) the
n p
grievant had a poor attendance record.”
6.3. COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS AND DISMISSAL PROCEDURES 
IN JAPAN AND BRITAIN
6.3.1. PROVISIONS CONCERNING DISCIPLINE AND DISMISSAL
(1)JAPAN
In Japan, most collective agreements contain 
provisions concerning disciplinary action and dismissal. 
According to a survey made by the Central Labour 
Commission, out of a sample of 606 agreements, 433 (71.5 
%) incorporated provisions concerning disciplinary action 
(including 'punitive dismissal’), and 501 (82.7 %)
contained provisions concerning dismissal, i.e. 'ordinary 
dismissal’. Of the agreements which included provisions 
concerning disciplinary action, 312 (72.1 %) either
specified standards for such action or provided the means 
of settling such standards, and 247 (40.7 %) stipulated 
procedures involving unions.
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Of the agreements which contained provisions
concerning dismissal, 402 (80.2 %) specified standards
for dismissal and 68 (13.6 %) provided a way of settling
standards for dismissal. The 402 agreements specifying
standards for dismissal often stipulated the following
matters as just cause; physical or mental disability
(71.3 %), misconduct punishable by ’punitive dismissal’
(57.1 %), expiration of suspension for illness or other
justifiable reasons (38.5 %) and incompetence (35.0 %).
461 agreements contained provisions on dismissal
procedure. Many of them did not provide for a high degree
of union involvement, but 118 (25.6 %) required the
employer to consult with the union and 20 (4.4 %)
required him either to obtain consent from the union or
to consult with the union before making his final
decision. Among the remaining agreements, 95 (20.6 %)
provided for the union to be given notice or explanation
of the dismissal and 7 (1.5 %) for it to have the
27union’s opinion heard.
It should be pointed out that union involvement in 
disciplinary and dismissal procedure is quite often found 
in provisions of the shugyo kisoku rather than within 
collective agreements. Since there are often unwritten 
agreements or practices between the employers and the 
unions, it cannot be denied that in practice unions are 
involved in dismissals or other disciplinary matters 
without formal procedures. A survey carried out by the
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Ministry of Labour found the following: regarding
dismissal, 35.2 % of the enterprises surveyed are
required to consult with their unions, 12.2 % to obtain 
consent from their unions and 14.9 % to notify their
po
unions prior to dismissal.
(2) BRITAIN
In Britain, the latest official Workplace Industrial 
Relations survey found that 90 % of the establishments
surveyed had disciplinary and dismissal procedures, and 
93 % of these were written procedures agreed with unions. 
It was also discovered that the procedure at 
establishment level often contained a provision for the 
appeal of an unresolved case to a body or person outside 
the establishment. Such provisions were found in 94 % of 
the procedures laid down at establishments in the public
pq
sector and 62 % in the private sector.
The third parties commonly specified in these
provisions include higher-level management (64 %), union
officials (11 %), ACAS (15 %), higher-level management
and union officials jointly (12 %), e m p l o y e r s 1
association and union officials jointly (7 %) and
arbitration bodies other than ACAS (4 %). Of those
respondents reporting provisions for third-party
intervention involving ACAS, 60 % said referral involved
both conciliation and arbitration, 20% - conciliation
30only and 9 % - arbitration only.
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6.3.2. LEGAL EFFECT OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS
(1) JAPAN
Section 16 of the L.U.L. provides: "Any clause of an 
individual contract of employment contravening the 
standards concerning conditions of work and other 
treatment of workers provided for in a collective 
agreement shall be null and void. In this case, the 
invalidated part of the individual contract of employment 
shall be replaced by provisions as contained in the 
collective agreement. The same rule shall apply to any 
part which is not laid down in the individual contract of 
employment." On the basis of this Section, the courts 
have held that a dismissal which is not based on the 
reasons specified in the collective agreement is void. 
However, in most cases, such a dismissal may also be 
considered abusive and therefore void. Thus, the legal 
effect of just cause provisions in collective agreements 
is not greatly significant.
In contrast, since the courts have made little of 
procedural aspects in determining the abusiveness of 
dismissal in ordinary cases unless a clear legal basis 
for doing so is proved to exist, procedural requirements 
contained within collective agreements have been a very 
important factor for the courts when determining whether 
dismissal is abusive. Where the collective agreement 
requires the employer to consult with or obtain consent
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from the union before dismissal, the court usually denies 
the legal effectiveness of dismissals carried out without 
advance consultation or consent. It has though been 
questioned whether the requirement for such consultation 
or consent before dismissal can be considered as falling 
among "the standards concerning conditions of work and
•z 1
other treatment of workers’1.
With regard to consultation, the courts have always
inquired whether the employer engaged in substantial
consultation with the union prior to dismissal. This is a
crucial factor in cases of dismissal for redundancy where
the courts require consultation with the union even if
the collective agreement itself does not require it. The
courts have always inquired why the employer did not or
could not have consulted with or obtained consent from
the union. Where they have found that there is a
justifiable reason for such lack of consultation or
"z o
consent, dismissals have been held to be valid. The 
courts have also held dismissal without consultation 
valid where the union refused to deal with the company’s
•z *7
proposal for redundancy dismissals and, also, where the 
union did not have a genuine intention to consult with 
the employer.^4
As regards provisions requiring the employer to 
obtain union consent, the courts have held that the 
union’s refusal to give its consent to dismissal may, in 
exceptional circumstances, constitute abuse of the right
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*7 c:
to consent. Therefore, even if there is a provision 
requiring the employer to consult with or obtain consent 
from the union prior to dismissal, the dismissal may be 
valid due to the union’s attitude.
Furthermore, it should be noted that there is 
disagreement as to whether or not the provisions of a 
collective agreement requiring the u n i o n ’s advance 
consultation or consent may apply to non-union members in 
the same undertaking. This is because Section 17 of the 
L.U.L. provides that: ’When three-quarters or more of the 
workers of the same kind regularly employed in a 
particular undertaking are covered by a particular 
collective agreement, the agreement concerned shall be 
regarded as also applying to the remaining workers of the 
same kind employed in the undertaking concerned." Since 
the Supreme Court has held that only the provisions of a 
collective agreement relating to "the standards 
concerning conditions of work and other treatment of 
workers" can be applied to the remaining workers of the
7 e
same kind, it follows that if the provisions requiring 
union consultation or consent constitute such standards, 
those provisions may apply to these workers. However,
■z 7
courts generally deny such application. This is 
reasonable in view of the fact that the union’s duty of 
representation has not been recognised.
(2) BRITAIN
Written collective agreements are conclusively
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presumed not to be intended by the parties to be legally 
enforceable contracts unless the agreement "contains a 
provision which (however expressed) states that the 
parties intend that the agreement shall be a legally
■Z O
enforceable contract." Accordingly, unions cannot 
enforce dismissal or dispute procedure agreements, at 
unless this is otherwise agreed with the employers. 
Certain terms of collective agreements may, however, 
become incorporated into individual employment contracts 
and become legally binding between the employer and 
individual employees. This will happen typically where 
the parties to an employment contract have expressly 
agreed that the relevant terms of a collective agreement 
will be incorporated into their contract.
There is a distinction between terms in a collective 
agreement which are designed and intended to govern the 
relationship between the employer and the union, and 
those designated and intended to benefit individual 
employees. Only terms which come within the latter 
category are apt for contractual enforcement by 
individual employees.4® If they are substantive terms 
such as enhanced redundancy payments, they are normally 
incorporated.41 However, procedural clauses, even though 
they appear to be intended to benefit individual 
employees, have often been regarded as inappropriate for 
incorporation. For example, with regard to a last-in, 
first-out agreement for redundancy selection, divergent
opinions were given in the interlocutory injunction 
hearing and the full trial of Alexander v. Standard 
Telephones and Cable Ltd.. In the injunction hearing, it 
was held to be arguable that this agreement had been 
incorporated into individual contracts of employment on 
the grounds that it was designed and intended to benefit 
individual employees.4  ^ By contrast after the full trial, 
it was held that there was no such incorporation.4^
Express incorporation fits in with the employer’s 
duty to provide a written statement of particulars of 
employment as required under the EP(C)A, ss.1-4. In the 
statement, the employer is required to specify any 
disciplinary rules applicable to that employee or refer 
the employee to the provisions of a document which 
contains such information and which the employee has a 
reasonable opportunity to read. This document could well 
be a collective agreement. Where an employer includes a 
note in the particulars of employment which refers to the 
disciplinary rules and procedures provided by a 
collective agreement, it is easier for an employee to 
prove that those rules and procedures are incorporated 
into his contract of employment.
Even if it is held that a dismissal procedure 
stipulated in a collective agreement has been 
incorporated into an employee’s contract, the common-law 
remedy for the employee, which may arise from dismissal 
contravening such procedure, has not, until very
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recently, been significant except in cases of permanent
or tenured employment. 44 However, as pointed out in
Chapter 3.1.1., because of recent developments concerning
contractual rights to procedural justice, there is a
strong possibility that an employee, especially when
employed by a large company or public authority, may
have more effective common-law remedies, such as an
injunction or a declaration. This is because mutual
confidence will be easily maintained in such an company
or authority. The court may infer that the employee has
accepted the e m p l o y e r ’s repudiation in certain 
4 5circumstances.
Agreements relating to dispute procedure agreements 
are also relevant in the context of the unfair dismissal 
legislation. It may be held that a dismissal contravening
A R
the provisions of a collective agreement is unfair. In 
Bailey v. BP Oil Kent Refinery Ltd. (1980), the Court of 
Appeal, however, held: "In most cases, if not all, a
failure to comply with [a disciplinary procedure] 
agreement would be a factor to be taken into account; but 
the weight to be given to it would depend on the 
circumstances. An Industrial Tribunal should not base its 
decision on reasoning to the effect that because there 
has been a failure to comply, the dismissal must have 
been unfair."47
6 .3.3.CONCILIATION, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION
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(1) BRITAIN
As has already been mentioned, some dismissal 
procedures provide for disputes regarding dismissal to be 
referred to arbitration bodies. However, even where there 
are no such provisions, the parties to these disputes 
may refer them to ACAS or some other arbitration body 
with their ad hoc agreement. The TULR(C)A, s.212(1) 
provides: "where a trade dispute exists or is apprehended 
ACAS may, at the request of one or more parties to the 
dispute and with the consent of all the parties to the 
dispute, refer all or any of the matters to which the 
dispute relates for settlement to the arbitration of -
(a) one or more persons appointed by the Service for that 
purpose (not being officers or employees of ACAS);
(b) the Central Arbitration Committee."
The "trade dispute" referred to in the TULR(C)A, 
s. 218 includes a dispute connected with a wide range of 
matters, including discipline and termination of 
employment. Where the parties refer the dismissal dispute 
to ACAS for arbitration, ACAS first "shall consider the 
likelihood of the dispute being settled by conciliation" 
and, "where there exist appropriate agreed procedures for 
negotiation or the settlement of disputes, ACAS shall not 
refer a matter for settlement to arbitration unless (a) 
those procedures have been used and have failed to result 
in a settlement or (b) there is, in ACAS’s opinion, a 
special reason which justifies arbitration. . .as an
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4 Ralternative to those procedures”.
Where ACAS considers a dismissal dispute to be
suitable to be referred to arbitration, it will most
frequently be referred to a single arbitrator. The
Central Arbitration Committee, a permanent body, is not
often used for voluntary arbitration. A board of
arbitration is generally used for more important issues
4Qthan matters of dismissal. Since British arbitration is 
voluntary in nature, and since British collective 
agreements are not usually legally enforceable contracts, 
neither party, on the basis of the general provisions by 
which disputes are referred to arbitration, has a legal 
right to refer a dismissal dispute to arbitration without 
the agreement of the other party on that particular 
occasion. Furthermore, arbitration awards made as a 
result of voluntary arbitration arranged by ACAS are not 
legally binding. w
Accordingly, in practice, ACAS utilizes the 
conciliation stage to ensure that the parties have
committed themselves in advance to accept and implement
the arbitrator’s award even though arbitration is not
C 1
legally binding. Where the parties are not able to give 
an undertaking to accept the award but want positive
suggestions on how to resolve the dispute, ACAS is
CO
entitled to refer the dispute to mediation. However, 
mediation is not often used and is particularly rare in 
dismissal cases.
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The parties to a dispute concerning dismissal may, 
instead of requesting arbitration by one or more persons 
appointed by ACAS, ask the Service to assist them by 
providing the names of suitable arbitrators. The 
Institute of Arbitrators and other professional bodies 
chiefly concerned with commercial arbitration will also 
nominate arbitrators who undertake industrial 
arbitration. The Industrial Society also offers 
assistance in nominating suitable arbitrators.
When arbitration is arranged by ACAS, the fees and 
expenses of the arbitrator are borne by public funds. The 
fee for a single arbitrator in 1993 was 177 pounds per 
day. Most cases involving dismissals are heard by 
arbitrators within 6 weeks of notification to the ACAS 
and awards are returned to ACAS within 10 days of the
E e
hearing. Arbitrations are held privately in a 
conference or committee room at the place of
EC
employment. In dismissal arbitration, cases are usually
presented by full-time officials of the unions with shop
57stewards present. Statements in the arbitration hearing
E O
are not taken on oath ’The arbitrator questions both 
sides and [the parties] may ask questions of each other 
but through the arbitrator rather than by cross- 
examination.” Parties are ’rarely represented by lawyers, 
and then only with the arbitrator's agreement and after
EQ
consultation with the other side." Most hearings only
last between three and four hours.®®
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A body of precedent has never been established, and 
even standing arbitration bodies do not operate by means 
of precedents. In fact, industrial arbitrators give 
reasons for their award in some cases and not in
R 1others, although H. Concannon discovered that it was
common to find a statement of reasons when written
R ?arbitration awards have been made in dismissal cases
However, the arbitration award generally does not give
R ^detailed reasons but rather general considerations.
The number of requests made to ACAS for arbitration
and dispute mediation is rather small. In 1995, only 136
such requests were made. The majority of requests
continue to be for the services of a single arbitrator.
There were 129 such requests in 1995. Of the total number
of requests, 35% were concerned with dismissal, 15%
with annual pay, 20% with other pay and conditions of
R Aemployment, 26% with grading and 4% with other matters. 
There are also a smaller number of unknown arbitration 
cases not organised by ACAS.
Concannon found that the following remedies resulted 
from arbitration in 1977: "(T)here were 16 cases (out of 
a total of 24) in which dismissal was found to be
’unjustified’, or its equivalent. Of these 16, 
reinstatement was awarded in 14 cases, but reinstatement 
was usually ’on terms’. In one case, the employee was
downgraded - which was allowed for in the agreed 
procedure. In four cases, a formal disciplinary warning
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was given in the award. In four cases, the employee was
penalized by a disciplinary suspension. In the remaining
fi Rfive cases, there was a ’simple’ reinstatement award’. 
This shows that arbitrators often make compromise awards 
and this can meet the very objective of arbitration. 
Dickens et al. said that ”A ’compromise’ award is likely 
to be one which, at least, allows both parties to feel 
that they did not lose their case completely and which, 
therefore, may be more acceptable and workable as a
R Vsolution to the dispute’.
(2) JAPAN
In Japan, when an employee is dismissed, the union 
often takes action against the dismissal. In fact, all 
prolonged strikes since World War II, without exception, 
have been caused by unions taking action against 
dismissals. Such action is taken seriously because 
dismissal will impose a harsh financial burden on the 
employee under the system where life-time employment and
R ftseniority-based wages operate. It is not easy for 
Japanese unions to strike or to maintain strike action 
since they are enterprise unions and generally not well 
financed. Thus, the unions have made use of every means 
to defeat employers' dismissal decisions. The unions 
often encourage dismissed employees to take civil 
proceedings. In addition, they themselves often apply to 
the Labour Relations Commissions for relief on the 
grounds that the employer has committed an unfair labour
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practice.
The unions often request the conciliation or 
mediation from the LRCs in dismissal disputes in 
accordance with the provisions of collective agreements 
which require the parties to resolve disputes through 
conciliation or mediation before resorting to industrial 
action. Under the Labour Relations Adjustment Law 1945 
ss.12 and 18 the unions, alone, may request conciliation 
from the LRC but they can only initiate the request 
mediation either with the employer's agreement or in 
accordance with a collective agreement. It is also 
possible for unions to request arbitration under this 
Act, but this seldom occurs.
In 1995, the LRCs dealt with 501 requests arising
out of industrial disputes and slightly more than 15 % of
these disputes were concerned with management or
personnel matters. 375 of those requests were not
withdrawn and of these, 338 were disposed of through
conciliation, 28 through mediation and 10 through
arbitration. 74.4 % of conciliation cases concerning
RQdismissal disputes resulted in an agreed settlement.
The reason why conciliation is so popular in Japan 
was explained by Professor T.Hanami in the following 
terms: "Conciliation is the most informal and closest to 
the traditional Japanese method of settlement by amicable 
mutual understanding, while arbitration is the farthest 
removed. In the case of mediation, the usual practice is
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for the LRC to submit its proposal only after both 
parties have reached an ’understanding*. This is also 
true in cases where the LRC makes a conciliation 
proposal. It is often pointed out that the parties rarely 
refuse to accept an LRC proposal, since this would 
’destroy the face' of the commissioners; similarly, the 
commissioners would not submit a proposal which might be
7Drejected because they do not want to ’lose face’’.
6.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the United States, under the NLRA, a union may
acquire the status of an exclusive bargaining
representative in a bargaining unit through a bargaining
representation election. If the union acquires that
status, it has the right to bargain exclusively with the
employer regarding all employees in the unit whether they
7 1are members of the union or not. A collective agreement
concluded as a result of such bargaining will be legally
binding on both parties. Disputes arising from
interpretation of clauses of the collective agreement are
dealt with through grievance and arbitration procedures.
The union have owes a duty of fair representation to
the employees in the unit while it has an exclusive right
72to bargain for them. If an employee complains about his 
dismissal, the union has to proceed with or present the 
employee’s grievance and, if necessary, bring it to
7*z
arbitration. The union must also represent the employee
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adequately at the arbitration hearing.7^ If the union 
does not treat the employee fairly during grievance and 
arbitration proceedings, the employee may not only take 
action against the union in the courts for a breach of 
its duty of representation but may also make a charge to 
the NLRB for the union’s unfair labour practice.7^
Since collective agreements generally require ’just 
cause’ for dismissal, the arbitrator has to do more than 
merely interpret the meaning of ’just cause. It is 
arguable that the arbitrator has wide discretion to 
determine whether the employer had 'just cause’ for 
dismissal. In determining this, the arbitrator inquires 
into the procedural as well as the substantive aspects of 
dismissal. When the arbitrator awards a remedy, the court 
has to enforce his award unless it clearly contradicts 
either agreed provisions or public policy. Therefore, in 
the United States, in undertakings where there is a 
majority union elected as a bargaining representative, 
all employees in the unit who are covered by a collective 
agreement may be effectively protected from unjust 
dismissal.
Neither Japan nor Britain have any equivalent 
procedures operating within a similar legal framework; 
they have no systems similar to exclusive bargaining 
representation, grievance arbitration or the unions’ duty 
of fair representation. In Japan, collective agreements 
are usually only concerned with union members. Provisions
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of collective agreements concerning dismissal are a 
legally binding on employers and employees, but, since 
the rule of abusive dismissal makes dismissal without 
’just cause’ void, the 'just cause' provisions of 
collective agreements are not very significant legally. 
The procedural requirements provided for in collective 
agreements have a significant legal effect only in cases 
of dismissal.
In Britain, collective agreements apply to all 
workers irrespective of whether they are union members or 
not. Collective agreements do not generally contain 
’just cause’ provisions, but collectively agreed disputes 
procedures have sometimes been used to regulate 
dismissal. These procedures may be incorporated into 
individual employees' contracts. This has not yet had a 
significant impact on the protection of employees because 
the law of wrongful dismissal often cannot provide an 
effective remedy for dismissed employees. Also, since 
dismissal procedures are important factors in unfair 
dismissal legislation, whether or not they are 
collectively agreed, violation of a collectively agreed 
dismissal procedure is not essential in order to 
establish the unfairness of the procedural aspect of a 
dismissal.
In Britain, arbitration clause in collectively agreed 
dispute procedures are not generally binding in law since 
neither the union nor the employer usually intend to
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give them contractual status. By comparison, in Japan, 
any collectively agreed term relating to arbitration, 
mediation or conciliation, is generally binding in law, 
but it is considered not to be enforceable. All that the 
injured party may do is claim against the other party for 
damages on the grounds that the agreement has been 
broken.
It is interesting that, since American law provides 
legal enforcement for arbitration clauses as well as 
arbitration awards, dismissal is regulated through 
arbitration without the agreement of the employer on each 
occasion. Arbitration awards are widely published in 
several labour arbitration reports. Labour arbitrators 
formed a professional association, the National Academy 
of Arbitrators in 1947, and annual meetings are held to 
discuss various problems concerning labor arbitration. In 
this way, a modest system of precedents for grievance 
arbitration has been formed although settled cases may 
have neither binding force nor authoritative force in 
later cases. It is noticeable that Japanese law does not 
give settled court decisions binding force in late cases. 
Therefore, it is useful to compare the principle features 
of regulation through arbitrators in American with those 
of British tribunals and Japanese courts.
From the discussion earlier in this chapter, it can 
be seen that American arbitrators apply a "balancing 
interests" test to general dismissals and a "last resort"
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test to dismissal for incompetence and ill health. 
Similarly to Japanese abusive dismissal law, American 
grievance arbitration law makes much of the substantive 
aspects of dismissal. In this sense, both laws can be 
called "substance oriented law" compared with the 
"procedure oriented law" of the British unfair dismissal 
system.
British private labour arbitration is purely 
voluntary in nature. Arbitration is initiated by the 
agreement of both parties on each occasion, and an 
arbitration award is not legally binding. By comparison, 
American grievance arbitration is not purely voluntary in 
that an arbitration clause as well as an arbitration 
award is enforceable in federal courts. Arbitration 
awards have been widely published in the United States 
but not in Britain. Unlike American arbitration 
decisions, the full reasons are never set out in British 
arbitration decisions. American arbitration awards are 
subject to judicial review although, in practice, this is 
extremely limited. Private arbitration awards may not be 
reviewed by the courts in Britain.
American grievance arbitration proceedings are far 
more formal than British arbitration proceedings. An 
American arbitrator often issues subpoenas for witnesses 
or documents, and requires witnesses to be under oath. 
The parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses. This 
is not the case in British arbitration proceedings.
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British hearings are inquisitorial rather than 
adversarial. An arbitrator questions both sides and the 
parties may ask questions of each other but through the 
arbitrator rather than by cross-examination.
Strict rules of evidence are not applied to either 
British or American arbitration proceedings, but the 
burden of proof and the quantum of proof are important 
subjects discussed among American arbitrators. While the 
parties are entitled to legal representation in America, 
the parties are rarely represented by lawyers in British 
since they must seek permission from the arbitrator and 
the other party in order to have such representation. For 
these reasons, it may be said that American grievance 
arbitration proceedings resemble those of British 
tribunals or courts more closely than those of British 
labour arbitration.
Arbitral remedies in Britain and the United States 
are almost identical. Where the dismissal is found to be 
unjustifiable, reinstatement is almost always granted by 
an arbitrator, but often reinstatement is not accompanied 
by full back pay. This enables the arbitrator to balance 
the interests of the workers and the employers. In the 
United States, the amount of back pay may also be reduced 
in cases where the employee or the union is guilty of 
unusual delay in seeking arbitration, where the employee 
had outside wage earnings or failed to seek other 
employment, or where the employee has a poor attendance
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record.
In Britain, an employee may be downgraded, given a 
formal warning, or suspended as an alternative 
disciplinary measure awarded by an arbitrator. The same 
kinds of award are often made by American arbitrators 
along with many other awards. American arbitrators 
sometimes order re-employment of the employee in a 
different job from the former one on the grounds of 
physical or mental capability, incompetence or 
disqualification to continue the former job, a need to 
screen him from contacts with the public, personality 
conflict or similar problems. Arbitrators also may order 
reinstatement which is conditional upon action to be 
taken by the employee, such as resignation from an 
outside job, furnishment of an indemnity bond, promise of 
conscientious compliance with company rules, promise to 
accept counselling from a pastor or some competent social 
agency.
These differences and similarities between American 
and British dismissal arbitration have several important 
implications. In the United States, the time involved in 
arbitration and the expense of the process are seen as a 
serious problem by a large proportion of unions and 
employers. A study found that 42% of the unions 
considered time to be a serious or potential problem and 
33% viewed the expense as a problem or potential problem. 
The figures for employers were slightly lower with 40% of
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the respondents feeling time was a problem and 30%
7 Rfeeling cost was a problem.
J.C.Sigler gave several reasons for the cost and
delay of the arbitration process. ’Factors affecting both
the delay and cost issues include the use of lawyers and
advocates, the need for reporters to establish a record,
the filing of pre-hearing and post-hearing briefs, the
use of experts during the hearing, and the need for
written arbitral opinions. Perhaps the single, most
important factor responsible for delay is the time it
takes the parties to decide on a mutually agreeable
arbitrator. The parties will study an arbitrator's past
decisions in the belief that doing so will help them
predict how the arbitrator will decide the case at 
77issue. ”
A different study indicates that where mediation is
used to settle grievance disputes, the time and costs for
7 fteach grievance will be reduced to some extent. Sigler
also wrote that mediation was more effective than
arbitration because it allowed for a "'win-win' mindset”
and that the parties entered the process knowing that no
solution will be imposed on them and that any solution
7 Qarrived at will be one they both can bear. However, he
also stated that ’without the threat of arbitration
waiting in the wings, the effectiveness of mediation in
80grievance resolution is dramatically lessened”.
These studies and views appear, to some extent, to
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illustrate the merits of British arbitration and to 
support the recent proposal of British academics to 
increase choice by by allowing voluntary arbitration to 
operate as an alternative option for tribunal
O 1
claimants.
Arbitration cannot work well where the employee does 
not have the protection of a union. Although some non- 
unionized companies have voluntarily introduced grievance 
arbitration systems in the United States, often with the
o o
motive of avoiding unionization, adoption of this 
system "has been stymied by workers' unwillingness to 
implement them without the protection of a union and by 
management's actual unwillingness, in some situations, to
Q 7
accept unfavourable arbitral decisions."
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CHAPTER 7 
LAW OF DISCRIMINATORY DISMISSAL
This chapter will examine the grounds on which it is 
unlawful to dismiss employees due to discrimination, the 
administrative bodies which deal with discriminatory 
dismissal claims, and the procedures and remedies for 
discriminatory dismissals in the three countries. This 
will be done in two separate sections; one concerning 
dismissal for union-re 1 ated reasons and the other 
relating to dismissals on grounds such as race and sex.
7.1. DISMISSAL FOR TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP AND ACTIVITY
7.1.1. THE UNITED STATES 
(1) REGULATION
The National Labor Relations Act 1935 made an 
employer’s discriminatory discharge of an employee for 
union membership and activities an unfair labour practice 
and established the National Labor Relations Board, an 
independent federal agency which has exclusive 
jurisdiction over charges of unfair labour practices. The 
application of the legislation is limited, as the Act 
excludes household servants, agricultural labourers, 
persons employed by their parent or spouse, persons 
employed as supervisors and independent contractors as 
well as all federal, state and local employees from its 
protection.1 The NLRB does not have jurisdiction to 
determine unfair labour practice disputes which do not
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affect "interstate commerce" since the Act was enacted on 
the basis of the "interstate commerce" clause in the 
Constitution. The Board has developed its own guidelines
to determine whether particular employment may affect
2
"interstate commerce".
(i) Dismissal for Union Membership
Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labour practice 
for the employer to discriminate against an employee not 
only by discouraging, but also encouraging, membership of 
any labor organization with regard to hire or tenure of 
employment or any term or condition of employment. 
However, the same section permits an employer to reach a 
union membership agreement with a union as an exclusive
7
bargaining representative under which the employees are 
required to be members of the union as a condition of 
employment.
Section 8(a)(3), on the other hand, severely 
restricts such agreements in the following ways. There 
should be a grace period (i.e. thirty days and more) 
before an employee is required to pay periodic dues and 
initiation fees. An employee should be required to pay 
such dues and fees only where membership is available to 
the employee on the same terms and conditions as are 
generally applicable to other employees. A majority of 
the affected employees may rescind the union’s authority 
to make such an agreement in a secret ballot conducted 
under Section 9(e). An employer is not permitted to
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discharge an employee for non-membership of the union
unless loss or non-acquisition of membership resulted
from his failure to pay periodic dues or initiation fees
which are uniformly required as a condition of union
membership. Employees who belong to bona fide religious
organizations with conscientious objections to joining or
financially supporting a labour organization may not be
required to join or support a union as a condition of
employment but are instead required to pay an amount of
money equal to union dues and fees to a charitable 
4organization.
Closed-shop agreements (i.e. agreements requiring 
workers to become union members prior to becoming 
employed) are therefore illegal. Union-shop agreements 
(i.e. agreements requiring workers, as a condition of 
continued employment, to become union members) cannot be 
enforced beyond requiring the payment of a fee equal to 
union dues. Agency-shop agreements (i.e. agreements 
requiring workers, as a condition of continued 
employment, either to become union members or to pay the 
union a service fee) have also been held to be legal. 
According to the US Supreme Court in NLRB v. General 
Motor Corp., this is because "it serves, rather than 
violates, the desire of Congress to reduce the evils of 
compulsory unionism while allowing financial support for 
the bargaining agent." However, Section 14(b) still 
permits state law to make the above described union-shop
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or agency-shop agreements unlawful. By 1992, a total of
22 states had statutory provisions prohibiting union
7
security arrangements.
(ii) Dismissal for Union Activities
The concerted activities guaranteed by Section 7 
have been construed to include strike activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection, and therefore it makes it an unfair labour 
practice for an employer to dismiss employees for 
participating in strikes. Although the Act requires the 
existence of a labour dispute between the striking 
employees and their employer as an indispensable 
condition for the protection of strikers, the types of 
strike that are protected are not prescribed by the Act. 
The Board and the courts have therefore been left to 
determine the extent of the protection afforded by this 
provision. According to their decisions, a strike is 
unlawful if it has an unlawful object or unlawful means
Q
are employed for the strike.
Another important feature relating to dismissal is 
how the unfair labour practice law treats the employer’s 
refusal to reinstate striking employees upon the 
termination of the union’s strike. In NLRB v. Mackay 
Radio & Telegraph C o m p a n y , the U.S.Supreme Court 
established the following rules:
It is not anunfair labor practice for the employer 
to displace striking employees with others in order
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to carry on his business. If the employer hires 
those [replacement workers] on a permanent basis, he 
is not bound to discharge them in order to vacate 
the places of strikers upon the election of the 
latter to resume their employment. However, it is 
unfair labor practice for the employer, in re- 
employing striking employees to fill vacancies upon 
the termination of strike, to discriminate against 
certain of them for the sole reason that they had
q
been active.
Employees who went on strike and who could not be 
re-employed because of the presence of permanent 
replacements retain the status of employees. They are 
entitled to be re-employed in their former positions, as 
occupied by the replacements, when those positions become 
vacant. The Mackay ruling cannot apply to strikes caused 
by employers’ unfair labour practices.1^
(2) BURDEN OF PROOF
In cases where an employee claims that his dismissal
amounted to unlawful discrimination, the employer’s
1 1
motive is determinative. The question of the burden of 
proof arises when the employer asserts a legitimate 
business reason for the discharge after the General 
Counsel has demonstrated that a discriminatory motive 
existed. The approach of the NLRB is to hold that the 
employer’s assertain will prevail if the discharge would 
have occurred even in the absence of the protected
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i 2
activity. This test was adopted in the Wright Line case 
and is known as the "motivating factor" test.
In the Wright-Line case, the NLRB stated: "First, we
shall require that the General Counsel make a prima facie
showing sufficient to support the inference that the
protected conduct was a ’motivating f a c t o r ’ in the
employer’s decision. Once this is established, the burden
will shift to the employer to demonstrate that the same
action would have taken place even in the absence of the
1
protected conduct." This decision was later approved by 
the U.S.Supreme Court.14
(3) ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
When an employee, a union or an individual files a 
charge with an NLRB office within six months following 
the employer’s conduct which is alleged to be an unfair 
labour practice,1  ^ an NLRB representative (a field 
examiner or an attorney) investigates the charge. If the 
investigation indicates that the charge is groundless, 
the regional director will generally recommend that the 
charge be withdrawn. If the charging party does not act 
on that recommendation, the director will dismiss the 
charge. On the other hand, if the investigation shows 
that the charge has merit, the regional director will try 
to settle the charge by informal agreement before he 
issues a complaint. The same or other informal means to 
seek a settlement are also often used after the complaint
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has been issued.
Section 10(J ) gives the Board the power, upon 
issuance of a complaint, to petition a federal district 
court for the appropriate temporary relief. Violation of 
the order for interim relief may constitute contempt of 
court.
At the complaint stage, an unfair labor practice 
hearing is conducted before an administrative law judge 
who presents findings and recommendations to the Board. 
At the hearing, a regional field attorney, on behalf of 
the General Counsel of the NLRB, presents the case 
against the respondent. The charging party is entitled to 
participate and supplement the case as presented by the 
attorney. After the hearing, the administrative law judge 
issues an order. If he finds a violation, he issues a 
remedial order. Any of the parties may appeal against the 
administrative law judge's decision. If the Board adopts 
it or if no timely appeal is made, then the order becomes 
the order of the Board.
If the employer refuses to obey an order, the Board 
has no inherent authority to enforce it. The Board must 
make an application to the appropriate federal court of 
appeals under Section 10(e) in order to secure 
enforcement. The aggrieved party, however, is entitled to 
petition the appropriate court of appeals for a review of 
the order under Section 10(f). The only orders which are 
subject to judicial review are those entered by the
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Board, either dismissing a complaint in whole or in part,
or finding an unfair labour practice and ordering a
remedy. Accordingly, a decision of the General Counsel
not to issue an unfair labour practice complaint is not
judicially reviewable. A court of appeals may not only
grant or deny enforcement of the Board's order but may
also modify the order and enforce it as modified or the
order may be remitted to the Board. After the court has
granted enforcement, the party's non-compliance with the
Board's order may constitute contempt of court.
Section 10(e) provides that "the findings of the
Board with respect to questions of fact, if supported by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole,
shall be conclusive." Section 10(f) incorporates the same
standard in this regard. Concerning the Board's findings
on the question of fact, the courts therefore should
1 Rexamine only the records considered by the Board. The
courts are also somewhat restricted in their ability to
review the Board's decision on matters of law as well as
on questions of fact. In Ford Motor Company v. NLRB, the
Supreme Court stated that "if [the Board's] construction
of the statute is reasonably defensible, it should not be
rejected merely because the courts might prefer another
1 7view of the statute."
(4) REMEDIES
The Board invariably orders reinstatement of the 
employee with back pay and issues an order requiring the
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employer to cease and desist from similar misconduct in
the future. The Board also invariably orders the employer
to post a notice in which he states that he has violated
the law and will not in future engage in similar 
1 Rmisbehaviour. Usually an order of reinstatement
provides for ’immediate and full reinstatement to the
former position, or if that position no longer exists, to
a substantially equivalent one without prejudice to
1 9seniority or other rights or p r i v i l e g e s . ” If a
substantially equivalent position is not available, the
employer may be required to offer employment in another
area of its operations, or place the employee in question
on
on a preferential hiring list.
”A backpay remedy must be sufficiently tailored to
expunge only the actual, and not merely speculat ive^
2 1consequences of the unfair labor practices." An 
employee who has been discriminatorily discharged may be 
paid net back pay which is equal to gross back pay less 
net interim earnings. "Interim earnings" include not only 
earnings actually received during the back pay period but 
also earnings which could have been received through the 
exercise of reasonable efforts.
7.1.2. JAPAN 
(1) REGULATION
In Japan, the Labour Union Law (L.U.L.) as enacted 
in 1949, provides an unfair labour practice scheme
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modelled on that in America. Labour Relations Commission 
(LRCs) which are administrative committees, were 
established under the L.U.L. to deal with unfair labour 
practices. Every aggrieved employee can bring a complaint 
before the appropriate Prefectural Labour Relations 
Commission (PLRC). A union can also bring a complaint 
about its member’s dismissal if it can show that it is an 
independent worker's organisation and has a constitution 
stipulating certain items as prescribed by the Act. 
Public employees in the administrative sector are 
excluded from the application of the L.U.L. although they 
are also legally protected against dismissal for 
membership of and activities within their labour 
organisation. The armed forces, police, prison staff and
firemen are not even entitled to freedom of
22association. Persons who represent the interests of the 
employer are excluded from protection against dismissal 
for union membership and activities.
An aggrieved employee can bring an action in the 
courts as well as presenting a complaint to a PLRC. In 
cases of civil litigation, if the employee proves 
successfully that the dismissal constitutes an unfair 
labour practice by the employer, the court will hold that 
the dismissal is void. The reason why it is void has not 
been made very clear. Section 27 provides : "Whenever a
complaint that an employer has violated the provisions of 
Section 7 is filed with an LRC, the Commission shall make
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an immediate investigation and shall, if it is deemed
necessary, hold a hearing to consider the issues
regarding the merits of the c o m p l a i n t . ” Thus, some
academics argue that Section 7 only provides the basis
for the decisions of the Commission. Others insist that
it provides the basis for the decisions of the courts as
well as those of the Commission. The Supreme Court once
ruled, without giving any precise reason, that a
dismissal in violation of Section 7(1) was naturally 
2 ^void. This decision might be understood to mean that 
the Court took the latter view. However, the former view 
will lead to the same ruling since Article 28 of the 
Constitution establishes a mandatory public policy and 
dismissal contravening this policy is void because of 
Section 90 of the Ci vi 1 Code which states that 
"transactions which are contrary to public policy or good 
morals are void."
(i) Dismissal for Membership
The Japanese unfair labour practice scheme under the 
L.U.L. does not provide special protection for the 
employee’s freedom not to associate. Article 28 of the 
Constitution guarantees only the workers' right to 
organize since Article 21 also provides for the people's 
freedom to associate. It has been held that the right to 
organize is superior to the freedom not to associate, so 
a union-shop agreement can be concluded effectively 
between the union and the employer if such a union
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represents the majority of the workers in the particular 
? 4establishment. As a result, the courts have held that 
the employer may dismiss the employee for non-membership 
in accordance with such a union-shop agreement without 
abusing his right to dismiss.
The courts have restricted the legal application of 
a union-shop agreement to some extent. According to the 
Supreme Court’s decisions, it is not permissible to 
force employees to join a specific union under the threat 
of dismissal based on a union-shop agreement if it 
infringes an employee's freedom to choose the union with 
which he would like to associate. Therefore, any part of 
a union-shop agreement which obliges the employer to 
dismiss the following employees is void under the Civil 
Code, s.90: an employee who is a member of any other 
union; an employee who has joined any other union or 
organized a new union after withdrawal or expulsion from 
the union which has a union-shop agreement with the
n p
employer.
(ii) Dismissal for Union Activities
Section 7(1) prohibits an employer from dismissing 
an employee by reason of his having performed the proper 
acts of a labour union. The words "proper acts" have been 
construed to include proper strike activities. Unlike 
American law, Japanese law does not allow the employer 
to hire permanent replacements when employees go on a 
proper strike.
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(2) BURDEN OF PROOF
Judicial views differs as to whether the employee or
his union can win the case when the employer’s legitimate
business reason for the employee’s discharge is proven at
the same time as a union-related reason is proved. Some
courts have adopted a ’but for’ test that where there is
a reasonable causal relationship between anti-union
intention and dismissal, the dismissal constitutes an
unfair labour practice even if there exists another
2 7legitimate reason for it. Yet, many courts and most
LRCs have applied a "predominant motive" test, under
which the test is that the anti-union motive must be
shown to have been the dominant one for unfavourable 
28treatment. However, the order and burden of proof has 
never been articulated by either the LRCs or the courts.
(3) ADMINISTRATION OF THE SCHEME AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The LRC system consists of the PLRC for the first 
trial and the Central Labour Relations Commission (the 
CLRC) for review. Both bodies consist of equal numbers 
of members representing employers, workers and the public 
interest. The members representing employers are 
appointed on the recommendation of an employers' 
association, the members representing workers op the 
recommendation of labour unions, and the members 
representing the public interest from the panel of 
scholars and men of experience with approval of both of
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the other members of the commission. Their status is in 
principle part-time and most representatives of the 
public interest who are exclusively given power to make a 
decision on unfair labour practice are professors of law 
or labour economics, lawyers or people from similar 
professions. In contrast to American proceedings, the 
complaint is initiated and pursued by the dismissed 
employee, his union, or both throughout the whole LRC 
proceedings. When a complaint is filed with a PLRC within 
one year of the conduct by an employer which is alleged 
to be an unfair labour practice, the PLRCs will open an 
investigation and, if it is deemed necessary, will hold a 
hearing. Unlike the NLRB, Japanese LRCs do not have the 
power to issue subpoenas to every witness or to examine 
witnesses under oath. LRCs may demand, with the sanction 
of a fine against failure, the attendance of or the 
presentation of reports, books or documents from the 
employer, the employers' organisation, the labour unions
pq
or others who may be involved.
Japanese LRCs do not have the power to petition the 
courts for temporary relief for dismissed employees 
between an investigation and a hearing. After the 
hearing, members representing the public interest of the 
PLRC will meet in order to make a decision about the 
complaint. However, prior to this meeting, the members 
representing the public interest have to ask the opinions 
of the other members who have attended the hearing.
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Complaints may be disposed of on the basis of an 
agreement between the parties at any of the above stages 
of the procedure. There are two different types of agreed 
settlement; that based on a recommendation, made 
formally, by the Chairman of the PLRC and the other made 
without such a recommendation. The former is generally 
considered as an agreed settlement on the premise that 
the employer has committed an unfair labour practice.
A party which is dissatisfied with the order of the 
PLRC may, within 15 days of receiving the order, file a 
request for a review by the CLRC. Where the dissatisfied 
party does not elect to request a review of the order of 
the PLRC or where the CLRC issues a reviewal order, the
dissatisfied party may petition an appropriate district 
court for cancellation of the PLRC' s or C L R C 1 s order 
within 30 days of the date of issue of the order. In a 
case where the employer files such a petition, the court 
with which the petition is filed may, on appeal from the 
PLRC or, as the case may be, from the CLRC, issue an
order, known as "kinkyu-meirei", requiring the employer 
to comply in full or in part with the order pending final 
judgment by the court.
Where an employer has violated the kinkyu-meirei, he 
will be liable to a non-penal fine not exceeding
¥100,000. In a case of dismissal, this amount will be
multiplied by the number of days of non-compliance. The 
employer cannot appeal against the kinkyu-meirei but may
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only request the court to cancel or modify it. The court 
may, on application from the parties or on its own 
motion, cancel or modify its kinkyu-meirei. The same rule 
applies in cases where an employer has violated the order 
of the LRC which has become irrevocable because he did 
not file a petition cancelling the order. Where an 
employer has violated an order of the LRC after all or a 
part of the order has been upheld by an irrevocable 
judgment of the court, he will be liable to imprisonment 
not exceeding one year, to a fine not exceeding ¥ 100,000, 
or both.^®
The proceedings in the LRC are rather similar to 
those of the ordinary courts. In judicial proceedings for 
cancellation of the LRC order, the findings of the LRC 
with respect to questions of fact do not have binding 
force and the presentation of new evidence is not 
restricted. Thus, the courts may rule on the facts for 
themselves and may decide the appeal for cancellation of 
the order based on their own view of the facts. This 
seems to encourage the aggrieved parties to file 
petitions for cancellation of the order. At the same 
time, this compels the LRCs to decide the facts as well 
as their conclusions with a great deal of care.
(4) REMEDIES
If the PLRC finds the complaint to be established, 
it will issue a remedial order. The remedy is normally an 
order of reinstatement with back pay and often includes
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an order requiring the employer to post a notice in which 
he states that he has committed an unfair labour practice 
and will not engage in future similar unlawful activity.
There has been some disagreement between the courts 
and the LRCs on the question of whether interim earnings 
should always be deducted from the amount of back pay. 
The LRCs generally did not deduct the employee’s interim 
earnings from other employment between the time of 
dismissal and the time of reinstatement. However, the 
Supreme Court held in the Dainihato Taxi case that an 
award of back pay not only purported to relieve employees 
of monetary losses arising from dismissal but was also 
intended to reduce the discouraging effect on union 
activity and therefore that interim earnings should not 
automatically be deducted. The Court continued to hold 
that if the LRC failed to give reasonable consideration 
to both purposes of the award, its decision would go 
beyond the limits of its discretion and would therefore
“Z  1
be illegal. However, since it is not clear how to 
measure the discouraging effect on union activity, this 
ruling has not succeeded in settling disputes over the 
deduction of interim earnings. Many academics argue that 
the LRC is not a judicial body so it need not take 
account of provisions in the Civil Code relating to the 
calculation of civil damages.
7.1.3. BRITAIN32
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(1) REGULATION
There is no global scheme in Britain regulating 
employers’ unfair practices which tend to reject or 
weaken the union’s bargaining power. There exists, 
however, a scheme to regulate discrimination (i.e. 
dismissal and action short of dismissal) by employers 
which infringes the employees’ freedom to associate. The 
law concerning unfair dismissal for a trade union related 
reason excludes from its application almost all the 
categories of employee which are excluded by the general
•z *z
scheme. However, under TULR(C)A s.154, unfair dismissal 
legislation does not exclude an employee who has not been 
continuously employed for a period of more than two 
years, or an employee who has attained either the normal 
retirement age at the undertaking, or the age of 65.
(i) Dismissal for Union Membership
According to TULR(C)A s.l52(l)(a) and (c), the 
British system concerning unfair dismissal for trade 
union membership protects not only the e m p l o y e e ’s 
positive right to associate but also his freedom not to 
associate. It is unfair for an employer to dismiss an 
employee who is not a member of a trade union even when 
there is a union membership agreement.
’Membership of a trade union’ within the meaning of 
Section 152(1)(a) is not construed broadly. In Discount 
Tobacco and Confectionary Ltd. v. Armitage, ^  the EAT 
construed the meaning broadly to include approaching a
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trade union officer to enlist his help in elucidating and 
attempting to negotiate terms and conditions of 
employment. However, in Associated Newspapers v. Wilson 
and Associated British Ports v. Palmer, a majority of the 
House of Lords held that membership of a union and making 
use of its services are in some way to be equated. Such 
action may be considered to be taking part in the 
activities of a trade union, but then it will be subject 
to the qualification of ’appropriate time’, as discussed 
below.
The British system does not permit an employer to 
dismiss an employee on the grounds that the employee 
has refused to make payments as a substitute for 
becoming or remaining a union member. Thus, Section 
152(3) deals with the following reasons as falling within 
Section 152(l)(c).
”(a) the employee's refusal, or proposed refusal, to 
comply with a requirement... that, in the event of hi,s not 
being a member of any trade union, or of a particular 
trade union, or of one of a number of particular trade 
unions, he must make one or more payments; or 
(b) his objection, or proposed objection...to the 
operation of a provision... under which, in the event 
mentioned in paragraph (a), his employer is entitled to 
deduct one or more sums from the remuneration payable to 
him in respect of his employment.”
(ii) Dismissal for Union Activities
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Section 152(1)(b) makes it unfair for an employer to 
dismiss the employee for taking part, or proposing to 
take part, in the activities of an independent trade 
union at an appropriate time. ’An appropriate time’ means 
a time which either (a) is outside his working hours; or 
(b) is a time within his working hours at which, in 
accordance with arrangements agreed with or consent given 
by his employers, it is permissible for him to take part 
in those activities.
Section 152 (l)(b) has also been construed narrowly 
since the Court of Appeal decision in Carrington v.
7 D
Therm-A-Star. In that case, the union had succeeded in 
recruiting some 60-65 members out of a workforce of 70. 
The representatives of those employees asked the union’s 
district secretary to apply to the company for 
recognition. The company then told the chargehands to 
select 20 employees for dismissal. However, the 
industrial tribunal found that what is now TULR(C)A 
s.l52(l)(b) only applied where the reason for dismissal 
was the activities of the individual worker who had been 
dismissed. The EAT allowed the appeal. They considered 
that this was far too narrow a view of the provision. 
However, the Court of Appeal restored the decision of the 
tribunal, and held that it would be wrong to construe 
that provision to include the dismissal of employees not 
because of anything they had done as individuals, but 
because the employer took objection to what their union
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had done.
The attitude of British law toward dismissal during 
a strike (including other industrial action) is very 
different from that of the American system. In the United 
States as well as in Japan, it is an unfair labour 
practice for an employer to dismiss employees because 
they have taken part in a proper strike. By contrast, 
British unfair dismissal legislation does not give the 
industrial tribunal jurisdiction to hear a complaint of 
unfair dismissal where an employer dismissed employees 
where, at the time of dismissal, the employer was 
conducting or instituting a lock-out, or the employee was 
participating in a strike, unless all other employees at 
the same establishment who were participating in the 
strike have not been dismissed or the complainant alone 
has not been re-engaged within three months of the
77
dismissal. Thus, the employer can re-engage selectively 
longer than three months after the dismissals without any 
fear of facing unfair dismissal complaints. If the 
dismissals are selective, or only some of the relevant 
employees are selected for re-engagement within three 
months, the tribunal will be entitled to consider the 
case in the ordinary way. Thus, an employer may still be 
able to show that it was reasonable in all the 
circumstances to dismiss or not to re-engage some of the 
strikers.
Moreover, TUUR(C)A, s. 237 removes the employee's
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right to complain of unfair dismissal if at the time of 
the dismissal he was taking part in an unofficial strike. 
For the purposes of this provision, a strike is 
unofficial unless the employee is a member of a trade 
union and the strike is authorised or endorsed by that 
union, or he is not a member of a trade union but among 
those taking part in the industrial action there are 
members of a trade union by which the strike has been 
authorised or endorsed.
(2) BURDEN OF PROOF
As far as the burden of proof is concerned, these 
provisions have to be read in the context of the general 
provisions concerning the burden of proof for unfair 
dismissal under Section 57(1). In ordinary cases, there 
is no onus on an employee to prove that the real reason 
for dismissal was his trade union membership or activity. 
The burden of proof to show the reason for dismissal 
remains with the employer. This rule can be seen in the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal in Maund v. Penwith 
District Council.
According to M a u n d , the employer should first 
produce evidence to the tribunal that appears to show a 
reason for the dismissal which is permissible under 
Section 57, and "then the burden passes to the employee 
to show that there is a real issue as to whether that was 
the true reason." However, this burden is not the burden 
of persuasion but only the burden of producing evidence
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and "Once this evidential burden is discharged, the onus 
remains upon the employer to prove the reason for the 
dismissal.
This rule cannot apply to those employees who are 
excluded from the general scheme because of their length 
of service or age. In such a case, the employee cannot 
rely on the burden placed on the employer by Section 
57(1) since he, the employee, alone can make a complaint 
to the tribunal by virtue of Section 64(3).4  ^ The onus 
is therefore on the employee to prove that the reason for 
his dismissal was related to union membership or 
activities. Moreover, the employee has to prove that the 
principle reason for dismissal is his trade union 
membership or activity if other reasons are put forward. 
It may be still more difficult for the employee to prove 
his case where the decision to dismiss was taken by a 
group of persons.41
(3) PROCEDURE
Only the dismissed employee himself may make an 
application to the industrial tribunal for unfair 
dismissal for trade union membership reasons. The case 
may be conciliated by ACAS conciliation officers. The 
tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints of 
unfair dismissal for trade union membership reasons. 
These provisions are the same as in other unfair 
dismissal cases. However, there is a special provision
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for interim relief which applies to the complaints of 
unfair dismissal for trade union membership reasons and 
certain other reasons relating to health and safety 
issues and cases where the employee is seeking to enforce 
his statutory rights.
An application for interim relief must be made to 
the tribunal within a period of seven days immediately 
following the effective date of termination. If the 
application alleges unfair dismissal because of trade 
union membership or activities, the employee must present 
a certificate in writing signed by an authorized official 
of the independent trade union of which he was, or had 
proposed to become, a member. No such requirement is 
necessary where the dismissal is alleged for n o n ­
membership of a union. If the tribunal finds that the 
complaint of unfair dismissal is likely to be successful, 
and the employer is willing to reinstate or re-engage the 
employee, then the tribunal makes an order of 
reinstatement or re-engagement. Otherwise, the tribunal 
will make an order for the continuation of the employee’s 
contract of employment until the determination or 
settlement of the complaint. However, even if the 
employer ultimately rejects an order for the continuation
of employment, then the tribunal can only order the
42employer to pay the employee compensation.
(4) REMEDIES
The remedies applicable in ordinary unfair dismissal
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cases apply equally to cases of dismissal for a trade
union-related reason. However, in the latter cases, the
employee can obtain more favourable compensation.
Firstly, where the employee makes a request for
reinstatement or re-engagement but the tribunal refuses
to make such an order, the tribunal might make a special
award of 104 weeks pay subject to a statutory minimum and
maximum (£13,400 - £26,800 in 1995).4  ^ Such an award
cannot be made in ordinary unfair dismissal cases.
Secondly, where the employer has failed to comply with an
order for reinstatement or re-engagement then, unless it
is proved impracticable to comply with it, the employee
will also obtain a special award of 156 weeks pay,
subject to a statutory minimum (£20,100 in 1995).44
However, as seen in Chapter 4.1.2, the Court of Appeal
has taken a broad view of the concept of practicability
4 5m  this context. Thirdly, for a dismissal for trade 
union membership reasons, the employee must be awarded a 
basic award, and a week’s pay (not less than £2,700 in 
1995),46
7.2. DISMISSALS BASED ON OTHER PROHIBITED REASONS
The law of discriminatory dismissal on grounds such 
as race and sex only constitutes a small proportion Qf 
the regulations covering discrimination, which themselves 
apply to a much wider range of circumstances. As a 
result, most of the case law on such discrimination does
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not concern dismissal. Therefore, we will analyse the law 
as a whole with reference to particular problems that 
have arisen in relation to dismissal.
7.2.1. THE UNITED STATES
(1) STATUTES AND THE PROSCRIBED REASONS
The United States is a leading country in this 
field of law. At federal level, the following are the 
main statutes and statutory provisions prohibiting 
employment discrimination including dismissal on one or 
more of these grounds.
--Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 196447--race, 
colour, religion, sex, pregnancy, childbirth, and 
national origin.
4 R--The Age Discrimination in Employment Act 1967 --age
(the prohibitions are limited to individuals aged forty 
and above.)
--The Civil Right Act 1866, Section 19814^--race,
national origin, and status as an alien.
cn
--Executive Order 1 1 2 4 6 -- race, colour, religion, sex, 
and national origin.
c 1
--The American with Disability Act 1990 --physical or 
mental handicap.
c p
--the Rehabilitation Act 1975 --physical or mental 
handicap.
At state level, many state laws (so called ’fair 
employment practice l a w s ” ) prohibit employment
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discrimination including dismissal on the grounds of 
race, colour, religion, sex, national origin, age (e.g. 
some laws prohibit discrimination against individuals 
over the age of 18), physical or mental handicap,
c 7
marriage and criminal history. Many state laws provide 
protection beyond that provided by federal law and also 
provide broader coverage. Federal statutes require the 
complainant to resort to state remedies as a precondition 
of federal adjudication. In addition, there are 
individuals who may only resort to the anti- 
discrimination ordinances of counties or cities.
(2) COVERAGE AND PROCEDURES OF FEDERAL STATUTES
Among the above federal statutes, the most important 
statutes are Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 
(Title VII), the Americans with Disability Act 1990 (ADA) 
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 1967 (ADEA) 
because of their wide coverage, frequent use, and 
influence on the judicial interpretation of other anti- 
discrimination statutes. Our discussion below will be 
centred on these three statutes.
These Acts do not apply to all workers because they
were enacted under the Interstate Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution. Title VII and ADA only apply to an employer 
with fifteen or more employees for each working day in
each of twenty or more weeks in the current or preceding
year, while ADEA only applies to an employer with twenty
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or more employees. These Acts apply to private employment 
as well as employment by states or local governments. 
The federal government is specifically exempt from 
definitions of "employer", but Title VII and the ADA 
separately prescribe different procedural methods of 
enforcement for employment discrimination by the federal 
government.
Title VII and the ADA exclude private membership
c 7
clubs and corporations wholly owned by Indian tribes. 
The provisions of Title VII do not apply to a religious 
corporation, association, educational institution, or 
society with respect to the employment of individuals oT
c o
a particular religion. The courts have refused to apply 
the ADEA to a religious organization which employs 
members of a particular religion even though the Act does 
not have a provision to the same effect as Title VII.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
an independent federal agency, was established to
c q
administer and enforce the provisions of Title VII. Its 
powers and duties extend to interpretation and 
enforcement of the ADEA^^ as well as the ADA. The ADA 
incorporates the enforcement procedures of Title VII and 
therefore its procedures are the same as those of Title 
VII. Under these three statutes, an employee must first 
file a charge with the EEOC, which thereupon hears and 
investigates the charge. The EEOC has extremely wide 
powers of investigation. For example, in the case of
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Title VII and the ADA, the EEOC can issue subpoenas,
examine witnesses, administer oaths and affirmations,
receive and copy evidence and in general conduct itself
in the same manner as the NLRB. In a case of refusal to
obey a subpoena, an appropriate federal district court,
upon application by the EEOC, can order the person to
appear before the EEOC to produce evidence or give
testimony. Failure to comply with such an order may be
fi 1construed as contempt of court. Moreover, although the
EEOC is prohibited from making public any information
R ?obtained during its investigation, it has been held 
that the EEOC may disclose such information to trhe
R ^complainants and the complainants’ attorneys.
If the EEOC believes a violation has occurred, it
must attempt conciliation before it files a suit in its
name in an appropriate federal district court. In the
case of Title VII and the ADA, the EEOC can institute an
action for temporary relief even before its own
R4procedures have been completed. It is undecided whether
complainants can bring such an action prior to the
fi ficompletion of the EEOC procedures. There are no
comparable provisions in the ADEA and therefore an action
for temporary relief can only be brought after the EEOC
R Rinvestigation has been completed.
If private parties want to file a suit in the courts 
after a charge with the EEOC, they must wait 180 days (irj 
the case of Title VII and the ADA) or 60 days (in the
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case of ADEA) before doing so to give the EEOC the
fi 7opportunity to conciliate. In the case of Title VII and
the ADA, the private parties must, in principle, get a
"right to suit letter" from the EEOC. The EEOC notifies
the charging party of its right to bring an action in a
federal district court when it finds that the
conciliation has failed and it will not bring suit 
fi Ritself. The charging party may also get this letter on 
request 180 days after the EEOC has assumed jurisdiction 
over his charge. Once a private party files a civil 
action under Title VII, the ADA or the ADEA, the 
plaintiff may seek preliminary relief.
(3) CONCEPTS OF DISCRIMINATION
The courts have developed two standards by which 
violations of Title VII are established and which may 
also apply to the cases under the ADEA as well as those 
under the ADA. These are "disparate treatment" 
(individual or systematic instances of disparate 
treatment on proscribed grounds) and "disparate impact" 
(practices that are ostensibly neutral in their treatment 
of different groups but in fact fall more harshly on one 
group than another and cannot be justified by "business 
necessity").
The standard of proof for "disparate treatment" was
first adopted by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
fi qC o r p . v . Green and has been gradually shaped by
70subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court. An example
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of the application of the disparate treatment framework 
to an indefinite lay-off which may or may not result in a 
permanent termination of employment is EEOC v. Jones & 
Laughling Steel Corp.71 The plaintiff, a laid off female 
employee brought a sex discrimination action. It was 
found that she made out a prima facie case of sex
discrimination where she was laid off from a position in 
which she was satisfactorily performing and was replaced 
by a male employee, Mr. Musante. However, the defendant 
company set forth the following non-discriminatory 
reasons for laying her off: (i) the company had
experienced a serious decline in its business, which 
resulted in a reduction in the number of salaried 
employees; (ii) the company adhered to the policy of 
retaining those employees who best met its needs based on 
the individual’s experience, performance, skills and 
ability; (iii) Mr.Musante was more experienced and 
qualified than the plaintiff. In reviewing the 
affidavits, depositions and other evidence, the court 
found that the defendant had set forth valid, non-
discriminatory reasons for its actions. The burden passed 
to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reasons set 
forth by the defendant were a mere pretext for
discrimination. However, the plaintiff could point to no 
specific facts other than her own speculation that showed 
sex discrimination. The court therefore concluded that 
the plaintiff failed to prove sex discrimination.
The other form of discrimination is "disparate
impact" which was first introduced by the Supreme Court’s
72decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. The court stated: 
"The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but 
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory 
in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an 
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes 
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the 
practice is prohibited."
The disparate impact framework, which was clearly 
affirmed by Section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
has been relatively infrequently used in dismissal cases 
under Title VII. An example of such a case, is 
Richardson v. Quick Trip Corp. where a black employee who 
was afflicted with a facial skin condition called 
pseudofolliculitis barbaes (PFB) was discharged for 
violation of his employer's no-beard policy. The trial 
court dismissed the employer's defence that his no-beard 
policy was justified by business necessity. The court 
stated: "The defendant can limit the perceived threat of 
customer dissatisfaction previously discussed by 
enforcing the no-beard policy against all employees 
except those who provide a medical certificate showing 
that they are afflicted by PFB. In addition, those 
employees who prove that they suffer from PFB, requiring 
beard therapy, can be required to maintain only short, 
neatly trimmed beards while on duty. The feasibility of
305
the implementation of these steps in the United States 
Army and other public bodies shows that there is no 
compelling need to enforce the no-beard rule against 
all."74
(4) REMEDIES
As the ADA adopts the remedial provisions of Title 
7 ^VII, the description of remedies will be limited to 
Title VII and the ADEA. Reinstatement (or re-engagement) 
is one of the primary remedies for discriminatory 
dismissal. Section 706(g) of Title VII provides that "the 
court may enjoin the ....practice, and order such 
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may 
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement....with or 
without back pay....or any other suitable relief as the 
court deems appropriate." Section Section 7(b) of the 
ADEA also provides that "the court shall have 
jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as 
may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of (the 
Act), including without limitation judgments compelling 
employment, reinstatement... or enforcing the liability 
for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid 
overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in 
addition an equal amount as liquidated damages."
Reinstatement and re-engagement may be granted as a 
form of equitable relief. The courts have wide discretion 
as to whether they should order employers to reinstate or
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re-engage dismissed employees. This is different from 
unfair labor practice cases where the NLRB invariably 
makes an order of reinstatement irrespective of whether 
the dismissed employee desires to be reinstated or re­
engaged.
In spite of the statutory language of Section
706(g), back pay is not refused other than in exceptional 
7 ficases. An employee who has been dismissed on the basis 
of the reasons proscribed in Title VII may be paid net 
back pay which is equal to gross back pay less net 
interim earnings (or amounts earnable with reasonable 
diligence). The courts have applied the same principle of 
back pay to age discrimination cases. However, in cases 
under Title VII, back pay does not accrue from a date 
more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with 
the EEOC.
In addition to back pay, the courts have held that 
payment of prospective "front pay" may be ordered as an 
equitable remedy in cases under Title VII as well as 
those under the ADEA. According to cases under Section 
7(b) of the ADEA, liquidated damages may be awarded in 
addition to back pay but only in cases of "willful 
violation." The Supreme Court held that "a violation is 
’willful’ if ’the employer either knew or showed reckless 
disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was 
prohibited by ADEA."77 As Section 706 (g) only provides 
for equitable remedies, in Title VII cases the courts
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have refused to award punitive damages as well as damages
for injuries such as nervous shock, mental distress and
loss of credit. However, this was changed by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 which allows for a remedy of both
compensatory and punitive damages "in addition to any
relief authorized by Section 706(g)" of Title VII.
Recovery of punitive damages is allowed only if the
employee demonstrates that the employer discriminated
against him "with malice or with reckless indifference
to" his protected right. The Act however places an upper
limit on "the sum of the amount of compensatory damages
for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,
and other non-pecuniary losses and the amount of punitive
damages". The upper limit is prescribed on the basis of
7 8the number of employees employed by the employer.
Although the remedies under the ADEA are legal as well
as equitable in nature, the weight of judicial authority
has also denied punitive and compensatory damages except
for back pay and front pay. The courts generally have
held that those damages would be inconsistent with the
statutory scheme of liquidated damages. Finally, it
should be pointed out that both Title VII and the ADEA
specifically provide for reasonable attorney’s fees to be
7Qawarded to the successful private plaintiff.
7.2.2. BRITAIN
(1) STATUTES AND THE PROSCRIBED REASONS
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In Britain, the list of statutes and statutory 
provisions regulating dismissal is as follows:
--The Race Relations Act 1976 (R.R.A.)--race, colour, 
nationality, ethnic or national origin.
--The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (S.D.A.)--sex and
marital status.
--Section 60 of the Employment Protection 
(Consolidation) Act 1978--pregnancy or childbirth.
--The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (R.O.A.)--a 
criminal conviction which has become spent or any 
circumstances ancillary thereto, or any failure to 
disclose a spent conviction or any such circumstances. 
The rehabilitation period depends on the sentence 
imposed.
-- The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (D.D.A.),
which is not yet in force - disability (i.e. physical or 
mental impairment) (See below).
An employee who has been dismissed for a-reason 
which is proscribed by the R.R.A. or the S.D.A. may not 
only seek the remedies which are provided by these Acts 
themselves but may also seek remedies for unfair 
dismissal under the EP(C)A. In contrast, the only remedy 
for an employee who has been dismissed for a reason 
proscribed by the R.O.A. or Section 60 of the EP(C)A is 
an action for unfair dismissal. Employees who are 
excluded from the right to complain of unfair dismissal 
cannot benefit from the provisions of the R.O.A. Those
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who have been excluded because of their length of service 
or age now qualify to make a complaint of unfair 
dismissal for pregnancy or reasons connected with
o q
pregnancy.
Dismissal because of a "spent" criminal conviction 
as defined under the R.O.A. is normally regarded as 
unfair.®1 Section 60 of the EP(C)A provides that a 
dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for the 
dismissal is any of the following: that the dismissed 
employee is pregnant or any reason connected with her 
pregnancy; that she has given birth to a child or any 
reason connected with her childbirth, and the dismissal 
occurred within four weeks the end of the maternity leave 
period; that she took, or availed herself of the benefits 
of, maternity leave; that before the end of her maternity 
leave period she gave the employer a medical certificate 
stating that she would be incapable of work after the end 
of that period; that she has been suspended from work on 
maternity grounds; that she has been made redundant 
during her maternity leave period and has not been 
offered suitable alternative employment. An employee who 
is denied the right to return to her job after having 
complied with the requirements of the EP(C)A will be 
treated as having been dismissed for the purposes of the
p p
law of unfair dismissal. In such cases, however, the 
dismissal is not treated as automatically unfair.
As far as discriminatory dismissals are concerned,
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at present, the Disabled Persons (Employment) Acts 1964 
and 1958 only require employers who have more than twenty 
employees to ensure that three per cent of their 
employees consist of persons registered as handicapped by 
their disability. These Acts are replaced by a newly 
enacted statute, the D.D.A. which makes it unlawful to 
discriminate against people with disabilities. The D.D.A. 
exempts employers who employ fewer than 20 workers. This 
exemption is subject to review after a period of four 
years. However, the D.D.A. will not come into effect 
until late 1996. This thesis concentrates on an 
examination of the present state of the law, and 
therefore it will not examine the D.D.A. in detail.
(3) COVERAGE AND PROCEDURE UNDER THE S.D.A.
AND THE R.R.A.
By contrast with the EP(C)A, the R.R.A. and the 
S.D.A. exclude only a small number of categories of 
employee. For example, the R.R.A. excludes employees of
o -z
private households. Two public agencies were 
established for the purpose inter alia of assisting with 
the enforcement of the S.D.A. and the R.R.A.; the Equal 
Opportunities Commission (EOC) for the S.D.A. and the 
Commission of Racial Equality (CRE) for the R.R.A. They 
may conduct formal investigations into cases where they 
believe that the employer’s conduct contravenes the 
relevant Act. In the course of such investigations, if 
the EOC or the CRE conclude that a person is committing
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an unlawful act, they may issue a "non-discrimination 
notice" requiring the employer to cease the 
discrimination or the discriminatory practice which is 
alleged. The employer must comply with the requirements 
of the notice unless he appeals to an industrial tribunal
Q A
within six weeks. For five years after a "non­
discrimination notice" has been served, or after there 
has been a court or tribunal finding of a contravention 
of the S.D.A. or the R.R.A., the EOC or CRE has the power 
to seek an injunction in a County court if the person 
concerned is likely to commit further acts of unlawful
Q  C
discrimination. So far as the S.D.A. is concerned, it 
has been pointed out that the persistent discrimination
O p
provisions of sections 71-73 have not been used. 
Neither have formal investigations been frequently
o 7
undertaken.
One reason for this is that before the Commission 
contemplates a formal investigation, it must have
p p
reasonable suspicion of discrimination. The
investigation must be confined to the acts of named 
persons which the Commission states in the terms of 
reference. Before issuing a non-discrimination notice, 
the Commission must give the named persons an opportunity
pq
to make oral or written representations. An appeal may 
be made against a non-discrimination notice, within six 
weeks, to an industrial tribunal, which may quash any 
requirement contained therein. On appeal, it is open to
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the person against whom the requirement has been made to
challenge the findings of fact on which the requirement 
qn
was based.
The EOC or the CRE may assist an individual in 
preparing or presenting his or her complaint to the
q i
tribunal. This may be seen as the sole function of the 
EOC and the CRE in discriminatory dismissal cases. An 
employee may bring an action against dismissal on the 
grounds proscribed by the Acts without advance reference 
to the EOC or the CRE.
The proceedings for individual complaints of 
discriminatory dismissal based on the S.D.A. or the 
R.R.A. are similar to those for unfair dismissal under 
the EP(C)A. A key difference is that in discriminatory 
dismissal cases, an individual may get assistance from 
the EOC or the CRE. This assistance may include giving 
advice, procuring settlement, arranging for assistance 
from a lawyer, arranging for representation, or any other 
appropriate form of assistance.
The questionnaire is a new addition to enforcement 
procedures in industrial tribunal cases under the S.D.A. 
and the R.R.A. It enables the complainant to obtain 
information so as to decide whether to institute 
proceedings and how to organize his or her case if 
proceedings go ahead. The respondent’s reply to it is 
admissible as evidence in the proceedings and his non­
reply may raise an inference that he committed an
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unlawful act.^2
(4) CONCEPTS OF DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE S.D.A.
AND THE R.R.A.
Both the S.D.A. and the R.R.A. define two different 
types of discrimination; ’direct discrimination” and 
’indirect discrimination”. These may be said to be the 
British versions of ’disparate treatment” and "disparate 
impact”. The Court of Appeal established the guidelines 
for the burden of proof for cases of "direct 
discrimination", which is similar to, but more flexible 
than, the burden of proof in American "disparate
a**
treatment” cases.
Both the S.D.A. and the R.R.A. expressly proscribe 
what is known as "indirect discrimination." Although 
there are necessary differences in the precise wording 
used in these Acts, both define the concept in basically 
the same way. The R.R.A., for example, defines it as 
follows:
"(A person discriminates against another if he) applies 
to that other a requirement or condition which he applies 
or would apply equally to persons not of the same racial 
group as that other but--
(i) which is such that the proportion of persons of the 
same racial group as that other who can comply with it is 
considerably smaller than the proportion of persons not 
of that racial group who can comply with it; and
(ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective
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of the colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national
origins of the person to whom it is applied; and
(iii) which is to the detriment of that other because he
Q4cannot comply with it."
The complainant must establish that only a small 
proportion of the group of persons with the relevant 
characteristics can comply with a requirement or 
condition and that the application of that requirement or 
condition is to his detriment. The burden then passes to 
the employer to show that such a requirement or condition 
is justifiable irrespective of the proscribed grounds. 
According to the Court of Appeal, the word "justifiable" 
requires "an objective balance between the discriminatory 
effect of the condition and the reasonable needs of the
qc
party who applies the condition".
There have been a small number of cases in which it 
has been questioned whether a redundancy agreement that 
part-time workers should be selected for redundancy 
before full-time workers constitutes indirect 
discrimination under the S.D.A. Such agreement may be 
indirect discrimination. For example, in Clark v. Eley 
(IMI) L.ynock Ltd., the company made 60 part-time women 
workers redundant. At the same time, 20 full-time men and 
26 full-time women were also dismissed for redundancy. 
The dismissal of the part-time workers was in accordance 
with the redundancy agreement that part-time workers 
shbuld be dismissed first. The EAT held that it was
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unlawful sex discrimination for an employer to operate a
policy of making all part-time workers compulsorily
9 6redundant before dismissing any full-time workers.
However, the agreement that part-time workers should be
dismissed first does not necessarily have an indirectly
discriminatory effect. It is a matter of evidence in each
particular case. Moreover, even if the redundancy
selection agreement has an indirectly discriminatory
97effect, the employer may be able to justify it.
(5) REMEDIES
In addition to a remedy under the S.D.A. and the 
R.R.A., an employee may seek a remedy under the unfair 
dismissal scheme. There are differences between the 
remedies for unfair dismissal and those provided for in 
the anti-discrimination Acts. Under the S.D.A. and the 
R.R.A., the tribunal can only make a recommendation which 
may be for reinstatement, while under the unfair 
dismissal scheme it must consider an order of
Q D
reinstatement or re-engagement as the primary remedy.
Where the employer fails to comply with an order under
the unfair dismissal scheme, the tribunal must make an
additional award of between 26 and 52 weeks pay, subject
to a statutory maximum (£10,920 in 1995). In contrast,
under the S.D.A. or the R.R.A., the tribunal may make an
award of increased compensation only if it thinks it just
99and equitable to do so. On the other hand, there is no
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upper limit on compensation awarded under the S.D.A. and
the R.R.A.1®® and monetary compensation for injury to
feelings can only be awarded under the S.D.A. and the 
101R.R.A. There are no provisions for reductions in
damages for the employee’s contributory fault in the
S.D.A. and the R.R.A.
Neither the S.D.A. nor the R.R.A. contain any
detailed provisions stipulating the kinds of damages
which the tribunal’s award of compensation may cover.
Compensation is payable according to the principles which
1 OPwould apply to a civil claim in tort. As a result of
1()7
the decision in AB v. South West Water Services, it is
now not possible to award exemplary or punitive damages
for sex or race discrimination.1®4
Finally, it may be appropriate to add here that the
Equal Treatment Directive of the EEC [No.76/207] has a
great influence on the S.D.A. As far as dismissal is
concerned it adds nothing to the S.D.A., but it has been
influential in securing a broad approach to the
interpretation of the S.D.A. and broad application of the
S.D.A. The R.R.A. has also been, although to lesser
106extent, indirectly influenced by the Directive.
7.2.3. JAPAN
(1) STATUTES AND THE PROSCRIBED REASONS
In Japan, the following are the main laws and 
provisions prohibiting discriminatory dismissal or 
compulsory retirement:
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--The Constitution, Article 14 --prohibiting 
discrimination in political, economic or social relations 
because of race, creed, sex, social status or family 
origin.
--The Labour Standard Law (the L.S.L.), Section 3 -- 
prohibiting discriminatory treatment with respect to 
wages, working hours or other working conditions by 
reason of the nationality, creed or social status of any 
worker.
--The Sexual Equality in Employment Law (S.E.E.L.), 
Section 11 --prohibiting an employer from discriminating 
against a female worker with regard to the compulsory 
retirement age and dismissal, from dismissing a female 
worker by reason of marriage, pregnancy, childbirth or 
for taking a leave as stipulated in the L.S.L., s.65, and 
from citing marriage, pregnancy or childbirth as a reason 
for the retirement of female workers.
--The Leave for Child-care and Family-care L a w , 
Sections 10 and 16 --prohibiting an employer from 
dismissing an employee on the grounds that she or he 
applies for or has taken child-care or family-care leave.
Besides the above regulation of dismissal and 
compulsory retirement, Section 19 of the L.S.L. prohibits 
the dismissal of employees who suffer from particular 
physical conditions. It provides that "an employer shall 
not dismiss an employee injured, or taken ill while on 
duty during the period of medical treatment or 30 days
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thereafter; nor shall he dismiss a pregnant woman or one
who has given birth in accordance with the provisions of
Section 65 or for 30 days t h e r e a f t e r . ” Section 65
provides that the employer shall not expect a woman to
work for 6 weeks before childbirth (or within 10 weeks in
the case of multiple births, etc.) when she requests a
rest day or within 8 weeks following childbirth. An
employer who dismisses an employee in violation of
Section 19 shall be punished with penal servitude or a
105fine and the dismissal shall be void.
In addition, two laws provide special protection for 
elderly and disabled workers. It seems, however, that 
these laws do not function as anti-discrimination law. 
The Law for Employment Promotion of the Disabled 1960 
requires all employers with regular employees to ensure 
that a prescribed percentage of employees are physically 
disabled persons. A financial burden is imposed on the 
employer in order to encourage him to achieve the 
prescribed percentage of employment. The Ministry of 
Labour collects a levy for employing physically disabled 
workers from employers who normally employing more than 
300 workers. The sum collected from each employer is 
reduced in accordance with the number of physically 
disabled persons actually employed by him every year. 
Employers who exceed the prescribed rate for employing 
physically disabled or mentally retarded workers will be 
paid an allowance. ^The Employment of Older Persons Law
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1971 requires employers who have a compulsory retirement 
age of below 60, to endeavour to set a retirement age of 
60 years or above. However, there is no legal sanction 
against the employer's failure to comply with this 
law.106
The most important laws among those listed above are
Section 3 of the L.S.L. and Article 14 of the
Const i tut i o n . S.3 of the L.S.L. provides that "no
employer shall discriminate against or in favour of any
worker by reason of nationality, creed or social status
with regard to wages, working hours and other working
conditions." If an employer violates this section, he is
punished with penal servitude or a fine. Any measure
which has legal effect such as a contract or notice of
dismissal shall be null and void. Some criteria or terms
for dismissing employees have been held to constitute
1 07"working conditions." According to the administrative
1 ORinterpretation, the term "social status" means status
gained by birth. Thus, being a bankrupt, having being
declared incompetent, or having a criminal record do not
1 OQconstitute "social status." "Social status" also does 
not include contractual status such as the status of 
regular employee or temporary employee.1*® The term 
"nationality" is generally construed to include the 
concept of "race". Cases related to "nationality" are 
rare. The only case that can be found is one where a man 
of Korean nationality was dismissed when he said he was
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Korean.111
The term "creed” has long been held to include both
11 p
political and religious beliefs. Where, m  conformity 
with his creed, an employee engages in conduct which 
adversely affects the company’s order or interests, the 
employer may take appropriate action to protect his 
interests. In the Nichibokaizuka case, employees were 
dismissed for engaging in activity inside the company’s 
factory to extend the sphere of influence of the 
Communist Party, for inciting other employees not to 
work, and for informing people inside and outside the 
company of false facts so as to obstruct the company’s 
operations. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the 
Tokyo High Court that the dismissal of those employees 
was valid because it did not occur because of their 
political beliefs but for conduct which was serious 
enough to justify dismissal. It has also been held that 
where an enterprise operated by an employer is 
inseparable from a particular ideology or creed, the 
employer may dismiss a worker for harboring opposing 
beliefs.1^
Section 3 of the L.S.L. does not proscribe 
employment discrimination including dismissal on the 
grounds of sex. An employer can dismiss an employee on 
the basis of his or her sex without violating the 
section. It does not necessarily follow that an employer 
can lawfully dismiss an employee on such a basis, as the
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courts have held that dismissal on the grounds of sex as 
well as race, creed, social status or family origin is 
unlawful and void. The reasoning which the courts have 
applied in reaching this conclusion is as follows:
Article 14 of the Constitution provides that "there shall 
be no discrimination in political, economic or social 
relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or 
family origin." Article 24 provides for people’s freedom 
of marriage. Section 1(2) of the Civil Code provides that 
"this Code shall be construed from the standpoint 
of....the essential equality of the sexes." On the basis 
of these provisions, the courts have held that a public 
policy has been established which prohibits 
discrimination on the grounds of race, creed, sex or 
social status. Therefore, dismissal on such grounds is 
not only void according to Section 90 of the Civil Code 
but also constitutes an unlawful act which is actionable 
under Section 709 of the Code. Due to this provision in 
Article 14 of the Constitution, the courts have been able 
to hold that dismissal on such grounds is void even if 
the dismissal itself cannot constitute "working 
conditions" under the L.S.L.
The Sexual Equality in Employment Law 1983 was 
passed in order to establish equal opportunities and 
treatment in employment for men and women. Section 11 of 
the Law provides as follows: "(1) An employer shall not
treat a female worker differently to a male worker on the
322
grounds of her sex with regard to dismissal or the age of 
retirement. (2) An employer shall not make any rule that 
a female worker shall retire when she marries, gets 
pregnant or gives birth to a child. (3) An employer shall 
not dismiss a female worker because she has married, got 
pregnant, given birth to a child or received leave...(for 
childbirth)."
It is not expected that the S.E.E.L. will change the 
substantive law of dismissal which existed before its 
enactment, as there had previously been a number of 
judicial decisions which made dismissal or compulsory 
retirement on the grounds of sex unlawful and void as 
being in violation of public policy.1*4
(2) COVERAGE AND RROCEDURES UNDER THE STATUTES
There are no exclusions from the application of 
Section 90 of the Civil Code. The L.S.L. provides only a 
few exclusions from the application of Section 3. It 
excludes domestic employees, employees to whom the 
Seamen^ Law applies, and an employer who employs only 
those relations living with him as family members or 
domestic employees. It also excludes workers employed by 
the national government except for those employed in the 
operational sector. The S.E.E.L. excludes workers 
employed by the national government or in local 
government.
In order to enforce the L.S.L., the inspectors in
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the inspection offices in each Prefectural Labour 
Standards Office have the power to inspect workplaces, 
examine records and documents, and question the employer 
or the workers. They also have the authority to exercise 
the rights of a judicial police officer as provided by 
the Code of Criminal Procedure. When encountering a 
contravention of the L.S.L., the employee may complain to 
the administrative office or inspector. The employer is 
then prohibited from dismissing or discriminating against 
the employee who has complained. The Law also established 
the Director of Women's and Minors* Superintendence 
Bureau in the Ministry of Labour to oversee an internal 
subdivision whose task it is to consider labour problems 
which are peculiar to women and minors.
The S.E.E.L. authorizes the Directors of Women’s and 
Minors * Bureau of all prefectures to provide 
administrative advice and guidance, or to make 
recommendations to the parties in disputes concerning sex 
discrimination in employment where one or both of the 
parties requests this. The Minister of the Labour 
Department himself may, if necessary, require the 
employer to provide a report on a dispute, give 
administrative advice or guidance, or make a 
recommendation. The S.E.E.L. set up in each Women's and 
Minors' Bureau, a Mediatorial Commission for Sexual 
Equality in Employment which consists of three persons 
with relevant knowledge and experience. It also
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authorizes the Director of the Bureau to refer a dispute 
to the Commission for mediation where both parties agree 
to this. The Commission may develop a mediation plan and 
recommend that the parties should accept it.
Employee may therefore have the easiest access to 
legal or administrative relief in cases of discriminatory 
dismissal based on sex. However, since there is no 
compulsory arbitration for disputes concerning sexual 
discrimination and no punishment against discrimination, 
the S.E.E.L. does not provide for effective control of 
dismissal on the grounds of sex.
(3) CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION
In contrast to the U.S. and Britain, neither the 
court nor the legislature has yet developed the concept 
of "indirect discrimination." Nor have the courts 
developed any precise method of proving discrimination. 
The courts will examine all relevant evidence in order to 
decide whether it is a reasonable inference that an 
employer intentionally discriminated against employees 
and whether there was a legitimate reason for the action 
as alleged by the employer. The courts have also held 
that the employee must prove that an improper motive was
l i e
the dominant reason behind the dismissal. In practice, 
the employer always alleges a legitimate reason since the 
dismissal will be void as an abuse of his right unless he 
does so. This situation has often made it difficult for 
employees to prove that dismissal was discriminatory.
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(4) REMEDIES
An employee who has been discriminatorily dismissed
may seek a court judgment to affirm his status as an
employee of the company and to order the company to pay
unpaid wages. A discriminatory dismissal is usually
considered to constitute a tort. For example, in the
Hitachi Seisakujo case, the plaintiff, a Korean worker
who was resident in Japan, was dismissed on the grounds
of his Korean nationality two weeks after the defendant
company sent a notice of hiring. The Yokohama District
Court delivered a judgment to affirm his contractual
status as' an employee of the defendant and to order the
defendant to pay unpaid wages with interest and future
wages until the finalization of the judgment. In
addition, the Court ordered the defendant to pay ¥300,000
as damages for the plaintiff's injured feelings since it
found that the plaintiff suffered mental anguish from
1 1 fiethnic prejudice.
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CHAPTER 8
THE LAW OF DISMISSAL FOR ECONOMIC REASONS
Dismissal for economic reasons is generally regarded 
as permissible even in those countries which require a 
valid reason justifying dismissal. Market economies 
cannot be successful if employers are not permitted to 
increase and decrease their workforce in response to 
their changing financial circumstances. However, the 
employer’s financial circumstances generally have nothing 
to do with the workers, and workforce reduction is not 
due to the fault of the workers concerned. Dismissal for 
economic reasons often arises on a large scale and 
therefore it may seriously affect the social and economic 
life of society. Even under severe economic conditions, 
dismissal is not necessarily a just reason for the 
employer to reduce his workforce. Thus, dismissals for 
economic reasons should be avoided or minimized not only 
to protect workers but also to protect social and 
economic stability. In cases where such dismissals 
cannot be averted, the effects which loss of employment 
may have on to the dismissed workers and their families 
should be minimized. This chapter examines the law 
regulating dismissal for economic reasons in Japan, 
Britain and the United States.
8.1. JAPAN
8.1.1, ABUSIVE DISMISSAL
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As already seen in Chapter 3.2.2 in this thesis, 
dismissal is void as an abuse of the employer's right 
unless it is for a rational reason and is permissible 
with regard to social norms. The employer's economic 
position as well as the employee's incompetence or 
misconduct may constitute a rational reason for 
dismissal. However, where employees are dismissed for 
economic reasons, the dismissals are subject to the 
question of whether they are permissible with regard to 
social norms. Since there is no fault on the part of the 
employees in cases of dismissal for economic reasons, the 
courts have intervened actively in disputes concerning 
these dismissals.
The courts have gradually developed criteria for 
determining whether dismissal for economic reasons is 
valid. The following four criteria have been established 
judicially although there is no Supreme Court decision 
directly affirming them. They are (1) whether there was 
a genuine financial need to reduce the workforce, (2 ) 
whether the employer made a reasonable effort to avoid 
dismissal, (3) whether the employer bargained or 
consulted with the unions, and (4) whether the standards 
by which he selected the employees for dismissal were 
reasonable and whether the employees were in fact 
selected in accordance with that standard.1
Regarding criterion (1), the courts decide whether 
it was probable that the company would have fallen into
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severe financial difficulties unless it reduced the 
workforce. Many decisions have required the company to
p
have had a large deficit. Some courts required proof
•z
that the company was in danger of going bankrupt while 
others in more recent cases have only required the 
employer to show severe financial difficulties.4 For the 
purpose of determining whether there are financial 
difficulties, the courts often look into the company's 
financial documents such as the statement of profit and 
loss, the balance sheet, dividend rates on stocks, the 
quantity of orders from customers, and prospects for 
business recovery. The courts also take into account 
whether the company stopped recruitment, raised wages, 
cut overtime work or provided "rest days" around the time 
of dismissal.
Under criterion (2), the courts look into whether 
the employer implemented measures such as voluntary 
retirement, transfer, or reductions in the numbers of
p
temporary or part-time employees. In the Waterman case, 
for example, the court held that the dismissal for 
redundancy was void, partly because the employer did not 
made an adequate effort to avoid the dismissal. The court 
stated: "the company did not seriously consider the
possibility that it might transfer the employee from the 
business department, which incurs enormous labour-cost 
per head, to a department which has a comparatively low 
labour-cost or that it might transfer him to its related
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company. Furthermore, the company did not invite 
employees to accept voluntary retirement. In these 
circumstances, it cannot be said that the employer made a 
reasonable effort to avoid dismissal." It was also stated 
by the court in the Sumitomo.juki Ehime Zousen case that 
the company did not make an adequate effort to avoid 
dismissal since it did not try to reduce the workforce 
reduction on a planned scale through a longer-term 
programme of voluntary retirement. In the Nishinihon
O
Densen case, the court held that the company did not 
make an adequate effort to avoid dismissal even though it 
had once invited employees’ to take voluntary retirement 
and also encouraged employees who came under the criteria 
set up in a collective agreement to retire. The court 
questioned why the company did not continue to encourage 
the employees to retire.
There have been several cases in which the courts 
have held that, if the company dismissed the employees on 
the grounds that they refused to accept an order of 
transfer to another company, made in order to avoid 
dismissal for economic reasons, the dismissal is still 
regarded as being for economic reasons. Therefore, its 
validity is judged in accordance with the above four 
criteria.
A reduction in the number of temporary employees and 
part-time employees is usually required prior to the 
dismissal of full-time employees. In the Toyo Seiki
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case,*^ the court stated that the rationale for this is 
that the employment relationship between these employees 
and the company is temporary and that their contribution 
to the company is smaller. When a court determines 
whether temporary employees should be the first to be 
dismissed, it should consider whether their relationship 
with the company is genuinely temporary.
Even though legal regulations similar to the law of
dismissal have been applied to the termination of the
contracts of so-called "regularized" non-regular
employees (i.e. employees employed under successive fixed
term contracts), they may be treated differently to
ordinary regular employees. According to the Supreme
Court, this is because those employed under fixed term
contracts only have a degree of expectation of
continuous employment while those employed under
contracts of indefinite duration have a legitimate
1 1expectation of lifetime employment.
Therefore, although many courts have applied four 
criteria similar to those applied to ordinary regular 
employees when they determine whether non-renewal for 
economic reasons is valid, their inquiry for each 
criterion is less severe for the employer in non-renewal 
cases than in dismissal cases. Nevertheless, in several 
cases, the courts have held that a decision not to renew 
a fixed-term contract with a particular employee is void 
because there was no genuine financial need for the non­
337
renewal, there was a lack of reasonable effort to avoid 
non-renewal, or unreasonable standards were applied for 
selection.
With regard to criterion (3), if there is a
collective agreement which requires the employer to
consult with the union prior to dismissal for economic
reasons, dismissal without adequate consultation is
usually regarded as void. However, there have been many
cases in which the dismissal was held to be void because
of the employer’s failure to consult with the union, even
though there was no collective agreement which imposed
l *3the duty of advance consultation on the employer. Among 
these cases, there are several in which it was held that 
the employer has to consult with a minor union as well as 
a major union; ^  cases in which it was held that 
dismissal was void partly because the employer had failed 
to consult with employees who were not represented by a
1 c
union. It has also been held that it was sufficient for
the employer to consult with a union which dismissed
1 Rtemporary employees did not belong to; and that, if 
there was a staff association, the employer had to
i 7
consult with it. These cases indicate that the employer 
should explain the following items and should consult 
with the union or the employees about them in good faith: 
the necessity for a reduction in the workforce, the time 
and scale of reduction, the policies and procedures to be 
observed in carrying out the reduction, the criteria for
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dismissal and the application of those criteria.
As to criterion (4), if the employer uses an 
unreasonable standard or unreasonably departs from the 
standard used in selecting employees for dismissal, then 
the dismissal is held to be void. However, since there is 
no rigid rule such as the American seniority rule or the 
British rule of "last in first out", the courts have had 
difficulty in deciding whether a particular standard is 
unreasonable or not. It is difficult to balance the 
efficiency of the company’s business after dismissal 
against protection of the lifestyle of the dismissed 
workers and their families.
Some of the criteria which one court set out as
being those which the employer should apply in selecting
employees for dismissal were very vague such as the
business efficacy of the company, the ability,
experience, skill, and professional qualifications of the
worker, the worker’s family circumstances, and other
1 8socially justifiable criteria. Many courts have held 
that only arbitrary or discriminatory standards are 
unreasonable. These standards include "a married woman", 
"a married woman with two or more children", "a married 
woman and a woman aged twenty or older", etc.
Employers often use the worker's age and length of 
service as one of the criteria for selection for 
dismissal. For example, where the employer applied the 
criterion "persons born before 1925" (in a 1979 case),
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"unskilled persons born after 1954" (in a 1980 case), 
"persons of thirty-six or younger employed after 1968" 
(in a 1980 case), and "persons of fifty-five or older", 
the court held that these criteria were not unreasonable. 
In the Takada Seikou.jo case where the employer applied 
the criterion "persons of thirty-six or younger employed 
after 1968" to select employees for dismissal, the court 
stated as follows:
"The criterion used in the present case to select 
employees for dismissal is not directly related to 
the company’s business necessity or needs for the 
improvement of its business. It is also a 
disadvantageous criterion for the company because it 
makes the company dismiss promising young persons 
with lower wages. Therefore, it appears that this 
criterion goes against the purpose of dismissal for 
redundancy and is unreasonable as a criterion for 
dismissal. However, although persons with long 
service and of higher age are costly for the company 
and are expected to contribute less to the company 
in the future, they have more skills acquired 
through experience and are more likely to stay with 
the company. Moreover, if the company sets up 
criteria by which it may substantially take into 
consideration its business necessity, the criteria 
would be abstract. The more abstract the criteria, 
the more difficult it is for the company to convince
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employees that the criteria are fair and 
reasonable. In circumstances under which a severe 
dispute is predicted between the company and the 
union with regard to the fairness of criteria, it is 
not unreasonable for the company to set up the above 
criteria which are objective and without the
i q
question of fairness.”
Although there have been a small number of cases in 
which the court has held that the criteria to select 
employees for dismissal are unreasonable, there have been 
many cases in which the court has held that the dismissal 
of a particular employee is void because he was selected 
in contravention of the criteria. This often occurs where 
the employer set up a criterion related to employees1 
previous work performance such as "persons not 
transferable to any suitable position", "persons with low 
efficiency", "persons with a bad working record" and so 
on. Since these criteria are apt to be influenced by the 
employers’ subjective evaluation, the courts have been 
very cautious in holding these dismissals to be valid.
It is useful to mention the relationship between 
dismissal for redundancy and the transfer of undertakings 
or amalgamation. If the contracts of employment made 
between the employees and the previous company are not 
automatically adopted by the new company, then the 
contracts of employment will be lawfully terminated and 
re-employment will be at the discretion of the new
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employer. If this is the case, the employees cannot claim 
contractual status as employees of the new company after 
the transfer of undertakings or the amalgamation.
However, in Japan, so far as amalgamation is 
concerned, the Commercial Law provides that the new 
company acquires the rights and duties of the dissolved 
company. It is generally accepted that the contracts of 
employment are also automatically taken over by the new 
company. If the employer refuses to hire all or some of 
the employees of the dissolved company, those employees 
can dispute the refusal as dismissal. In such a case, the 
law of economic dismissal as discussed above may be 
applied. In contrast, in cases of transferred 
undertakings, it is considered that contracts of 
employment are transferred from the transferor to the 
transferee only where both the contract of transfer has 
provided for this and where the employees have agreed 
that their contracts will be transferred to the 
transferee. Accordingly, if the transferee does not agree 
to accept the employees of the transferor, the employees 
can make no claim against the transferee.
However, in many cases, the courts have regarded the 
transferor and transferee as having agreed to the 
transfer of contracts of employment. One of the reasons 
given by the Osaka High Court is that "the enterprise is 
not only a private and commercial organization but also 
an existence of public nature in that it is a legal
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existence to be protected in the interest of its owners 
and management as well as its employees and their 
families. If the contracts of employment are construed to 
be transferred with the transfer of the undertaking, the 
problems which may otherwise arise, e.g. the problem of
unemployment, can be avoided, and therefore the transfer
20of the undertaking will be carried out smoothly.” There 
has been one case in which the court held that even if 
there was a specific agreement between the transferor and 
the transferee not to transfer the contracts of 
employment, the agreement would be void because of abuse
of their right unless there was a good reason behind the
2 1agreement.
8.1.2. NOTICE REQUIREMENT FOR WORKFORCE REDUCTION
Where an employer reduces the workforce by more than 
30 employees through dismissal or retirement in one 
establishment in any one month because of reduction of 
scale of operations or some other reason, he must give 
notice to the Public Employment Security Office one month 
prior to the date of that workforce reduction. However, 
where the entire reduction does not occur at the same 
time, notice may be given prior to the date of the last 
dismissal or retirement. If the employer fails to do 
this, he can be fined. The purpose of this requirement of 
notification is to make it easy for the government to 
take action to promote the employment of separated
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workers through employment security agencies and public
22vocational training agencies.
8.2. BRITAIN
8.2.1. DEFINITION OF "REDUNDANCY"
In Britain, dismissals for economic reasons are
mainly regulated by three areas of the law; unfair
dismissal legislation, redundancy payments legislation
and legislation concerning redundancy notification and
consultation. Dismissal for redundancy is defined in
Section 81(2) of the EP(C)A for the purposes of unfair
dismissal and redundancy payments. It is defined as
dismissal which is attributable wholly or mainly to -
"(a) the fact that his employer has ceased, or intends to
cease, to carry on the business for the purposes of which
the employee was employed by him, or has ceased, or
intends to cease, to carry on that business in the place
where the employee was so employed, or (b) the fact that
the requirements of that business for employees to carry
out work of a particular kind, or for employees to carry
out work of a particular kind in the place where he was
so employed, have ceased or diminished or are expected to
cease or diminish."
According to the above definition, dismissal for
redundancy arises in the three situations. The first is a
cessation of the business for which the employee was
employed. It includes not only a permanent cessation but
2 3also a temporary one. The second situation is a
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cessation of business in the place where the employee is
employed. The question here is one of construction of the
24individual’s contract of employment. If an employee’s 
contract contains an express mobility clause, his 
dismissal for refusal to move to a new location is 
usually not for reason of redundancy. In such a case, the 
court cannot formally limit its scope by reference to the
p C
concepts of good faith or reasonableness. However,
there has been a case in which the EAT held that a broad
mobility clause should be qualified by ascertaining the
employee’s normal place of work by a factual test
instead of relying on a contract test.^  A mobility
clause may also be implied into the contract. Such an
implied term will normally be qualified in that the
mobility requirement will be limited to a reasonable
2 7daily travelling distance from the employee’s home.
The third situation is surplus labour due to a 
reduction in the employer’s requirements for employees to 
perform "work of a particular kind.” Therefore, even if 
the work in question remains to be done, an employee is 
still redundant if the company has so organized its 
affairs that fewer employees are required to perform the 
work, whether this is achieved by improved mechanization, 
automation, other technical advance or reallocation of 
functions.
The application of the phrase ”work of a particular 
kind” is often difficult. For example, in Vaux Breweries
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Ltd. v. Ward, the employer decided to relaunch one of 
their hotels by employing young "bunny girls" in place of 
older barmaids. The Divisional Court reversed the 
tribunal’s decision that a dismissed barmaid was entitled 
to redundancy pay and remitting the case, the Divisional 
Court held that the whole question was:"Was the work that 
the barmaid in the altered premises was going to do work 
of a different kind to what a barmaid in the unaltered
pq
premises had been doing?" The work had changed merely 
regarding the type of person the employer required to do 
that work. Similarly, in a case in which a manager of a 
garage who had been heavily involved in repair work was 
required to do more paperwork and less repair work, it 
was held that his work remained essentially the same.
The question of whether work remains essentially the 
same or not is difficult. For example, where a general 
plumber was dismissed on the basis that the employer 
needed a heating technician who could deal with both 
electrics and plumbing rather than a general plumber, the 
dismissal was held to be valid for reason of
T  1
redundancy. It has also been held that night-shift work 
was a particular kind of work as opposed to day-shift
70
work. In contrast, where two women who had worked as 
clerk from 9.00 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. were dismissed for 
refusal to work shifts of 8.00 a.m. to 3.00 p.m. and 1.00 
p.m. to 8 p.m., the dismissal was held not to be for 
redundancy on the grounds that they would do the same
346
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amount of work.
In the above cases, courts and tribunals attempted 
to identify redundancy by asking whether the requirements 
of the employer for employees to carry out work of the 
kind on which the employee was actually engaged had 
ceased or diminished. This approach has been described as 
the ’job function' test. There is however a line of cases 
taking a different approach. It has been described as the 
'contract' test since it makes it necessary to show that 
such diminution or cessation was in relation to any work 
that he could have been asked to do. For example, in 
Cowen v. Haden Carrier Ltd., ^  the plaintiff was employed 
as a regional surveyor and was later promoted to 
divisional contracts surveyor. His contract of employment 
provided that he would be required to undertake "any and 
all duties which reasonably fell within the scope of his 
capabilities.” Due to a reduction in the volume of their 
business the defendant company decided to abolish the 
position of divisional contracts surveyor and the 
plaintiff was made redundant. He argued that he had not 
been made redundant, since his contractual duties were 
sufficiently extensive for him to have been redeployed to 
new work. The Court of Appeal held that the requirement 
that the employee should perform the duties was, 
following his promotion, restricted to the duties of a 
divisional contracts surveyor. Accordingly, the employer 
had no right to require him to transfer from that work to
assume the job of any one of their quantity surveyors. 
Since there was a diminution in the particular kind of 
work that the employee was required to do, the employee
•Z C
was redundant.
Finally, re-organisation which does not fit the 
definition of redundancy because there is no diminution 
in the requirements for employees is also a permissible 
reason as "some other substantial reason" in unfair 
dismissal law if there is "some sound, good business 
reason for it". Cases of dismissal caused by r e ­
organisation were examined in Chapter 3.1.2.
8.2.2. SPECIAL PAYMENTS FOR REDUNDANCY DISMISSAL36
The employer has to give redundant employees 
"redundancy payments" which are calculated according to 
their age, length of continuous employment and weekly 
pay. For the purpose of deciding whether the dismissal is 
due to redundancy, Section 91(2) of the EP(C)A provides 
that the dismissal is presumed to be by reason of 
redundancy unless the contrary is proved by the employer. 
Even if the dismissal is found to be by reason of 
redundancy, the employee may lose any right that he would 
otherwise have to a redundancy payment in the following 
situation. Where, prior to the dismissal, the employer 
makes an offer to renew the contract of employment or 
offers to re-engage the employee and the offer is to take 
effect either immediately as the old one comes to an end
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or no more than four weeks after this date, either where
the terms and conditions of the contract would not
differ from those of previous contract, or where the
former provisions would differ (wholly or in part) from
the latter provisions, but the offer constitutes an offer
of suitable employment for that the employee, and in
either case the employee unreasonably refuses that 
37offer. The courts have regarded the ’suitability’ of an 
offer on an objective basis and the ’reasonableness’ of a
70
refusal on a subjective basis.
The redundancy payments law purports to facilitate 
labour mobility and industrial efficiency by mitigating 
financial hardship to employees which would otherwise
TO
result from the loss of employment. However, because of 
the above definition of ’redundancy" and the tribunals’ 
interpretation of it, the employee may not be entitled to 
a redundancy payment even though he is dismissed as a 
result of the employer’s modernisation of his company.
8.2.3. UNFAIR DISMISSAL
Although redundancy is provided for by the EP(C)A, 
s.57(2)(c) as a permissible reason, it may be considered 
to be unfair under Section 57(3) which provides for a 
general test of fairness. It should first be noted that 
it is not open to the tribunal to investigate the 
commercial and economic reasons which prompted redundancy 
dismissals. ^  * What the tribunal has to consider is 
whether the employer acted reasonably in treating the
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financial situation of the company as a reason for 
dismissal.
The manner in which the tribunals have been required 
to approach the question of reasonableness under Section 
57(3) has been said to be highly c o n t r o v e r s i a l I n  
Vickers Ltd. v. Smith, the EAT overruled the tribunal's 
finding that the employer unfairly dismissed the employee 
when another employee had volunteered for redundancy. The 
EAT stated a proper test for deciding whether dismissal 
for redundancy is fair or not. According to the EAT, the 
tribunal should "ask themselves the question whether it 
was so wrong that no sensible or reasonable management 
could have arrived at the decision at which the 
management arrived in deciding who should be 
selected... for redundancy."4^
However, in Williams v. Compair Maxam Ltd., the EAT 
took a more interventionist stance. The EAT laid down 
guidelines which directed the tribunals to consider 
whether objective selection criteria were chosen and 
fairly applied, whether the possibility of transfer to 
other work was investigated, whether employees were 
warned and consulted and whether the union was consulted 
as to the most equitable manner of implementing the 
redundancy.44 The guidelines laid down in Compair Maxam 
seem to have formed the framework for regulating the 
fairness of dismissal for redundancy since then. Analysis 
of these guidelines is useful therefore in examining what
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factors the tribunals have taken into consideration in 
determining whether dismissals for redundancy are fair.
Selection Criteria
The employer must "show how the employee came to be
dismissed for redundancy, upon what basis the selection
was made and how it was applied in practice. "4^ In
Compair Maxam, the EAT considered that criteria for
selection should be those which "can be objectively
checked against such things as attendance record,
efficiency at the job, experience, or length of 
*46service." u
The selection criterion of "last in first out" 
(LIFO) is generally regarded as fair,47 although the way 
in which LIFO is applied sometimes makes dismissal for
A Q
redundancy unfair. ° Factors such as performance and 
attendance are often used as criteria for selection. In 
these cases, the tribunals seem to examine the 
application of those criteria more cautiously.4^
If the employer uses a unlawful criterion for 
selection, the dismissal for redundancy is unfair. Thus, 
TULR(C)A, s.153 specifically provides that the dismissal 
is automatically unfair where the reason behind selection 
for redundancy is a union-related reason. However, this, 
of course, does not mean that reasons for selection 
other than union-re 1 ated reasons may not make the 
dismissal unfair. The reasons which make selection for
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dismissal unfair may include all the reasons which 
constitute discriminatory dismissal.
Warning To And Consultation With Employees
In deciding whether an employer acted reasonably in
dismissing employees for redundancy, the tribunals have
made much of the procedure which is followed. The
dismissal is usually unfair if the employer has not
warned and consulted the employee or a recognized union
before dismissal. The Industrial Relations Code of 
cn
Practice 1972 provided that warnings should be given 
and there should be consultation with employees or their 
representatives if redundancy becomes necessary. In 
Polkey v. Dayton Service Ltd., the House of Lords stated 
that "In the case of redundancy the employer will 
normally not act reasonably unless he warns and consults 
any employees affected or their representative, adopts a 
fair basis on which to select for redundancy and takes 
such steps as may be reasonable to avoid or minimize 
redundancy by re-employment within his own
c 1
organisation."
However, the House of Lords also stated that "where 
the employer could reasonably have concluded in the light 
of circumstances known to him at the time of dismissal 
that consultation or warning would be have been utterly 
useless he might well act reasonably even if he did not 
observe the provisions of the code. Failure to observe 
the requirement of the code....will not necessarily
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c o
render a dismissal unfair”. In Duffy v. Yeomans and 
Partners Ltd., the Court of Appeal held that the question 
to be asked in the exceptional case contemplated by 
Polkey is not whether the employer in fact made a 
deliberate decision not to consult, but whether a 
reasonable employer could have decided not to consult in
C 7
the light of the facts that were known at the time.
Investigation Of Alternative Employment
It has also been held that dismissal is unfair where 
the employer had made no effort to find an alternative 
job for the employee. In Yokes Ltd. v. Bear, the National 
Industrial Relations Court held that the dismissal was 
unfair because the company had not made any attempt to 
see whether the employee could have been employed within 
its company group. The 1972 Code of Practice also 
provided that management should offer help to employees 
in finding other work. The NIRC stated that ”The employer 
had not yet done that which in all fairness and reason he 
should do, namely to make the obvious attempt to see if 
Mr Bear could be placed somewhere else in this large 
group.
Consultation With Unions Or Other Workforce 
Representatives
Failure to satisfy this requirement may result in
the payment of a protective award (see below) and failure
to consult with unions can in itself mean that a
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EC
dismissal is unfair. ° Nevertheless, it is an important 
factor which the tribunal has to take into consideration 
in deciding the fairness of a dismissal. In Compair 
Maxam, the EAT stated that the employer must ’consult the 
union as to the best means by which the desired 
management result can be achieved fairly and with as
c p
little hardship to the employees as p o s s i b l e . ” 
Consultation with unions does not preclude consultation
C7
with individuals.
8.2.4. TRANSFERS OF UNDERTAKINGS58
At common law, if the undertaking is transferred 
from one owner (the transferor) to another (the 
transferee), there will be a change in the identity of 
the employer and thereby the contracts of employment made 
by the transferor will terminate. The transfer 
constitutes a repudiatory breach of the contract of 
employment by the transferor, and the employees are
c q
entitled to treat it as a wrongful dismissal. This 
means that the employees do not have any right to 
continuing employment. However, under the Transfer of 
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 
(TUPE) which was enacted under the European Communities 
Act 1972 to implement the provisions of EEC Directive 
[No.77/187], the contract of employment of any person 
employed by the transferor shall not terminate, but shall 
have effect as if made by the transferee [reg.5(l)].
Under TUPE, an ’undertaking’ is widely defined as
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including ’any trade or business’. It also covers a part
of an u n d e r t a king.TUPE applies to a transfer from one
person to another of an undertaking situated immediately
before the transfer in the United Kingdom or a part of
one which is so situated. It applies whether the transfer
is effected by sale, by some other disposition or by
operation of law. It applies even if the transfer is
governed or effected by law, or if the employees in the
undertaking work outside the UK, or if their employment
R 1is governed by foreign law. TUPE does not apply to a
mere transfer of assets or property from one to another
employer. There must normally also be a transfer of
fi?business goodwill as well. Nor does it apply if the
identity of the employer remains the same. Thus, it does
not apply to the acquisition of control in a company by
R ^share purchase. In deciding whether there has been a
transfer of an undertaking, the critical question is
whether the undertaking retains its identity and is
R4carried on by the transferee. The ECJ has held that a
company's contracted out canteen service was within the
EEC Directive [N o . 7 7 / 1 8 7 ] , and that one individual
cleaner employed by a bank was protected by the Directive
against dismissal when the bank contracted out its 
RRcleaning work.
Where an employee is dismissed either before or 
after the transfer, the dismissal will be automatically 
unfair [reg.8(l)]. However, if the dismissal is for an
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economic, technical or organizational reason entailing
changes in the workforce, for the purpose of Section
57(1) of the EP(C)A, the dismissal will be regarded as
having been for a substantial reason of a kind such as to
justify dismissal[reg.8 ( 2)] . Where the prospective
purchaser insists on the prior dismissal of existing
employees, this is not an 'economic reason' within
meaning of regulation 8(2), and therefore a dismissal in
R 7such circumstances will be unfair. As regulation 8(2)
covers only those economic reasons 'entailing changes in
the workforce’ as a whole, in Berriman v. Delabole the
transferee’s decision to cut the wages of the
transferor’s employees to bring them into line with those
of his own employees amounted to unfair constructive
dismissal because there was no change in the workforce
i n v o l v e d . T h e  'economic r e a s o n ’ exception in
regulation 8 (2 ) is narrower than the 'some other
substantial reason’ involving reorganizations.
Furthermore, even if the reason for dismissal is
considered to be an ’economic reason’ under regulation
8(2), it will, of course, remain to be considered whether
the employer acted reasonably in the circumstances. The
ruling in Berriman raises a difficult question of how
long the transferred employees can enjoy such a better
eq
protection in relation to unfair dismissal.
Regulation 5(1) only applies to a person employed in 
an undertaking, or part of one which is transferred, who
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was so employed immediately before the transfer
[reg.5(3)]. In Secretary of State for Employment v.
Spence the employees were dismissed at 11.00 a.m. and the
business was sold at 2.00 p.m. the same day. The
employees were re-engaged by the transferee, but they
sought a redundancy payment from the Secretary of State,
as the transferor had gone into liquidation. The
employees argued that they were not employed ’immediately
before the transfer'. The Court of Appeal upheld the
employees' argument that they were not employed
'immediately before the transfer' and therefore that
7 0regulation 5(1) did not apply to their case. This
result may, however, make it easy for a transferor
without funds to agree with a transferee that employees
should be dismissed a short time before transfer, thus
7 1leaving them with a worthless remedy.
The House of Lords in Litster v. Forth Dry Dock & 
Engineering Co.Ltd. held that regulation 5(3) should be 
read as if there were inserted after the words 
'immediately before the transfer' the words 'or would 
have been so employed if he had not been unfairly 
dismissed in the circumstances described in regulation 
8(1)'. This broad interpretation of regulation 5(3) is 
based on the idea that: "under Article 4 of the Directive 
[77/187/EEC], as construed by the European Court of 
Justice, a dismissal effected before the transfer and 
solely because of the transfer of the business is, in
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effect, prohibited and is, for the purpose of considering 
the application of Article 3(1), required to be treated 
as ineffective.’^
8.2.5. INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION IN ADVANCE OF 
REDUNDANCIES
The employers’ obligation to provide information and
consultation in the event of collective redundancies was
first introduced in 1975 in order to give effect to EEC
7Directive [No.75/129]. However, the original British 
provisions concerning information and consultation for 
collective redundancies were condemned by the European 
Court of Justice in two cases,^ on the grounds that the 
employer’s obligation was limited to cases where the 
employer recognised a trade union for collective 
bargaining purposes and that there was no procedure for 
the designation of employee representatives in other 
circumstances. Accordingly, the Government has issued the 
Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings 
(Protection of Employment)(Amendment)Regulations 1995 to 
comply with the ECJ’s rulings.
An employer who contemplates dismissing employees 
for redundancy must both notify the Department of Trade 
and Industry and consult the appropriate employee 
representatives. "Dismissal for redundancy" for the 
purpose of this obligation is defined substantially 
differently than that for the purpose of the law on 
redundancy payments and unfair dismissal. It is "the
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dismissal for a reason not related to the individual
concerned or for a number of reasons all of which are not
so related."^
Where the employer is proposing to dismiss 100 or
more employees at one establishment, he must consult the
"appropriate representatives" of the employees concerned
at least 90 days before the first of those dismissals
takes effect. Otherwise, consultation must begin at least
7 R30 days before that date. In the case of dismissal of
less than 100 but 20 or more employees, he should consult
77within a period of 30 days or less. This 20-redundancy 
threshold which was introduced by the 1995 Regulation is 
estimated to remove the requirement to consult employee
70
representatives from some 96 % of UK business although
it is in the line with the provisions of the EEC
Directive [No.75/129].
"Appropriate representatives" are defined as either
(a) employee’s representatives as elected by them, or
(b)representatives of an independent trade union 
recognized by the employer for employees of that
description, or (c) where there are both, either employee
representatives or union representatives, as the employer
70
chooses. "Employee representatives" are defined as 
either persons elected by employees for the specific 
purpose of being consulted by their employer about the 
proposed dismissals, or (b) persons elected by employees 
other than for that specific purpose, if it is
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appropriate for the employer to consult them about the 
proposed dismissals. In either case, the employee 
representatives must be employed by the employer at the
on
time of their election.
For the purposes of the consultation the employer 
must disclose the following information in writing to the 
appropriate representatives: the reasons for his
proposals, the number and description of employees to be 
dismissed as redundant, the total number of employees of 
any such description at the establishment in question, 
the proposed method of selection for dismissal, the 
proposed method of carrying out the dismissals with due 
regard to any agreed procedure, the proposed method of 
calculating the amount of redundancy payments otherwise
O 1
than in compliance with a statutory obligation.
The consultation should include discussion about ways 
of: avoiding the dismissals reducing the numbers of
employees to be dismissed, and mitigating the 
consequences of the dismissals. The employer should also 
undertake to try to reach agreement with the appropriate
o o
representatives. The trade union or the employee 
representatives or any of them or any employees concerned 
may complain to an industrial tribunal about an 
employer’s failure to consult it and ask for a 
"protective award", the effect of which is that the 
employees concerned have to be paid for the period of the 
award. The length of the period will be what is
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considered to be just and equitable by the tribunal in
all the circumstances having regard to the seriousness of
the employer’s default. This will be (a) up to 90 days
where 90 days’ minimum notice should have been given, or
(b) up to 30 days in any other case in which consultation
was required, beginning on the date on which the first of
the dismissals to which the complaint relates was
proposed to take effect, or the date of the award,
ft 3whichever is the earlier
The purpose of the protective award is not very
clear since TULR(C)A, s.l89(4)(b) provides that the
protected period should be ’just and equitable in all the
circumstances having regard to the seriousness of the
employer’s default’. It has been construed so as to
compensate the employees for the employer’s failure to
consult, not to penalise the employer. However, the
tribunal should take account of the seriousness of the
employer’s default in determining the size of the award.
In doing so, the tribunal should consider the default in
relation to the employees and not in relation to the
84appropriate representative who have not been consulted.
In Spiller-French (Holdings) v. USDAW,^^ the EAT held 
that compensation should be based not on the loss or 
potential loss of actual remuneration during the relevant 
period by the particular employee but on the loss of days 
of consultation. Therefore, even if the employees have 
suffered no pecuniary loss, for example, through being
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found immediate alternative employment, there may still 
be a protective award. On the other hand, if the employer 
has done everything that he can possibly do to find 
alternative employment for the employees, "the tribunal 
may well take the view that either there should be no
p p
award or, if there is an award, it should be nominal.”
The employer is also required to notify the 
Department of Trade and Industry, in writing, of the 
proposed dismissals for redundancy at least 90 (or 30) 
days before the first of those dismissals in the case of 
dismissal of 100 or more (or 20 or more) employees. If 
consultation with appropriate representatives is 
required, the representatives concerned must be 
identified and the date when consultations began must be 
stated. Where consultation with the appropriate 
representatives is required, the employer must give a 
copy of the notice to those representatives. If the 
employer fails to give notice to the Secretary of State 
as is required, he is liable on summary conviction to a 
fine.87
8.5. THE UNITED STATES
8.3.1. COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS AND ARBITRATION
In the United States, termination of employment for 
economic reasons often takes place in the form of "lay­
off" . Lay-off terminates the employment contract on the 
condition that the employees will be recalled if the
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demand for workers is recovered. Lay-off includes a 
temporary lay-off of a fixed duration, but it usually 
means an indefinite lay-off which may or may not result 
in a permanent termination of employment. In the United 
States, the use of wrongful discharge theory at common 
law is limited as seen in Chapter 3.3.. Therefore, in 
many cases, the common law does not provide much 
assistance to employees who have been discharged or laid
o o
off for economic reasons or because of plant closures.
If, however, there is found to be an express or 
implied promise of discharge only with just cause, then 
most state courts will seek to ascertain whether the 
dismissal is in fact for economic reasons. Adverse
o q
economic conditions constitute just cause, but the
employer may not use the defence of economic conditions
as a pretext for discharge. The defence of economic
conditions is reviewable by a jury to determine whether
QOthey were the true reason for discharge.
Moreover, where the c o m p a n y ’s written policy
expressly declares criteria for selecting employees for
lay-off, there is a possibility that, on the basis of the
breach of an implied term or the duty of good faith and
fair dealing, a court may award damages to employees who
q i
have been discharged in breach of those criteria.
Collective agreements between employers and unions 
have not imposed substantive restrictions on the
qp
employers' rights to lay-off. For example, an agreement
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(made in 1985) by Macy’s provides that ”the necessity for 
layoffs or reduction of staff shall be at the discretion 
of the employer.” Collective agreements generally provide 
for a seniority system controlling the ranking of
q**
employees for layoff and recall from layoff.
In addition, the BNA survey found in 1986 that the
majority of agreements have provisions for income
maintenance during unemployment, including guarantee pay,
Q4severance pay or supplemental unemployment benefits.
The supplemental unemployment benefits plans are
generally geared to the level of unemployment benefits in
a particular state and most of these plans are designed
to maintain the laid-off worker’s income at 60 to 80 % of
his ordinary pay. The BNA survey found that 16 % of
Q sagreements contain such plans. Disputes concerning 
these provisions may be referred to arbitrators through 
the grievance process and then may be enforced by the 
courts.
The company’s selection of employees for lay-off is 
mainly based on seniority, but the company can also take 
other factors into consideration. An agreement (made in 
1987) by the Ford Motor Company provides: ”The order of
layoff and recall shall be governed first by seniority of 
employment, and secondly by ability. The Company shall 
consult with the Union before deviating from strict 
seniority except where prior consultation is rendered 
impracticable because of a sudden interruption or
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resumption of work.” According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, seniority is the sole criterion in only 25%
of the collective agreements. The remaining agreements
also provide for other factors to be considered, in
particular the ability to meet certain standards of 
Qfiperformance.
Seniority is based on how long the employee has been
continuously employed in the company, in the particular
unit, department or factory, or at the particular job
classification. However, most collective agreements
provide for ’bumping rights", the privilege of a senior
person to "bump" a less senior person from another job in
the event of lay-off. Thus, bumping rights may result in
considerable sifting of job assignments before it is
determined which employee is actually left without work
Q7in a case of lay-off.
When demand for its production or services recovers, 
the company will recall laid-off employees. Those 
employees will be recalled in reverse order of lay-off. 
Employees’ rights to be recalled are normally conditional 
upon the worker responding to a recall notice within a 
given number of hours or days. For example, an agreement 
(made in 1985) of General Foods Mfg. Co. provides that 
"when after a lay-off an employee fails to reply within 
three working days from the time a return-to-work notice 
sent by Certified Mail has been delivered to his last 
known address recorded in the Personnel records", his
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seniority will be cancelled.
Many non-union companies also seem to utilize 
seniority-based lay-off when it is necessary to reduce 
their workforce. This is partly because it is necessary 
for them to demonstrate their fair dealings when 
undertaking workforce reductions in order to maintain 
employees’ morale or to avoid the possibility of 
litigation for wrongful discharge or discriminatory 
discharge. However, in such companies, it is considered 
that factors other than seniority have a more decisive 
role in selecting employees for lay-off. Most white- 
collar employees are exempt from the coverage of 
collective agreements and voluntary retirement with 
monetary incentives is often utilised to reduce the 
number of white-collar employees.
8.3.2. STATUTORY NOTICE REQUIREMENT FOR WORKFORCE 
REDUCTION
There are statutes concerning workforce reductions 
due to plant closures or relocation both at federal level 
and state level. At federal level, the Worker Adjustment
qo
and Retraining Notification Act (WARN)0 was enacted in 
1988. According to the Act, employers who employ more 
than 100 employees have to give 60 days notice prior to a 
plant closing or mass layoff to the e m p l o y e e s ’ 
representatives or, if there is no such representative, 
to each affected employee and also to state and local
q q
government representatives.
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The term "plant closing" in the Act is defined as 
"the permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of 
employment... if the shutdown results in an employment 
loss at the single site of employment during any 30 day 
period for 50 or more employees excluding any part-time 
employees." 100; ’part-time employees" mean those who are 
employed for an average of less than 20 hours per week or 
who have been employed for less than 6 of the 12 months 
preceding the date on which notice is required.1^1 The 
term "mass layoff" is defined as "a reduction in [the 
work]force which.... results in an employment loss at the 
single site of employment during any 30 day period 
for....at least 33 percent of the employees.... and at 
least 50 employees. . . .or at least 500 employees
1 no
(excluding any part-time employees.)" "Employment
losses for 2 or more groups at a single site of 
employment, each of which is less than the a b o v e ­
specified minimum number of employees but which in the 
aggregate exceed that minimum number, and which occur 
within any 90-day period shall be considered to be a 
plant closing or mass layoff unless the employer 
demonstrates that the employment losses are the result of 
separate and distinct action and causes" and are not his
1 0*7
attempt to evade [his obligation]".
Some courts interpreted the "90-day" provision very 
narrowly. For example, in Jones v. Kayser-Roth Hosiery, 
Inc., the court held that in order for any layoffs within
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a ninety-day period to be aggregated, none of the layoffs 
within this period might qualify as a plant closing or 
mass layoff in itself. If one layoff does, then none of 
the other layoffs within the same ninety-day period may 
be aggregated at all.*^ Similarly, in United Electrical 
Workers v. Maxim, the court held that only layoffs 
involving less than fifty employees could be aggregated 
within a ninety-day period, even if the layoff of fifty 
or more employees did not trigger WARN because the 
employees represented less than 33 percent of the work 
force.
The term "employment loss" means "(A) an employment
termination, other than a discharge for cause, voluntary
departure, or retirement, (B) a layoff exceeding 6
months, or (C) a reduction in hours of work of more than
i n  r50 percent during each month of any 6-month period."
However, "employment loss" is not experienced where the
closure or layoff is the result of the relocation or
consolidation of part or all of the employer’s business
and, prior to the closure or layoff the employer offers
to transfer the employee to a different employment site
107under certain conditions prescribed by the Act.
The employer may order the shutdown of a single site 
of employment before the conclusion of the 60 day period 
if the employer, at the time that that notice would have 
been required, was "actively seeking capital or 
business", which would have enabled him to avoid or
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postpone the shutdown and he reasonably and in good faith 
believed that the advance notice would have interfered 
with or precluded him from obtaining the necessary
1 no
capital or business. The courts have construed this
provision narrowly, as in Local 597, IUE v. Midwest
Fastener, In c ., for example, the court held that
attempting to sell a plant facility is not "seeking
1 0 9capital or business".
The employer may also order a plant closing or mass
layoff before the conclusion of the 60 day period if the
closure or mass layoff is caused by business
circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable at the
time when the notice would have been required.**® In UAW
v. Shadyside Stamping Corp., the court held that a major
client’s "unexpected cancellation of a purchase order"
was not reasonably foreseeable within the meaning of this 
1 1 1exception.
If the employer fails to give the mandated 
notification to the employees, they can receive back pay 
for each day, up to a total of 60 days, that the employer
ii p
was in violation of WARN. Where the employer fails to
give the required notice to local government authorities,
he can be fined $ 500 per day (up to a maximum of 60 days
or $ 30,000) unless he pays all amounts owed to aggrieved
employees within 3 weeks of the plant closure or layoff 
1 1 3order. This suit should be brought in an appropriate 
federal district court by aggrieved employees, a
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representative of employees or an aggrieved local 
government.**^ The court may allow the prevailing party a 
reasonable attorney’s fee.**®
It is stated that WARN does not alter or affect any 
other contractual or statutory rights and remedies 
available to the employees, except that the period of 
notification required by WARN shall run concurrently with 
any period of notification required by contract or by any 
other statute.**®
8.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Based on the above examination in this chapter, we 
may make the following remarks on the features of the law 
of dismissal for economic reasons in each country.
In the United States, there is very little direct 
regulation of dismissal for economic reasons although 
anti-discrimination laws such as Title VII and ADEA often 
play an important role in the regulation of such cases, 
(see Chapter 7.1.) In the unionized sector, however, the 
law indirectly regulates dismissal for economic reasons 
through arbitrators’ interpretations of collective 
agreements concerning lay-off, recall, work-sharing, and 
so on. In addition, unfair labour practice legislation 
sometimes plays an important role. In comparison, the 
Japanese law of abusive dismissal and the British law of 
unfair dismissal directly regulate dismissal for economic 
reasons.
Although both the Japanese law of abusive dismissal
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and the British law of unfair dismissal regard dismissals 
for economic reasons as permissible, there is a 
significant difference in the interpretation of economic 
reasons, which permit employers to dismiss employees, 
between Japan and Britain. British law gives a unique 
definition to "dismissal for redundancy". According to 
the definition, it includes dismissals on the grounds of 
cessation of the whole or part of the business, or of 
cessation or diminishment of the business requirement for 
work of a particular kind. Moreover, it is not necessary 
that the cessation of the business or cessation or 
diminishment of the business requirement for work of a 
particular kind is caused by the employer’s financial 
difficulty. The financial difficulties of the employer 
may also constitute "some other substantial reason" for 
which an employee may be fairly dismissed. (See Chapter
3.1.2.)
In comparison, Japanese law does not permit 
dismissal unless the employer proves he has severe 
financial difficulties. If there is no severe financial 
difficulty, the employer cannot dismiss the employees on 
the grounds that he needs to restructure or reorganize 
his company in order to improve its competitiveness or 
productivity. Dismissal for positive rationalization not 
caused by economic problem alone is permissible in 
Britain but not in Japan.
In Japan and Britain, consultation with unions prior
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to dismissal for economic reasons is an important factor 
which the court or tribunal takes into consideration in 
deciding whether the dismissal is abusive or unfair. In 
Japan, dismissal of regular employees is considered to be 
a last resort to do when an employer resolves the 
imbalance in the scale of production and the number of 
employees in a certain undertaking or workplace; and 
whether the employer has transferred or has considered 
transferring employees from overmanned workplaces to 
other places is a very important factor as is whether the 
employer has implemented voluntary retirement. In 
Britain, dismissal is normally considered to be unfair 
where the employer made no effort to find an alternative 
job for the employee.
When British tribunals inquire about the employer’s 
efforts to avoid dismissal, they only examine it from the 
view-point of fair procedure. This contrasts with the 
approach of the Japanese courts who judge whether it was 
really necessary for the employer to resort to dismissal. 
It can be said that Japanese courts apply the "last 
resort” test to dismissals for economic reasons as well 
as to those for incompetence or illness. (See Chapters 
5.)
Certain criteria, especially those which 
discriminatory, for selecting employees for dismissal for 
economic reasons in Britain and Japan, and employees for 
lay-off in the United States are unlawful. One problem
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with Japanese law is the absence of the concept of 
indirect discrimination. (See Chapter 7.2.3.) Thus, in 
Japan, it is not illegal for employers to dismiss part- 
time employees first even if the vast majority of them 
are female. On the contrary, in Japan, it has been 
considered that the employer is obliged to dismiss part- 
time employees before regular full-time employees. The 
employer is entitled to terminate fixed-term employment 
contracts upon the expiry of the term before he dismisses 
regular employees. Part-time employees and employees 
under fixed-term contracts are therefore the most likely 
to be sacrificed when there is a need for a workforce 
reduction. In Britain, workers who have worked for less 
than two years are not protected by unfair dismissal law. 
In the United States, the law (i.e. WARN) requiring 
advance notice for a plant closure and layoff excludes 
part-time employees for the purposes of determining 
whether the numerical thresholds for a plant closing and 
layoff have been reached.
In Japan, courts have been faced with the difficulty 
of how to deal with the employer's non-renewal of fixed- 
term contracts in the situation of redundancy especially 
where such contracts have previously been renewed several 
times. Courts have generally applied similar criteria to 
those applied to regular employees, but their inquiry is 
less severe for the employer than in cases of regular 
employees. The courts have sought a balance between the
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employee’s expectation of renewal and the employer’s 
business necessity. British law treats non-renewal of 
fixed-term contracts very differently from Japanese law, 
but not every case of non-renewal of a fixed term 
contract is subject to unfair dismissal protection. An 
employee is excluded from the protection of unfair 
dismissal law where the dismissal consists of the expiry 
of a fixed-term contract of one year or more without its 
being renewed if before the end of the term the employee 
has agreed in writing to exemption. (See Chapter 2.4.).
In Japan, there is no general rule such as the 
’seniority rule’ or "last in, first out" in dismissal for 
workforce reduction. Therefore, the employer often sets 
ambiguous criteria which are convenient to improve 
productivity and to reduce labour costs. However, courts 
have had difficulty in condemning dismissals based on 
such criteria unless they are clearly arbitrary or 
discriminatory. As a result, older employees and 
physically weak employees have often been selected for 
dismissal. The rationale for selecting older employees 
is that they are generally highly-paid under the 
seniority-based wage system prevalent in Japan.
In Britain, "last in, first out" is a redundancy 
selection criterion commonly found in agreed procedures. 
Thus, the shorter the continuity of employment an 
employee has, the more likely he is to be dismissed for 
redundancy. However, the rule is not always strictly
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applied since the selection of employees for redundancy 
is often subject to other factors such as employees’ 
skill, capabilities, age, health and competence. It 
appears that tribunals do not interfere with agreed 
criteria unless they are deemed unlawful. In the United 
States, collective agreements stipulate rather rigid and 
precise seniority rules controlling the ranking of 
employees for lay-off and recall from lay-off. The 
seniority rule does not however exclusively control lay­
off and recall; most collective agreements also permit 
employers to take the abilities of individual employees 
into consideration in selecting workers for lay-off. 
However, since the United States enacted the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, the employer may not 
select older employees without considering their actual 
ability. (See Chapter 5.2.1.)
Besides legislation determining the appropriateness 
of dismissal for economic reasons, laws exist requiring 
employers to provide notice to the union (in the United 
States), or employee representatives or union 
representatives (in Britain), prior to a mass layoff or 
plant closure (in the United States) or mass dismissal 
(in Britain) for economic reasons which take place within 
a relatively short period of time. In the United States, 
WARN does not oblige the employer to consult the union 
but only to give advance notice in order to provide the 
employees with time to adjust themselves to the loss of
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employment and to enter job training. In Japan, there is 
no law which requires the employer to give advance 
notice or to consult with the union. However, under the 
law of abusive dismissal, dismissal without adequate 
consultation with the union is usually regarded as void. 
Yet, a lack of consultation with the union or employees 
may only be questioned in an individual employee’s claim 
for abusive dismissal. In Britain, consultation with the 
union is also an important factor in determining the 
fairness of dismissal for redundancy. This implies that 
Japanese law has placed less stress on the collective 
regulation of redundancy dismissals.
In all three countries, laws exists obliging the 
employer to give notice to the public authorities, 
prior to a mass dismissal (in Britain), a mass employment 
termination (in Japan), or a mass layoff or plant closure 
(in the United States), for economic reasons which takes 
place within a relatively short period of time. This may 
assist the public authorities in providing support for 
redundant workers in finding an alternative employment.
Any transfer of undertakings may have a great impact 
on employment security. In Japan, in many cases, the 
courts have regarded the transferor and transferee as 
having agreed to the transfer of contracts of employment 
unless there is a specific agreement between them not to 
do so. In Britain, this issue is covered by statutory 
provisions. The contract of employment of any person
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employed by the transferor shall not terminate, but shall
have effect as if made by the transferee. Where an
employee is dismissed because of the transfer, the
dismissal will be automatically unfair. There is no
comparable statute or case law in the United States. In
addition, it should be pointed out that in Britain there
is a statutory obligation on employers to provide
information to and consult with employee representatives
or the union representatives of any of the affected
117employees prior to the transfer.
In addition to a decision of the law regulating 
dismissals for economic reasons, it may be useful to 
point out some features of the law which aim to avoid 
such dismissals. In Japan, under the Employment Insurance 
Law, a number of different type of subsidies are payable 
to the employer in order to prevent dismissals. For 
example, an employment a d j u s t m e n t  subsidy may be paid to 
employers who give "rest-days" to their employees, 
transfer them to other firms temporarily, or make them 
undergo vocational training, so as to prevent 
unemployment and stabilize employment. In the case of a 
small or medium sized company, the subsidy given is equal 
to two-thirds (three quarters until June 1995) of the 
amount paid for wages or the "rest-day" allowance. In the 
case of a large company, the subsidy is equal to half
1 1 Q
(two-thirds until June 1995) of those amounts. This 
subsidy is financed by the employers’ contribution to
employment insurance. The United States and Britain do 
not have such a subsidy scheme. Such subsidies did exist 
in Britain from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, * ^  but
i on
they would now be unlawful under EC Law.
The American lay-off practice is another device for 
employment security since it comprises the employee's 
right to be recalled. During the period of unemployment 
between the time of lay-off and the time of recall, 
employees who are union members are often entitled to 
guarantee pay, severance pay or supplemental unemployment 
benefits.
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- PART IV -
CHAPTER 9 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS(l) -
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THREE SYSTEMS
We have examined the present state of dismissal law 
in the three countries primarily in relation to how the 
law regulates dismissals, the procedures for complaints 
of unjust dismissal and the remedies provided for the 
unjustly dismissed. Differences and similarities in the 
present laws on dismissal in the three countries have 
also been identified. This chapter examines how 
effectively the employee is protected by the law of 
dismissal in each of the countries.
9.1. THE METHODS OF REGULATING DISMISSALS
As far as the regulation of dismissals is concerned, 
it can fairly be said of the three different systems that 
the Japanese is the most effective. That system regulates 
ordinary dismissals in general through the law of abusive 
dismissal which in principle covers all employees. The 
burden of proof for abusive dismissal is fairly 
favourable for the employee. The courts restrict 
managerial prerogative by applying a "balancing 
interests" test and "last resort" test when they 
determine whether the dismissal is abusive or not. With 
regard to redundancy dismissals, only the Japanese courts 
require the employer to prove severe financial difficulty
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in order to justify dismissal. This is linked to many of 
legal measures which provide for employers to be 
subsidized when experiencing economic difficulties so 
that they may retain their employees.
The Japanese law of unfair labour practice prohibits 
not only dismissals for union activities but also those 
for conducting or taking part in industrial action. 
Japanese law also prohibits a fairly wide range of 
discriminatory dismissals for non-union related reasons. 
In particular, it prohibits dismissals on the basis of 
inherent social status or origin. Dismissals are also 
subject to regulation through collective agreement 
provisions and provisions of shugyo kisoku. A clear 
inadequacy in the employee’s protection in Japan, is that 
system fails to recognize the concept of 'constructive 
dismissal’.
Although the British system is generally less 
adequate than the Japanese system, unfair dismissal 
legislation also regulates dismissal in general. The 
common law on wrongful dismissal is only concerned with 
violation of due notice requirements in an ordinary case. 
The problem with British unfair dismissal legislation is 
that it provides a wide range of exclusions from its 
application. Most importantly, it excludes workers who 
have been continuously employed by the same employer or 
an associated employer for less than two years. Moreover, 
British tribunals have applied an objective "no
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reasonable employer" test to determine whether the 
dismissal is fair or unfair. In fact, more attention is 
devoted to the procedural than the substantive aspect of 
dismissal. Therefore, tribunals do not go very far in 
challenging managerial prerogative.
The factor which is most favourable to the 
employee's protection in the British system is the 
concept of 'constructive dismissal' provided for under 
unfair dismissal legislation and the provisions on 
redundancy payments. A similar concept is also found in 
American law mainly in relation to anti-discrimination 
laws, where it is arguable that a remedy is available for 
an employer's discriminatory conduct resulting in 
termination of employment even though the termination 
itself may not constitute a dismissal. Thus, in the US, 
'constructive discharge' is only concerned with what 
remedy may be awarded.
Furthermore, it may be said that, compared with the 
requirements of the American 'constructive discharge', 
those of the British 'constructive dismissal' are more 
objective. Little use is made of subjective criteria 
such as "deliberate" and "intolerable". In addition to 
this, British tribunals are willing to recognize a wide 
range of implied obligations owed by the employer towards 
his employees. Therefore, it appears to be easier for the 
employee to prove 'constructive dismissal' in Britain 
than 'constructive discharge' in America.
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In comparison with the Japanese and British systems, 
the American dismissal regulation scheme is very 
fragmented and its coverage is far from comprehensive. 
Overall, it provides less beneficial protection for the 
employee. However, two areas of American dismissal 
regulation are commendable; regulation of discriminatory 
dismissals, and regulation of dismissal through 
collective agreement. The American system covers the 
widest range of discriminatory dismissals among the three 
countries. Notably, it is the only system to prohibit 
discriminatory dismissals on the basis of age and 
physical or mental handicap although Britain will do this 
when the DDA comes into force.
As far as regulation through collective agreements 
is concerned, most such agreements provide for a 
grievance procedure and arbitration. Regulation of 
dismissal by arbitrators is comprehensive. Arbitrators 
generally apply a "balancing interests" test and a "last 
resort" test similar to those applied by Japanese courts 
when determining abusiveness of dismissal. There is also 
reluctance to recognize the voluntary nature of an 
employee's resignation. In this way, a wide range of 
employment terminations may be regulated.
Unlike British arbitration, American arbitration is 
compulsory, and American unions are legally obliged to 
treat all employees within their own bargaining units 
properly with regard to grievance procedures and
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arbitration, under the duty of fair representation. If 
they fail to do so, they will be subject either to 
lawsuits in federal courts or unfair labour practice 
charges to the NLRB. Thus, some 15 percent of non- 
agricultural workers are legally well protected by 
collective agreement.
Finally, it should be noted that since there are a 
number of anti-discrimination Acts prohibiting many forms 
of discriminatory dismissal and that the common law of 
wrongful dismissal based on tort or contract theories is 
undergoing rapid development. Employers may therefore in 
practice have considerable difficulty in effecting 
dismissals which may not be challenged by employees, 
especially at managerial level.
9.2. REMEDIES AND PROCEDURES
9.2.1. RE-EMPLOYMENT AND MONETARY REMEDY
In Britain, despite the statutory preference for re­
employment of employees who succeed in claiming of unfair 
dismissal, several empirical studies show that that 
remedy is not frequently ordered by British tribunals. 
Less than 2 % of the total number of successful
applicants in unfair dismissal cases result in awards of 
re-employment. The reason why tribunals infrequently 
award re-employment is related to the statutory provision 
which requires them to take account of (a) whether or not 
the employee desires to be re-employed, (b) the 
practicability of re-employment, and (c) the employee’s
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contributory fault.*
With regard to criterion (a), the majority of 
complainants prefer monetary compensation to r e ­
employment. A survey revealed that only 24 % of the 
complainants surveyed indicated a preference for re-
p
employment on their application form. As far as 
criterion (b) is concerned, tribunals have construed 
"practicable” in a very strict sense. Thus, in 
determining whether re-employment is practicable, they 
have taken the following factors into consideration; non­
existence of the e m p l o y e e ’s previous job or other 
suitable job, the likelihood of personal friction between 
the employee and supervisors or other employees, the size 
of the company, distrust between the employee and the
•z
employer, the employee’s ability or health, and so on. 
What is interesting is that in some cases tribunals made 
much of the close personal relationship in a contract of 
employment. This can be seen as the surviving influence 
of the refusal to order specific performance in cases of 
wrongful dismissal at common law.^ Furthermore, in Port 
of London Authority v. P a y n e , the Court of Appeal 
discouraged the tribunal from making a re-employment 
order by holding that the tribunal must give due weight 
to the commercial judgment of the employer on the 
practicability of compliance with the re-employment 
order.® With regard to criterion (c), an empirical study 
concluded that a tribunal's finding of the employee’s
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contributory fault in excess of 60 % was unlikely to be 
compatible with an order re-employment, while one of 20 % 
or less would be compatible.
It is believed that only re-employment may relieve 
the unjustly dismissed employee from non-economic damages 
which are caused by his exclusion from the workplace 
community: loss of his social status, self-esteem and 
friendship. Monetary compensation does not relieve the 
employee from having to adjust to a new job and workplace
7
community. Viewed in this light, it is not appropriate 
for the tribunals to have construed the practicability of 
re-employment as to criterion (b) in a very strict sense 
since it ought to be the employer who bears the risk 
resulting from an unfair dismissal. Furthermore, it is 
questionable whether criterion (c) is a reasonable 
requirement, especially taking account of the fact that 
the tribunal has to apply the "no reasonable employer" 
test to determine the fairness of dismissal.
As a result of the application of the above 
criteria, most successful applicants for unfair 
dismissal are awarded monetary compensation. However, 
Dickens et al found that the average amount of 
compensation was around 8 times the average weekly wage 
in 1978 while less than half of those compensated found a
o
new job within three months in the same year. This is 
partly because the amount of compensation is subject to 
various statutory deductions and partly because of the
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tribunals’ impossible guesswork in determining how long 
the employee is likely to be unemployed and the rate of 
pay which might be expected in a new job.
Under the present legislation, a basic award may be 
reduced because of an unreasonable refusal of an offer of 
reinstatement or the employee's conduct before dismissal. 
A compensatory award may be reduced because of the 
employee's contributory fault to his dismissal and his 
failure to take reasonable steps to get another job or 
otherwise minimize the loss. The latter reduction is the 
same as the duty of mitigation at common law. As result 
of these reductions, the employee may sometimes not 
receive any compensation at all. This is the case 
especially where the dismissal was unfair only because 
the employer did not follow fair procedures.
Furthermore, British tribunals do not normally order 
the employer who has lost his case to pay the successful 
employee's costs although the employee, his witness and a 
representative may be paid a small allowance for travel
q
expenses or other expenses. Therefore, the compensation 
which the employee may finally receive is much less than 
what he loses. Thus, it can be said that a monetary 
remedy is inadequate to compensate the unfairly dismissed 
employee and that at the same time it does not have a 
great deterrent effect on unfair dismissals.
In Japan, remedies for abusive dismissal may be 
given by ordinary courts. Although employees may request
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a provisional disposition from the courts as a temporary 
measure to preserve their contractual status with pay, 
they may eventually be forced to pursue litigation for a 
formal judgment. The formal judgment confirms the 
employee’s contractual status as an employee and orders 
the employer to pay wages and other benefits which would 
have been paid, but for dismissal, between the date of 
dismissal and the date of judgment. Although the 
employee’s interim earnings are deductible from back-pay, 
the court may deduct only those that exceed 60% of the 
employee’s "average wages” defined in the L.S.L., s.12.1  ^
Moreover, the court ordinarily orders the company to pay 
interest on damages.
Since such an order confirms that the employee 
retains his previous contractual status, the employer is 
legally obliged to continue paying him until the time of 
future lawful termination, even if he does not actually 
allow the employee to work. In this sense, it can be said 
that the Japanese law of abusive dismissal provides the 
most complete remedy for unjust dismissaJ. As discussed 
below in connection with the LRC * s order of re­
employment, a court’s confirmation of the employee’s 
contractual status appears to be more effective than the 
LRC’s re-employment order, at least in so far as to make 
the employer re-employ the employee.
However, since the Japanese dburt holds that abusive 
dismissal is automatically void, if the employee gives up
393
the chance of returning to his previous employment, he 
will not be able to claim damages for wages which would 
have accrued, but for dismissal after that time. This 
means that the employee does not have the option of 
claiming damages other than those for injured feelings, 
lawyer's fee and the like. The court's devotion to the 
declaration of voidance of abusive dismissal is closely 
related to its recognition of lifetime employment 
practice although the practice is, in fact, often not 
quite practicable in smaller companies and has become 
less widespread, as seen later in Chapter 11. Indeed, it 
is very difficult for a dismissed employee to find 
another or equivalent job, since the labour market among 
larger companies is restricted due to the lifetime 
employment practice and it is difficult for a dismissed 
employee to be hired as a regular employee by another 
company equivalent to the former employer. Even if he is 
successfully employed by such a company, it cannot be 
expected that he would attain a wage and status 
equivalent to those of the former employment because of 
seniority-based pay and promotion systems accompanying 
the lifetime employment. Furthermore, since employees' 
job descriptions are generally vague under the lifetime 
employment practice, it is comparatively easy for a court 
to confirm the contractual status of an employee without 
inquiring whether the dismissed employee's previous job 
or other suitable employment remains available.
394
However, for employees in smaller companies who are 
not adequately covered by the lifetime employment 
practice, the declaration of voidance of an abusive 
dismissal appears to be less attractive. Nor is it 
helpful for employees who do not wish to return to their 
former employers. Nevertheless, under the present law, 
these employees must resort to the declaration of 
voidance of abusive dismissal. In fact, out of 46 
reported cases in 1991 in which the court decided on the 
effectiveness of a dismissal, only 10 cases concerned 
companies employing more than 2,500 employees. The 
majority of the remaining cases concerned small and 
medium size employers with less than 300 employees, 
including three companies having less than 15 employees.
9.2.2. PROLONGED PROCEEEDINGS
It is quite clear that this remedy is far less 
accessible to the employee than the remedy awarded by 
British industrial tribunals because litigation in 
Japanese courts is a very technical, costly and time- 
consuming business. Firstly, stamp tax must be paid in 
order to file a suit.** The amount of stamp tax is 
calculated as approximately 1/200 of the cost of the
1 o
claim. Lawyers are not obliged to comply with the
standard fee table issued by the Japanese Bar
Association, with the result that their fees are quite
1 3unpredictable. Unlike the US, there is no special
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device such as contingency agreements for lawyer’s fees.
Nor may the employees have any expedient temporary relief
other than a provisional disposition.
The average duration of the district court
proceedings in formal civil trials concerning labour
disputes is about 15 months,*^ but that this is probably
above average for trials of dismissal cases. In fact,
even the provisional disposition proceedings which are
frequently disposed of on the basis of ex parte testimony
1 5may take more than one year. The average duration of 
British tribunal proceedings is much shorter than that
for Japanese court proceedings although the former has 
rapidly increased. The Department of Employment found 
that the time which elapses between application and 
hearing was less than half a year in 54% of all 
applications heard before the tribunals in 1993/4 and 79% 
of decisions were promulgated within 5 weeks of the
1 Rhearing in the same year. Prolonged court proceedings 
in Japan make people feel that the court is inaccessible. 
This situation is well reflected in polls conducted by 
the Japan Culture Conference. They show that the reasons
why people do not want to go to court are that doing so
is is "too costly" (64.6 %), "too time-consuming" (54.0 
%), and also dislike of "the win-or-lose" solution (26.3
1 7
%). The infrequency of dismissal litigation seems 
mainly due to the inaccessibility of the court. If the 
accessibility of proceedings were to be improved, the
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number of dismissal litigation cases would greatly
increase. In 1993, the Tokyo Metropolitan Department of
Labour Affairs received 7,341 requests from employees and
1,995 from employers for guidance on problems relating to 
1 Rdismissal. It is clear that it is very difficult for an 
employee to file a suit with the court without any 
financial and strategic assistance from a union or other 
supportive body.
Furthermore, prolonged proceedings also mean that 
the practicability of re-employment is made less likely 
even though a formal judgment may be the only way to 
force the employer to re-employ. This view is suggested 
by a British survey concerned with the reasons why 
employees do not opt for re-employment as a remedy for 
unfair dismissal. Their reasons are: irreconcilable
destruction of the relationship with the employer (27.7 
%), hatred of the company (21.7 %), fear of possible 
victimization (21.7 %), disappearance of the job (8.4 %), 
possession of another job (3.6 %) , the employer’s clear 
refusal to re-employ (3.6 %), likelihood of company 
closure (2.4 %), and other (4.8 The number of
reasons may increase and become more serious as time 
passes. In fact, statistics concerning agreed settlement 
of civil litigation in Japan suggest that the parties 
should consider compromise rather than litigation. The 
proportion settled by agreement in 1995 was 44.6 % of the 
applications for provisional disposition and 44.5 % of
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on
those for formal judgment.
Although there is no formal investigation into how 
court cases of abusive dismissal are finally settled, a 
common belief among Japanese academics is that many cases 
have been settled by a financial agreement at some stage 
after the formal judgment of a district court. Many 
employees know that the employer may retaliate against 
them, perhaps by refusing promotion, or transferring them 
to a disadvantageous post or location. Also, many 
employers do not want to spend time and money on 
litigation which might damage the company’s image and the 
morale of other employees. A British study suggests that 
the re-employment remedy is not always effective even 
under much less prolonged tribunal proceedings. According 
to Williams and Lewis, of 304 employees reinstated 
between 1972 and 1977, 150 had later resigned or been
lawfully dismissed and 154 were still employed at the
p i
time of the survey in 1977. Although it may be 
considered that over 50% is an acceptable record weighed 
against the normal labour turnover rate, it should be 
taken into consideration that reinstatment is very 
restricted in Britain because of the statutory provisions 
and tribunal practice. Yet, it would be too hasty to 
conclude that most Japanese employees do not eventually 
return to their previous employment and remain there long 
term, as the matter depends to some extent on the 
employee’s loss and gain calculation.
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In this connection, one again has to take account of 
the Japanese lifetime employment practice. Larger 
companies generally employ those who have just left 
school, college and university and train thgm by 
transferring and promoting them within the cojnpany 
according to business needs. Thus, employees typically 
remain with the same company until that company's 
mandatory retirement age. The existence of this practice 
may be confirmed to some extent by a comparison of the 
employees’ average length of service with one company in 
Japan and Britain. The statistics revealed by OECD in 
1984 indicate that 21.9% of workers in Japan, 12.1% in 
Britain and 9.9% in the United States had been employed 
for 20 years or more, and that the worker’s average 
length of service is 11.7 years in Japan, 8.6 years in
pp
Britain and 7.2 years in the United State. Accordingly, 
compared with British employees, Japanese employees may 
have a stronger desire to return to their previous 
employment and to stay there longer.
Although in theory the law of abusive dismissal 
covers all employees, in reality the expense and duration 
of court proceedings clearly means that it is often 
meaningless and impossible for employees in smaller 
companies to pursue a suit in the courts for abusive 
dismissal. This is because they are probably low paid and 
unorganized employees who are able to find alterqative 
jobs, equivalent to their former ones, with relative
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ease.
9.2.3. THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF REMEDIES
The American law of wrongful discharge which has
recently developed also contrasts strongly with the
above-described British and Japanese laws in that
monetary compensation may only be awarded on the basis of
the common law theories of either breach of contract or
tort. American laws of wrongful discharge provide the
dismissed with a much better financial remedy. The
damages for breach of an express or implied contract
terminable only for a good cause usually equal the
employee’s lost earnings plus legal interest for a
reasonable period although they are subject to reduction
in accordance with the duty of mitigation. For example, a
Californian appellate court supported a trial court
decision that the employee would have completely and
profitably performed his managerial services for an
23additional 10 years after discharge. In cases of the 
tort of wrongful discharge, the courts have not only 
awarded compensatory damages but have often also made 
additional awards for the employee’s emotional distress 
and anguish as well as loss of professional reputation.^4 
Furthermore, the courts often award punitive or exemplary 
damages the amount of which is determined at the jury’s 
discretion and is therefore often very generous. An 
attorney in San Francisco reviewed 51 wrongful discharge 
cases which went to trial in California between October
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1979 and January 1984 and found that the dismissed 
employee won in 36 cases. The award for general damages 
averaged $178,000 in the winning cases, of which 19 cases
pc
contained punitive damages averaging $533,300.
This remedy, however, faces problems with 
technicalities, time and expense, although the 
accessibility of American courts may be much better than 
that of Japanese courts since lawyers are plentiful and 
contingent fees are available to employees for 
litigation. Since the duty of mitigation applies to 
monetary remedy, the amount of compensation payable to 
employees is probably not as generous as is widely 
believed, except in cases of tortious wrongful discharge 
where the jury decides the level of punitive damages. 
This tortious wrongful discharge is attractive to 
employees. Professor West pointed out that unionized 
employees argued that damages in tort were a more 
adequate remedy than reinstatement and therefore federal 
law deferring to collective agreements should not preempt 
state law. She suggests that a sufficient monetary 
detriment may deter that employer’s unjust dismissal more
p O
effectively than re-employment. From this point of 
view, the Japanese law of abusive dismissal may also have 
a deterrent effect on unjust dismissal. However, it can 
fairly be said that the British law of unfair dismissal 
does not provide an adequate monetary detriment to deter 
unjust dismissal - except in cases where the minimum
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basic award and special award apply.
Despite Professor West’s remark, it is undeniable 
that the American arbitration award of re-employment is 
superior to these alternative remedies with respect to 
both accessibility and remedial practicability. The 
arbitration is quicker and imposes no expense on the 
grievant. According to an investigation carried out by 
Malinowski in 1981, of the 73 employees whose 
reinstatement awards were reported between September 1977 
and October 1978 in the BNA’s Labour Arbitration Reports, 
10 had not returned to work and 16 had subsequently 
resigned, retired, or been discharged or placed on lay­
off. Of the 47 employees who were still at work (Juring 
the survey, 22 had returned to work without back pqy. In 
addition, of the 63 employees who returned to work
following arbitrators’ awards, only 5 were subsequently 
?7discharged.
However, another study indicates that the time 
between request and decision is approximately 200 days 
according to the figure of the American Arbitration 
Association and 260 days when using that of the Federal
op
Mediation and Conciliation Service. These delays are 
relatively low in comparison with the time spent on the 
NLRB proceedings, but they are not in comparison with 
compared to the time spent on British tribunal 
proceedings. The success of re-employment by arbitrators 
does not stem from the swiftness of settlement alone,
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other factors must also be considered. Arbitration awards 
are based on a process agreed on by the parties. 
Arbitrators may flexibly balance the interests of the 
employee, the employer and the union by awarding 
different types of re-employment. Furthermore, union 
power normally backs up an arbitration award of re­
employment .
9.2.4. DISCRIMINATORY DISMISSALS
As far as dismissal for a union-related reason is 
concerned, reinstatement is a necessary remedy because 
the employer may destroy the union by dismissing all 
employees who are members. British unfair dismissal law 
applies basically the same principle to dismissals for 
union-related reasons as are applied to ordinary unfair 
dismissals. However, interim relief may be awarded and 
increased compensation including a special award of two 
or three years' pay are available.
In comparison, both Japanese LRCs and the NLRB of 
the US, in ordering re-employment, do not take account of 
the employee's contributory fault. Nor do they consider 
the practicability of re-employment as British tribunals 
do. While the Japanese LRC does not order re-employment
when the employee does not want it, the NLRB makes such
orders irrespective of the employee's wishes.
Nevertheless, an American investigation found that 32 % 
of employees who were offered re-employment by the NLRB
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or the federal courts under the unfair labour practice 
legislation between 1970 and 1979, refused to accept re-
p q
employment offered by the employers. In Japan, as 
discussed below, there are many cases where the employees 
agreed not to return to their previous employment at all 
although they were awarded re-employment by the LRCs.
The reasons why employees do not go back to their 
previous employment in American unfair labour practice 
cases are somewhat similar to those in British unfair 
dismissal cases as described above. In the US t the 
reasons are fear of company backlash (88 %), possession 
of a better job (39 %), company’s pay offer (16 %), 
hatred of the company (15 %), and other (15 %).
The above statistics indicate that the employee’s 
fear of possible victimization is a much more important 
factor in the US than in Britain. This seems to be due to 
the fact that NLRB orders are only related to dismissals 
for union-related reasons. The employers who dismiss the 
employees for union-related reasons usually tend to have 
a persistant anti-union sentiment. Nevertheless, in cases 
of dismissals for union-related reasons, the 
reinstatement may be the most desirable remedy for the 
employees and his union because the employer’s eventual 
purpose of dismissal is generally to exterminate the 
union organisation within his company. This may explain 
why the NLRB as well as the LRCs almost automatically 
order re-employment as a remedy and why the proportion of
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employees who are willing to return to their previous 
employment is much higher in the US than in Britain. In 
fact, Dickens et al found that, even in Britain, 44 % of 
unfair dismissal complainants who were union members
i
sought re-employment compared with 14 % of non-members.
In the US, as in Britain, it is considered that re­
employment may become more difficult the further the 
decision-making process is prolonged. In the US, 
Professor Chaney wrote: "Where reinstatement was ordered
within two weeks, the success rate was 93 percent, ^s the 
length of time increased, the number of employees 
accepting reinstatement declined dramatically to five- 
percent after six months- Acceptance after one or two
7 O
years was extremely small."0 Similarly, P.Lewis in 
Britain found that many employees (71.5 % - national 
figure) chose re-employment as a preferable remedy at the 
application stage of unfair dismissal procedure but far 
fewer employees (20.9 % - postal respondents in Northern 
Region) chose re-employment at the hearing stage.
From this point of view, the British unfair 
dismissal procedure is better than the NLRB procedure of 
the US. The median number of days to lapse between filing 
a charge and the issuance of the Board’s decision was 535 
in 1993 and 738 in 1994 for all types of unfair labour 
practices.^4 Even if the employee is willing to take his 
previous job back and successfully obtains an order of 
re-employment which can be enforced through an order of a
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federal court, it may be very difficult for the employee 
to return to the job and remain there for long because of 
dislike of the employer and distrust of unionists. 
Professor Chaney’s investigation revealed that, of the 72 
employees who were offered re-employment during the years 
of 1971-72, 54 had terminated employment or had been 
discharged by January 1973, and eventually 68 had left 
within eight years.
The effectiveness of the Japanese LRC order, which 
is enforceable either by a non-penal fine or, if 
finalized by the court’s decision, by imprisonment or a 
fine, appears not too different from that of the NLRB 
order. For example, an administration officer of the 
Ehime Prefectural LRC found in 1061; that, of the five 
employees who had once been re-employed by order of the 
EPLRC during the previous 10 years, four had retired or 
had been dismissed within two months and only one had 
remained in the same company for two years after re-
7Cj
employment.
Furthermore, this author discovered the following 
facts when he conducted an investigation in 1985 into the 
settlement of all of the cases (61 cases) in which the 
PLRCs issued re-employment orders between January 1980 
and December 1984. (i) Only 4 PLRCs’ orders of re­
employment were finalized without request of review or 
petition of cancellation, and half of them were complied 
with by the employer, (ii) Nobody had actually been re-
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employed in 18 cases; all or some of the employees had 
actually been re-employed in 28 cases, and, in 14 cases, 
either disputes were still unsettled or results were 
unknown, (iii) After filing with the Central Labour 
Relations Commission (CLRC), the employer made an agreed 
settlement through the CLRC’s conciliation stage .^n 15
cases, (iv) In at least 34 cases, the employees filed in 
the courts either for a formal judgment or a provisional 
disposition, (v) In the majority of cases in which the 
employees filed for a formal judgment, the employees 
actually regained their employment; i.e. 7 out of 10 
cases, (vi) In cases where the parties reached an agreed 
settlement, the agreement typically included the 
following; (a) that the employer should retract his 
notice of dismissal, (b) that the employee should 
voluntarily retire on the day of settlement, and (c) that 
the employer should pay a certain amount of money tq the 
union which thereafter might be distributed among the 
dismissed employees.
This serious failure to re-employ is, to some 
extent, caused by the administrative structure and legal 
rules concerning unfair labour practice. In Japan, with 
regard to the same dismissal for a union-related reason, 
the employee may file a suit with a court for a formal 
j udgment confirming his contractual status or a 
provisional disposition as well as filing an unfair 
labour practice complaint with the PLRC.
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Moreover, the employer may either request a review 
of the PLRC’s order by the CLRC or file a petition with a 
court for cancellation of that order. An order of the 
CLRC may also be subject to judicial revocation. 
Furthermore, in deciding whether to revoke the orderT the 
court may itself establish the facts independently of the 
findings of the LRC. Also, there is a strong tendency 
for courts to intervene excessively in the reasonableness 
of the LRC decisions. It is often pointed out that the 
courts do not have confidence in the decision-making 
ability of the LRCs because the representatives of public 
interest who make decisions on unfair labour practice are 
not always experienced in the legal profession and work 
only on a part-time basis.
These administrative, structural and legal rules may 
easily undermine the authoritative power of orders made 
by the PLRC. As a result, the PLRCs tend to be very 
careful in establishing the facts and in reaching 
decisions. This may make the PLRC procedure more 
legalistic and lead to prolonged proceedings. In fact, 
the average number of days between bringing a complaint 
and issuance of the PLRC’s decision was 1,056 in 1995 and 
1,211 in 1994. Also, the average number of days between 
the disposition of a request for review and actual review 
by the CLRC was 1,388 in 1995 and 1,476 in 1994.^®
However, another explanation behind the 
ineffectiveness of the PLRC’s re-employment orders is
408
that the cases in which such orders are made are 
exceptionally devastating ones. In fact, according to 
national statistics, most of the unfair labour practice 
cases brought against employers are disposed of 
informally. In 1995 (and in 1994 ), for example, 
approximately 22.9 % (22.0 %) of the total number of 
applications to the PLRC were disposed of by remedial 
orders, about 9.9 % (5.7 %) were dismissed, about 11.0 % 
(16.3 %) were withdrawn, and about 55.9 % (55.6 %) were
disposed of by agreement between the parties.(TABLE 3.)
TABLE 3. DISPOSITION OF UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICE COMPLAINTS
IN THE 
1981
PLRC
1982 1 
L
82 I
1993 1994 1995
Withdrawals 60 68 43 32
(11.3 %) (16.1) 1 
i
(21.1) (16.3) (11.0)
Agreement 331
l
318 1 179 147 164
(62.1) (62.5)1 
1
(55.6) (55.9) (56.2)
Dismissals 13 12 1 7 15 29
(2.4) (2.3) 1
i
(2 .2) (5.7) (9.9)
Remedial 129
I
97 f 68 58 67
Orders (24.2) (19.1)1 (21.0) (22.0) (22.9)
Total 533
1
509 1 322 263 292
(100.0) (100.0)1 (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Sources: Chuo-Rodojiho, Nos.700, 893 and 910.
According to an investigation carried out by the 
Kyoto Prefectural LRC (KPLRC) in 1979, of 76 employees 
who were re-employed in their previous employment either
j ■
by order of the KPLRC or agreed settlements arising out 
of the conciliation process between 1956 and 1975, 9
employees had stayed for less than six months, 4 for six
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months to one year, 8 for one year to three years, 27 
were still in their employment, and 20 were unknown. 
Although it is not clear in the case of those who 
remained longest quite how many were re-employed by order 
or by agreement, it may easily be inferred from the 
ineffectiveness of re-employment orders and the large 
proportion of agreed settlement cases, that a greater 
proportion of them were re-employed by agreement. Thus, 
it can be said that re-employment through agreed
•zq
settlement is, by and large, successful.
The proportion of agreed settlements in Japanese 
unfair labour practice cases is noticeably high in 
comparison with the proportions of agreed settlements in 
comparable American and British cases. As far as American 
unfair labour practice cases are concerned, in 1994 (and 
in 1993), for example, approximately 3.0 % (and 3.0 %) of 
all cases were disposed of by compliance with Board or 
Court decisions, about 29.0 % (and 29.2 %) were
dismissed, about 32.3 % (31.7 %) were withdrawn, and 
about 35.0 % (and 35.5 %) were disposed of by agreement 
by the parties either before or after issuance of a 
complaint.(TABLE 4.) In British unfair dismissal cases 
for union-related reasons, in 1982 (and 1981), about 2.6 
% (and 6.6 %) were disposed of by remedial award, about 
12.8 % (and 23.6 %) were dismissed, about *78.2 % (and 
52.0 %) were withdrawn, and about 6.5 % (and 17.7 %) were 
disposed of by agreement.(TABLE 5.)
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TABLE 4. DISPOSITION OF EMPLOYER’S UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICE
CASES IN THE UNITED STATES
1981 1982 I
i
1992 1993 1994
Withdrawals 10,090
(34.4%)
1
9408 1 
(35.4)I
7,541
(33.1)
7,467
(31.7)
7,705
(32.5)
Agreement 8,293
(28.3)
1
7,8891 
(29.7)I
i
7,689
(33.7)
8,354
(35.5)
8,304
(35.0)
Dismissals 9,915
(33.8)
1
8,4031 
(31.6)1
6,778
(29.8)
6,887
(29.2)
6,876
(29.0)
Compliance with 
Board or Court 
Decision
1,053 
(3.5)
1
861 1 
(3.2)1 
1
660
(2.9)
694
(3.0)
695
(3.0)
Others 0
(0 .0)
1
20 1
(0 .1)1
i
117
(0.5)
145
(0 .6)
125
(0.5)
Total 29,351
(100.0)
l
26,5811 
(100.0)1
22,785
(100.0)
23,547
(100.0)
23,70!
(100.0
Sources: NLRB Annual Reports of 1981-82 and 1992-94.
TABLE 5. UNFAIR DISMISSAL CASES ON GROUNDS OF TRADE UNION
MEMBERSHIP AND ACTIVITIES
1980 1981 1982
Withdrawals* 226 141 641
(36.4 %) (52.0) (78.2)
Agreement 140 48 53
(22.5) (17.7) (6.5)
Dismissals* 221 64 105
(35.5) (23.6) (12.8)
Complaint upheld 34 18 21
(5.5) (6 .6) (2 .6)
Total 621 271 820
(1 0 0.0 ) (1 0 0.0 ) (1 0 0.0 )
Source: L.Dickens et al., Dismissed, p.247, Table 8.4
(1985)
• Dickens’ book does not mention these items 
specifically. These calculations are derived from the 
other figures provided.
411
Proportions of agreed settlement cases between the 
three countries differ probably due to the different 
conciliation system each adopts. In both Japan and the 
US, conciliation is a compulsory process conducted by 
experts in unfair labour practice cases who are not 
independent from the decision-making body (in Japan) or 
the prosecuting body (in the US), while, in Britain, it 
is conducted by experts in the area of dismissals who are 
independent from the industrial tribunal. Since British 
conciliators do not specialize in discriminatory 
dismissal for union-related reasons and are not in a 
position to influence the outcome of the case, employees 
who are dismissed for union-related reasons may have less 
incentive to make an agreed settlement through 
conciliation in Britain.
On the other hand, in the US, an agreed settlement 
is very rigidly controlled by the regional director of 
the NLRB. Even before an issuance of complaint, he may 
agree a settlement with the employer and the employee, 
but only if he considers the employer’s conduct does not 
constitute a serious unfair labour practice. After an 
issuance of complaint, the director and the employer may 
reach an agreed settlement only if they agree that the 
employer’s conduct constitutes an unfair labour practice 
and the NLRB issues a remedial order which becomes 
enforceable by a court order. The parties, however, are 
always free to reach an agreed settlement at any stage of
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the PLRC procedures although the chairman of the PLRC 
sometimes formally recommends an agreed settlement to the 
parties under the common understanding that the employer 
has committed an unfair labour practice. This may explain 
why the proportion of agreed settlements in the PLRC 
cases is higher than that in NLRB cases.
However, the proportion of agreed settlements does 
not necessarily mean that the parties agreed to re­
employment. In relation to the above KPLRC cases, the 
KPLRC stated that the majority of cases of agreed 
settlements resulted in re-employment. Yet, it is clear 
that, without the threat of a potentially heavy 
detrimental award against the employer, an agreed 
settlement may often result in a solution unfavourable to 
the employee. This is probably the case in Britain with 
unfair dismissal conciliation in general. In Britain, the 
conciliator’s duty is to settle cases, not to seek to 
promote the employee’s protection and he is completely 
separated from the decision-making process. Moreover, the 
tribunal award itself is unlikely to impose a heavy 
financial burden on the employer who loses the cases.
The PLRC’s order of re-employment may be said to 
place the heaviest financial burden on the employer. In 
the US, where the NLRB orders re-employment, the Board 
always reduces the amount of back pay in compliance with 
the employee’s duty of mitigation, which is basically the 
same as the principle applied by British courts and
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tribunals. The NLRB has developed very precise rules 
concerning how to decide the amount of reduction. In 
contrast, in Japan, although the Supreme Court held that 
the LRC should, in principle, deduct the employee’s 
actual interim earnings gained from other employment, the 
LRCs maintain that they have discretion on that matter.
In practice, the LRCs do not calculate back pay, but 
only order the employer to pay the amount of wages and 
other benefits which would have accrued between the date 
of dismissal and the date of re-employment, but for 
dismissal. They are very reluctant to deduct interim 
earnings since they fear that their decision-making 
process will be delayed further by calculating the 
precise amount of back pay. Thus, in a sense, Japanese 
applicants may receive more favourable back pay than 
those in the US because interim earnings may not be 
deducted.
As far as discriminatory dismissal on grounds such 
as race and sex is concerned, Japanese law does not 
provide effective measures, other than administrative 
guidance* to assist the employee’s claim. In contrast, 
both the US and Britain have well-organized 
administrative agencies to administer anti-discrimination 
Acts. The British EOC and CRE may offer various kinds of 
assistance. The American EEOC has the power to conduct a 
compulsory investigation of an individual complaint, file 
a petition with a federal court for temporary relief, and
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bring a suit against the employer in its name.
However, in practice, neither the EOC, CRE nor EEOC 
prove to be very helpful; the EEOC has a severe backlog 
problem and will not file a suit unless the case involves 
a serious problem or a pattern and practice 
discrimination. The EOC and CRE do not provide full 
support, such as legal representation for the employee, 
unless the case involves legally complex matters or 
important issues of principle. As a result, in most cases 
of discriminatory dismissal, if the employee cannot get 
satisfaction through the conciliation process, he 
eventually has to go to court (in the US) or the tribunal 
(in Britain). Thus, the situations in Britain and the US 
are not totally different to that in Japan.
British and American employees may use the methods 
developed by courts and tribunals to prove 
discrimination. Yet, in Japan as well as in Britain, even 
if employees are unable to prove discrimination in 
dismissal, they may manage to obtain a remedy for abusive 
dismissal (in Japan) or ordinary unfair dismissal (in 
Britain). In fact, in both Britain and Japan, the 
remedies for discriminatory dismissal are not altogether 
different from those available for ordinary dismissal 
although, in Britain, damages for injured feelings may be 
awarded for discriminatory dismissal but not for ordinary 
dismissal. Thus, with regard to proof of discrimination, 
the most important difference between the three countries
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is that Japanese law and courts have not recognized the 
concept of indirect discrimination.
In cases of discriminatory dismissal, re-employment 
is probably more practicable than in cases of dismissal 
for union-related reasons, since employers are less 
afraid to retain people from minority groups than 
unionists who may interfere with their future managerial 
prerogatives. As far as monetary detriment is concerned, 
employers suffer more in cases of discriminatory 
dismissal since they may be ordered to pay damages for 
injured feelings and lawyer’s fees.
9.2.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
From the above discussion, it may be concluded that 
of the three countries, the Japanese system generally 
offers the least accessible procedures and the most 
generous, though sometimes impractical, remedy to the 
employee. The British system, on the other hand, affers 
the most accessible procedures but the least generous, 
though practical, remedy. The procedures and remedies 
available under the American system are both mediocre. 
The British system does not provide effective deterrence 
against dismissal. The American law of tortious wrongful 
discharge and the Japanese law of dismissal generally 
provide an effective deterrent against unjust dismissal.
tn Japanese cases of abusive dismissal, the courts 
confirm the employee’s contractual status and order the 
employer to pay unpaid wages and other benefits, less
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actual interim earnings, plus legal interests. Damages 
for injured feelings may not be awarded except in cases 
where the dismissal constitutes a tort. In all three 
countries, lawyers’ fees are usually not usually 
recoverable in ordinary courts, but exceptionally in US 
cases of discriminatory dismissal, such fees may be 
awarded under statutory provisions. In Japan, if 
dismissal constitutes a tort, l a w y e r ’s fees may be 
awarded. Typical examples include discriminatory 
dismissals on grounds of sex or race or union-related 
reasons.
The American NLRB, British tribunals, and the 
Japanese LRC may not order an employer who has lost a 
case to compensate the employee for l a w y e r ’s fees. 
Furthermore, neither the NLRB nor the tribunals usually 
require an employer who has lost a case to reimburse the 
employee’s legal expenses, and the LRC may not order the 
employer to make such a reimbursement. However, 
litigation costs as well as lawyer’s fees will increase 
as time passes. Thus, unless trade unions or other 
organizations undertake these costs, the employee will 
eventually obtain very little net compensation. Thus, 
from a financial point of view, none of the systems in 
the three countries provide an adequate remedy to the 
dismissed employee. Financially, American arbitration 
protects only the employee since all costs are undertaken 
by the union and the employer.
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CHAPTER 10
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS(2) - CONSIDERATION OF POLICY
We have examined the sufficiency of protection 
provided for employees in each of the three countries 
with regard to the adequacy of regulation offered by the 
different legal systems, ease of access to the systems 
and the adequacy of remedies available. It has been found 
that none of the three systems is truly satisfactory in 
protecting the employee’s interests. The Japanese system 
has remedial and procedural defects, the British system 
has problems with loose regulation and inadequate 
remedies, and the American system is of very narrow 
application.
However, the Japanese law of abusive dismissal and 
the American law of tortious wrongful discharge have been 
found to have a great deterrent effect on unjust 
dismissals. To maximise the employee’s protection* it is 
desirable to prevent unjust dismissal before it occurs. 
The Japanese system applies to a broad spectrum of 
employees as even those under contracts of indefinite 
duration have, at least potentially, the right not to be 
unjustly dismissed. Furthermore, of the three countries, 
the Japanese system provides the most rigid regulation 
and the most effective, though sometimes impractical, 
remedy. In this sense, it is fair to say that the 
Japanese legal system of dismissal is the best among the
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three countries.
Why do the above-mentioned differences exist between 
the systems regulating dismissal in the three countries? 
A legal system is the product of complex political 
interests and therefore it can hardly be said that 
dismissal regulations exist solely to promote the 
employee’s protection. An understanding of the policies 
behind the creation and maintenance of a legal system may 
assist us in considering whether and how the employee’s 
protection may be improved.
Before examining the three systems, it should be 
pointed out that the law of discriminatory dismissal on 
grounds such as race and sex only constitutes a small 
proportion of the regulations covering discrimination, 
which themselves apply to a much wider range of 
circumstances. It therefore is inappropriate for such 
regulations to be considered in respect of policy 
implications for the general legal system of dismissal. 
Therefore, the examination will proceed mainly on the 
basis of laws of dismissal not specifically relating to 
discrimination on grounds of race, sex, and so on.
10.1. THE JAPANESE SYSTEM
In Japan, the system has been developed by the 
ordinary courts. Although not explicitly stated, it can 
easily be inferred that the courts have developed the law 
of abusive dismissal on the basis of the constitutional 
right to life and right to work conferred on the people.
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In the early stages after World War II, there were three 
different academic and judicial views on the employer’s 
right of dismissal. One view was that the employer had 
the freedom to dismiss the employee at will. The opposite 
view was that the employer was not entitled to dismiss 
the employee without just cause. The latter was based on 
the people’s right to life and right to work provided for 
in the constitution.
For example, the Nagoya District Court stated that 
”If the employer is allowed to arbitrarily dismiss and 
expel the employee from the workplace, it will... result 
in denying the employee’s right to life. Thus, the 
employer does not have the freedom to dismiss the 
employee.”* However, most courts took the third view that 
the employer’s decision to exercise the right to dismiss 
was not totally free but subject to the principle of 
abuse of right. This is because denial of the employer’s 
freedom of dismissal clearly conflicts with Section 672 
of the Civil Code, which provides that a contract of 
employment for an indefinite term may, at any time, be 
terminated by either party with two weeks notice.
Thus, in a different case, the Nagoya High Court 
seated ”Article 25 of the Constitution declares that the 
state has the obligation to guarantee minimum standards 
of health and cultural life for the people in general. 
But it does not impose a specific obligation on 
individual employers. Similarly, although Article 27
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declares that the people have the right to work, it 
should not be regarded as prohibiting the employer from
o
dismissing the employee.” Yet, as reviewed earlier in 
this thesis, the Supreme Court formulated the principle 
that dismissal is void as an abuse of the employer's 
right to dismiss unless it is for a rational reason and
is permissible with regard to social justice.
Furthermore, the courts have been very reluctant to find 
dismissal valid unless the reason for it are particularly 
serious, having regard to all relevant circumstances.
It is necessary to point out that in Japan the 
principle of abuse of right has been widely utilized as a 
last resort in preventing unacceptable decisions which 
may result from rigid application of a specific statutory 
provision. This principle is commonly found in other 
civil law countries. In a sense, it seems to have a 
similar function to the rule of estoppel in common law
countries. The abuse of right in the Japanese Civil Code
is not subject to any specific limitation, while other 
civil law countries put some restriction on its 
application; the Swiss Civil Code, for example, requires
7
"der offenbare Missbrauch” (clear abuse of right).
Yet, this legal situation is unusual because the 
principle of abuse of right usually only applies in the 
case where one'9 exercise of right is exceptionally 
abusive. In cases of abusive dismissal, the opposite is 
true. How is this possible? The answer is that the courts
424
make use of the principle merely as a convenient means to
give effect to the spirit of the aforesaid constitutional
provisions. Those provisions along with that proclaiming 
the worker’s right to "organization, collective
bargaining or other concerted activities" (Article 28) 
are aimed at reducing pre-war q u a s i - f e uda1istic
totalitarianism by giving rights and powers to working 
people.^ It is generally stated that the Labour Union Law 
was enacted to give effect to Article 28 and the Labour 
Standard Law to give effect to both Article 25 and 
Article 27.
It can be seen that the courts have thereby balanced 
the worker’s right to work against the employer's 
property right, by applying the principle of abuse of 
right. As seen earlier in this thesis, Japanese judicial 
regulation of dismissal rather resembles American 
arbitral regulation of dismissal. This is not merely a 
coincidence, as arbitrators also have to balance the 
interests of the employer with those of the employee, 
although they do also have to take union interests into 
account.
A further question may be raised: Why is dismissal 
constituting abuse of right void? In Japan it has been 
held, in the context of continuing contract relationships 
that, if the exercise of right constitutes an abuse of 
right, it can have no legal effect. Thus, it was not 
difficult for the courts to establish the principle that
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dismissal constituting abuse of right is void. This was 
considered to be a suitable cause of action for the 
dismissed in the context of the Japanese lifetime 
employment practice which prevails in the public sector 
and among larger companies in the private sector.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that despite the 
existence of the constitutional provision of the right to 
work, no statute has been enacted to reinforce it for 
over 40 years. In other words, the government has so far 
failed to perform the political duty proclaimed by 
Article 25. However, it should be recognised that the 
legislature has not interfered with the development of 
the law of abusive dismissal through the imposition of 
any restrictions, thus, at least implicitly, authorizing 
the law of abusive dismissal. This has allowed the law of 
abusive dismissal to have a considerable effect in 
further promoting the lifetime employment practice and in 
expanding it to include even smaller companies. As 
dismissal is very difficult in law, companies have to 
develop the practices under which they can retain their 
employees without impairing the flexibility of labour or 
workplace discipline. Employers once attempted to loosen 
legal regulation of dismissal for economic reasons, as a 
result of which, in 1965, the Japan Federation of 
Employers’ Association proposed a new lay-off scheme, 
which was modelled on the American system. This scheme 
indicated that the criteria for selecting employees for
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lay-off included not only seniority but also factors such 
as business necessity, age and family circumstances. 
Labour unions unanimously and strongly opposed this 
proposal, claiming that its purpose was to facilitate 
dismissal of middle-aged and senior employees. The 
proposal disappeared about six months later. This was not 
only because of the unions1 opposition but also because 
employers themselves considered that, if they made 
middle-aged and senior employees anxious about lay-off, 
discipline in the workplace, which is central to good 
industrial relations, would be affected as would 
employees' loyalty.®
The government also became more willing to support 
the lifetime employment practice. A good example of this 
is provided by the temporary subsidies offered to 
employers in order to retain employees during economic 
depression. In fact, the government introduced various 
statutory schemes regarding temporary subsidies during 
the 1970's despite the fact that the level of 
unemployment was low in comparison with levels in Britain 
and the US . These schemes are still available to the 
Japanese employers. Thus, it can be seen that the 
government is concerned to keep the number of dismissals 
as low as possible and that the government considers the 
lifetime employment practice to be necessary for good 
industrial relations and strong economic performance.
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10.2. THE BRITISH SYSTEM
Britain is one of several advanced industrialized 
countries which have until quite recently maintained a 
common law rule that the employer may dismiss the 
employee at any time simply by giving due notice. It is 
widely believed that unfair dismissal legislation itself 
serves a dual purpose; protection of employees from 
dismissal and reduction of industrial action over 
dismissal. This legislation is also concerned to improve 
workplace discipline. In some workplaces, foremen often 
failed to deal properly with workplace discipline, 
overlooked employees* misconduct, or made informal 
arrangements with workers’ groups. Thus, the Donovan 
report argued that "the availability of a statutory 
procedure which is fair, and known to be fair, could do 
much to clarify the situation and so to enable discipline
7
to be improved.”
However, it is true that greater emphasis was placed 
on reducing of industrial action caused by dismissals. 
This is illustrated by the circulation of a consultative 
document by the Conservative government just before the 
Industrial Relations Bill in December 1970, which, stated: 
”Bt*itain is one of the few countries where dismissals are 
frequent causes of strike action...both on grounds of 
principle and as a means of removing a significant cause 
of industrial disputes, the government proposes to 
include provisions in the Industrial Relations Bill to
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ogive statutory safeguards against unfair dismissal.”
This intention to reduce industrial action caused by 
dismissal was expressed not only by the Conservative 
government at that time but also by successive 
governments, both Labour and Conservative. It was a 
matter of great concern because the number of strikes 
caused by dismissals for reasons of either discipline or 
redundancy was over 230 per year in the 1960’s, amounting 
around 8 % to 13 % of the total number of strikes. These 
circumstances were a major force behind the enactment of 
the Redundancy Payment Act 1965 by the Labour Government. 
Since the Government intended to improve labour mobility 
in order to increase the efficiency of the labour market, 
it needed an Act which entitled employees to payment for 
dismissal by reason of redundancy and which would thereby 
diminish their resistance to redundancies. Mr.Gunter, a 
Labour minister, explained that lump-sum payments such as 
redundancy payments were superior to income-related 
unemployment benefits for the purposes of promoting
q
labour mobility.
The Labour government was seriously concerned about
damage to ”the country’s economic development" caused by
strikes over discipline related dismissals.1^ The Donovan
Commission argued in 1968 that the right to a speedy and
impartial decision on the justification for a dismissal
may have averted many stoppages arising out of non-
1 1redundancy dismissals. The Labour government, however,
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saw much room for improvement, stating in In Place of 
Strife in 1969 that the government’s proposals, including 
those for unfair dismissal, "will provide alternative 
remedies for matters which at present give rise to a
1 p
large number of strikes."
Accordingly, May 1970, the Labour government 
introduced a Bill which included unfair dismissal
provisions, but it failed to become law as a general
election was called the following month. A bill 
containing similar provisions became law under the newly 
elected Conservative government. Despite amendments by 
subsequent governments, the basic structure of unfair 
dismissal legislation remains unchanged. It can be seen 
that the principle motivation behind unfair dismissal
legislation was "reducing the need for, and likelihood
of, industrial action over dismissals." The same motive 
still prevails although such concerns have diminished 
with the decline in industrial action in the 1990s. An 
employment protection function also exists and a real, 
though arguably subsidiary, aim of the legislation 
concerns unfair dismissal.
The desire to reduce industrial action explains why 
unfair dismissal legislation provides highly accessible 
procedures. A swift resolution of an i n d i v i d u a l ’s 
complaint about dismissal is necessary to prevent 
industrial action which may result. The legislation fails 
to provide an adequate remedy for unfair dismissal
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because too great a financial burden on the employer 
could hamper the nation’s economic development which 
would be inconsistent with the motive behind reducing 
industrial action. The reason behind the application of 
the "no reasonable employer" test by tribunals can be 
explained from this viewpoint.
Finally, it should be noted that there remain 
differences between the Labour and Conservative Parties 
as to the degree of attention which should be paid to 
employee protection. When the Conservative government 
first introduced unfair dismissal legislation, the 
qualification period to be satisfied to make a claim was 
104 weeks; an employee was excluded from the legislation 
where his employer had less than 3 other employees who 
had been continuously employed for at least 13 weeks; and 
the employee employed under a fixed term contract of two 
years or more was excluded from the legislation where he 
had so agreed in writing.
The Labour government in 1975 reduced the 
qualification period to less than 26 weeks and repealed 
the small employers exclusion. Subsequently, the 
Conservative government in 1980 extended the 
qualification period to two years in respect of employees 
working for an employer who employed less than 20 other 
employees and reduced the duration of the fixed term 
required to exclude a claim from two years to one year. 
In 1985, the government extended the qualification period
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to two years for all employees.
In 1972, under the Conservative government, the 
burden of proving unreasonableness rested implicitly on 
the employee, but in 1974 the Labour government 
transferred the burden on the employer. The Conservative 
government, however, again removed that burden from the 
employer in 1980. Re-employment could only be recommended 
under the Conservatives’ initial legislation in 1971, but 
in 1975 the Labour government made it possible to order 
re-employment. The Labour government in 1975 improved the 
compensation award system by drawing up a detailed 
formula for calculation, and established the minimum 
basic award. Subsequently, the Conservative government in 
1980 allowed for the possibility that the basic award 
could be reduced on the grounds of an unreasonable 
refusal of an offer of alternative employment by the 
employer and of the conduct of the employee before the 
dismissal. The minimum basic award was also abolished.
In short, the history of successive governments 
indicates that Labour takes a more protection-oriented 
approach than the Conservatives although it cannot be 
said that the Labour government’s amendments indicate any 
intention to change the main purposes of unfair dismissal 
legislation.
However, recent judicial attitudes toward wrongful 
dismissal appear to be more employee-protection oriented. 
Ironically, this is a result of unfair dismissal
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legislation. For example, in Hill v. Parsons, where the 
Court of Appeal granted an interlocutory injunction 
restraining the employer from terminating employment, the 
court stated as an important reason for granting an 
injunction that the employee’s rights were safeguarded 
under unfair dismissal legislation and therefore that 
damages were an adequate remedy for the dismissed 
employee.
Another example is R. v. BBC ex parte Lavelle. The 
High Court adopted the argument that the employment 
protection legislation had substantially altered the 
common law situation so far as dismissal was concerned. 
The court said that the t r i b u n a l ’s power to order 
reinstatement indicated that even the ordinary contract 
between master and servant now had many of the attributes 
of that of an office-holder, and that the distinction 
between the two forms of contractual employment was no 
longer clear. In these circumstances, the employee may 
have the contractual right to be heard before dismissal, 
which may alter the employee’s right substantially from 
what they would have been at common law before the law on 
unfair dismissal was enacted.
10.5. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM
Some consideration should be given to the laws 
concerning unfair labour practice and grievance 
arbitration which are found within the National Labour 
Relations Act 1935 (the so-called Wagner Act) and under
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the Labour Management Relations Act 1947 (Taft-Hartley
Act) respectively. These two Acts form the basis of 
labour relations policy in the US. The law of unfair 
labour practice protects the employee from dismissal or 
other unfavourable treatment which is implemented because 
of the anti-union motive of the employer. The law of 
grievance arbitration also gives the employee protection 
from unjust dismissal so long as he is within a 
bargaining unit. Therefore, it is important to know 
whether these laws were enacted for the purpose of 
assuring the employee’s protection by giving legal 
recognition to the unions and utilizing their strength.
The main purpose of the Wagner Act is twofold, to 
eliminate a reason for work stoppages and to remove 
"inequality of bargaining power and consequent 
deficiencies in consumer purchasing power upon the volume 
of economic a c t i v i t y . T o  promote the New Deal policy, 
Senator Wagner argued that the New Deal program has "made 
relatively slow progress in effecting that fair 
distribution of purchasing power upon which permanent 
prosperity must rest...this situation... can be remedied 
only when there is cooperation between employers and
1 K
employees, on the basis of equal bargaining power." 
Where employees are in a weak bargaining position, 
"production is lagging behind profits because consumer 
income is too low and prices too high for more goods to 
be sold."*®
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The unfair labour practice legislation was amended
by the Taft-Hartley Act which established the unions’
unfair labour practices, gave legally binding force to
collective agreements, and introduced various regulations
1 7concerned with industrial action. The dual function of 
the unfair labour practice legislation was maintained, 
although the balance of bargaining power shifted towards 
the employer and more stress was laid on the reduction of 
industrial action.
These objectives of the American legislation may 
explain the procedural differences between the NLRB and 
the Japanese LRC. Since Japanese unfair labour practice 
legislation was enacted to give effect to the worker's 
constitutional right to "organization, collective 
bargaining or other concerted activities", the procedure 
of the LRC is designed to be pursued by the party 
discriminated against. In comparison, the American 
legislation was enacted to promote the public interest; 
so the NLRB procedure is designed to be pursued by public 
representatives (regional field attorney).
The law of grievance arbitration has been enforced 
effectively under the Taft-Hartley Act. The Supreme Court 
has clarified the enforceability of arbitration clauses
and arbitral awards as a substitute for industrial
action, based on the Taft-Hartley Act.
Accordingly, the protection of the employee is not
the main purpose of either the law of unfair labour
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practice or that of grievance arbitration. In fact, until
very recently, the American Congress considered there to
be no need to regulate dismissal unless it involved some
1 8economic or societal wrongdoing.
However, it may be perceived that the law of 
wrongful discharge has been created for the protection of 
the employee. In order to enable themselves to protect 
the dismissed employee on the grounds of the employer’s 
violation of public policy, the courts have actually 
extended the range of public policy grounds available. 
Until quite recently, employment for an indefinite term 
was regarded as terminable at will, but the courts have 
now positively recognized the implied term of "dismissal 
for just cause" taking account of the personnel policies 
or practices of the employer, the employee’s length of 
service, actions or communications by the employer 
reflecting assurances of continued employment, or the 
practices of the industry. Furthermore, despite the fact 
that it is considered difficult to establish the 
existence of a fiduciary duty in the contract of 
employment, some courts have been willing to recognize 
the employer’s implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing as a cause of action for wrongful discharge 
either in contract or tort.
Generally speaking, American courts appear far more 
willing to promote protection of employees in the law of 
dismissal than British courts. This is partly because
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American courts traditionally have more freedom to change 
existing common law rules. British courts have less 
incentive to change the traditional common law of 
dismissal because of the existence of the unfair 
dismissal legislation although they have changed it as a 
lot since 1972.
This judicial orientation toward employee protection 
forced the Montana Assembly to enact the Wrongful 
Discharge From Employment Act 1987, Montana is currently 
the only state to have such a comprehensive law of 
dismissal. Thus, the motive behind its enactment should 
be examined. It is clear that the purpose of the Act is 
not simply to protect employees from wrongful discharge. 
As reviewed in Chapter 4.2.2., the state of Montana is 
one of a small minority of states in which the courts 
have adopted the tort theory of an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing as a cause of action for 
wrongful discharge. Accordingly, the jury may award 
punitive damages. Employers and insurance companies who 
paid the damages for tort actions came to believe that 
statutory regulation of unjust dismissal was a better 
option than judicial regulation and lobbied for the
i q
passage of the Act.
Under the Act, "good cause" for dismissal is broadly 
defined, damages are limited to a maximum of four years 
of wages and fringe benefits and are subject to the duty 
of mitigation. No damages for injured feelings are
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available, and punitive damages are available only where 
dismissal is contrary to public policy or where actual 
fraud or malice is proven. In short, the Montana 
legislation appears to provide neither a readily 
accessible procedure, nor strict regulation in return for 
a considerable cutback in the monetary remedy which had 
been available at common law. The Montana legislation is 
very much a reaction against common law developments and 
aims to exclude the possibility of an extraordinary 
amount of compensation being awarded as punitive damages.
The contents of the Wrongful Discharge From 
Employment Bill were much amended in relation to the 
employee's protection during the course of assembly
p n
discussion. Moreover, in 1991, the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws passed a Model Employment Termination
Act which would introduce a scheme of arbitrating just
cause for most employees. Also, the AFL-CIO has recently
21announced its willingness to accept a law of dismissal 
although it earlier opposed to such a law on the grounds 
that it may remove an important incentive for employees
p p
to be members. Even at federal level, in 1988 the 
Congress, where the Democratic party which is more 
sympathetic to workers had a majority, enacted 
legislation requiring the employer to give advance 
notice to both the employees' representative and the 
local government before effecting mass plant closures and
p 7
layoffs. In 1993, the Democratic party took the reins
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of federal governments. However, despite these events, 
there has been little further improvement to the law of 
dismissal through legislation.
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CHAPTER 11
PROSPECTS OF IMPROVEMENT IN EMPLOYEE PROTECTION AND 
SOME REFLECTIONS ON JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT LAW
From the above discussion on the intentions behind 
the legal systems of the three countries, it becomes 
clear that economic considerations are very often given 
priority over employee protection, and that, without the 
employers' support, it is impossible to create any 
effective system of statutory regulation of dismissal. In 
the US, the employers of Montana State lobbied to enact 
the WDFEA in order to restrict the common law liability 
caused by wrongful dismissal litigation. In Japan, the 
courts developed a law of abusive dismissal based on the 
then prevalent lifetime employment practice which private 
companies had promoted in order to improve productivity 
through employees' loyalty. In Britain in recent years, 
the government has placed considerable emphasis on the 
economic effects of employment rights on business. 
Therefore, in contemplating possible further alteration 
to the legal systems to improve employees' protection, we 
have to consider the potential any economic impact of any 
proposals made.
In recent years, there has been a perceptible growth 
in academic opinion opposed to regulation of dismissal. 
It is argued that for the employers, legal regulation may 
give rise to psychological costs, increased costs 
associated with less flexibility and increased litigation
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expenses. Legal regulation of dismissal may thus lead to 
lower wages because the increase in costs must be 
partially transmitted to the workers themselves. Unless 
the supply of labour alters, this may result in a 
decrease in demand for labour as a factor of production, 
which will have a severe effect on workers with low 
skills and few alternative employment opportunities.1
However, there is still a body of academic opinion, 
which maintains that legal regulation may foster rather 
than harm the national economy. It is argued that 
arbitrary or economically unjustified dismissal may 
result in relocation costs for the employee and a waste 
of training and expertise and broken continuity for the 
employer. Moreover, it is said that regulation of 
dismissal may assist a cooperative employer-employee 
atmosphere and employee loyalty. It may also, therefore, 
increase employees' willingness to accept technological 
change and internal mobility, while reducing absenteeism,
o
employee turnover rate, and disruption.
Unfortunately, there is no hard evidence as to what 
kind and what extent of legal regulation may foster or 
harm the national economy and employment opportunities. 
In Japan, however, it is noticeable that while the 
efficiency of workers and the n a t i o n ’s economic 
performance are far better than is the case in Britain 
and the US, the system of regulating dismissals is more 
effective than those in Britain and America in providing
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protection for the employee. Many of those adhering to 
the above pro-regulation view refer to the lifetime 
employment practice which prevails in Japanese companies, 
where the employees are more loyal, efficient workers and 
willing to accept internal mobility than their British 
and American counterparts.
Since the author is not an economist, it is not 
appropriate here to consider which opinion is strongest 
from an economic perspective. Such examination should be 
left in the hands of economists and, perhaps, industrial 
relations experts. However, it should be noted that, even 
if Japan is a good model for legal protection of 
employment, adoption of any model should be considered in 
the wider context of general employment law. This is 
because the law of dismissal is only part of employment 
law and the former should be harmoniously integrated into 
the latter.
There are six principle factors ^ which explain how 
Japan is able to operate its present law; the use of an 
extremely cautious recruitment policy, the existence of 
’punitive dismissal*, the stress on the importance of a 
relationship of trust and confidence in employment, the 
contractual bredth of .job-description and location, the 
flexibility in working h o u r s , and the use of many 
atypical or non-regular workers .
Many companies, especially larger ones, employ 
school-leavers and graduates as their employees in April,
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immediately after the end of each academic year. These 
’regular’ employees comprise the nucleus of the labour 
force within companies. The company begins recruiting 
staff in the preceding year in order to compete with 
other companies in hiring good people. The companies 
generally examine the personal history, aptitude, 
academic ability or technical skill, and health or 
physical condition of the candidates thoroughly, through 
documentation, interview and other means. The companies 
often use agents to investigate the applicants’ personal 
character.
Furthermore, after choosing those applicants to whom 
they want to make job offers, many companies require them 
to present written pledges, a suretyship document and 
other documents. A personal suretyship document generally 
states a comprehensive guarantee of the surety. For 
instance, a food manufacturing company requires an 
applicant to ask two persons to sign on a document whose 
terms are stated below. This document shows that the 
company acts extremely carefully in employing workers.
”1 will be fully responsible in seeing that the 
aforesaid person, who has been employed, is a sound- 
thinking person with good references and therefore 
that he will never cause any trouble or annoyance to 
your company. I guarantee that the aforesaid person 
will serve your company sincerely in compliance with 
its ’shugyo kisoku’ and other rules. I promise that
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if the aforesaid person violates those rules and 
damages your company intentionally or due to a 
serious mistake, I shall make him compensate you for 
the damage caused and I accept the responsibility of 
recompensing you jointly with the other surety.”
The Suretyship Law recognizes the binding effects of 
suretyship contracts such as that above under the 
following conditions: The duration of a suretyship
contract must be for no more than 5 years; a suretyship 
contract without a definite term shall be treated as 
lasting for 3 years; the employer must give notice to the 
guarantor as soon as the employer becomes aware that the 
employee has become unacceptable in his position, has 
done wrong or when the employee’s working position or 
place has changed; the guarantor can terminate the 
suretyship contract when he has become aware either by 
himself or by the above employer’s notice that the 
employee has became unacceptable, has done wrong, or a 
change of working position or place has occurred; and the 
court has discretion to decide the amount of damages 
having regard to all relevant circumstances.
Post-appointment, company managers generally engage 
in a very careful personnel management policy. The 
employer evaluates the employee’s fidelity and loyalty 
towards the company and makes much of the employee’s 
cooperative and harmonious character in order to 
determine any increase in salary, promotion, etc. In
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fact, as seen in Chapter 5., the courts also derive much 
from these factors in deciding whether dismissal or 
’punitive dismissals’ are abusive. The employer sometimes 
interferes excessively with the employee’s personal 
affairs in order to protect workplace discipline and 
productivity. Therefore, it has recently been argued by 
academics that the employees’ personal rights should be 
given greater protection in the workplace. However, it 
can be asserted that the c o m p a n y ’s grasp on the 
employee’s personal and social life has been an 
important factor in maintaining the lifetime employment 
practice without damaging workplace discipline and 
morale.
Another important factor is the existence of 
’punitive dismissal’. As seen in Chapter 3.2.2., most 
Japanese companies provide for ’punitive dismissal’ in 
their shugyo kisoku. Most employment contracts provide 
for the company to pay a fair amount of retirement 
allowance as an incentive for continuous service and good 
conduct or as a financial convenience for the company. 
The level of retirement allowance generally depends on 
the employee’s age, length of employment and the reason 
for retirement and is usually highest at the mandatory 
retirement age. However, most shugyo kisoku also provide 
that, if the employee is guilty of grave misconduct, his 
retirement allowance will be reduced to, perhaps, half 
the full amount or even totally revoked. This provision
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has generally been authorized by the courts.^ 
Accordingly, ’punitive dismissal’ is widely utilized as 
an effective measure in maintaining discipline in the 
workplace and securing the loyalty of employees for 
Japanese companies, although it may prove quite harsh to 
employees in certain cases.
The most crucial element enabling Japan to maintain 
its present system of regulating dismissal is the 
contractual bredth of .job-description and location. Where 
the employer cannot dismiss the employees easily he may 
have difficulty in reallocating tjie workforce in 
accordance with business demands. In Japan, companies 
resolve this problem by utilizing internal labour 
markets. Companies, especially the larger corporations, 
tend to employ young people who have just left school, 
college and university in order to educate and train them 
by transferring and promoting them within the company 
according to business needs. To attain this, there is a 
widespread understanding that the employee is employed as 
a ’generalist’ and is not engaged in a particular job, 
position or location. Therefore, in practice, so long as 
it does not involve a wage reduction, the company may 
normally transfer the employee from the accountancy 
department to the personnel department for example, or 
from the iron furnace section to the maintenance section.
A typical example is the transfer of an employee to 
a different location. The legal basis for the employer’s
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right of transfer is considered to be the contractual 
agreement. Transfer within the company is common; the 
company’s shugyo kisoku generally provides that the 
company is entitled to transfer its employees between 
positions and places in accordance with its business 
needs. It is also frequently provided that employees may 
not refuse to comply with such a request without just 
cause. Therefore, although the employee’s agreement to be 
transferred may be questionable as a legal basis for 
effecting transfers , it is generally presumed by the 
courts that the employee has agreed an engagement to be 
transferred anywhere unless it has been agreed expressly 
that his working place is to be fixed.
The courts even appear willing to provide approval 
in cases where the employer transfers the employee to 
another company. In most cases of transfers of employees 
between companies, the employee’s contractual status 
remains with the company which has transferred him 
although he works in and for the company to which he has 
been transferred. Compared with the law relating to 
transfer within a company, the law regulating transfer 
between companies is more restrictive. This is because 
such a transfer means that the employee must work for an 
employer with whom he does not have a contract of 
employment. Therefore, it is considered important that 
the terms and conditions of transfer to other companies 
are clearly stipulated in shugyo kisoku, or collective
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agreement, on a legally enforceable basis.
The courts have, however, tended to affirm the 
effectiveness of transfer to another company without such 
a clear stipulation where the transferee company is an 
affiliated or closely related company, particularly where 
the employees are transferred to that company as a means 
of avoiding dismissal for redundancy. The contractual 
flexibility is the most important element in Japanese 
regulation of dismissal although transfer between 
locations or companies has often caused serious problems 
in employees’ private and family lives.
The flexibility of working hours is also an 
important factor. Most Japanese manufacturing companies 
require workers to work overtime in order to comply with 
fluctuations in demand. The life-time employment practice 
supported by the law of abusive dismissal means that 
employers have to keep the number of production workers 
to a minimum in order to reduce both labour costs per 
head and risks of dismissal for redundancy. Thus, a 
significant amount of overtime work has been carried out 
in Japan. The law does not prohibit employers from 
ordering employees to work overtime where the employer 
has concluded a written agreement with the union which 
represents a majority of the workers or the 
representative of a majority of workers at the 
workplace. Under the legislation, the minimum amount of 
pay for overtime work is presently only 25% above the
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normal wages. According to the Supreme Court decision in 
the Hitachi Musashi Factory case, where, in addition to 
the above mentioned agreement, there is a provision in 
the shugyo kisoku that the employer may request the 
employee to work overtime, the employee has a duty to 
comply with the request if it is considered to be 
reasonable.
Finally, another important factor in maintaining the 
present Japanese system is the legal recognition of 
different treatment of atypical employees compared to 
regular employees. Although judicial law has developed to 
regulate the termination of employment contracts for a 
fixed term to some extent, employees under such contracts 
may be dismissed before regular employees. A considerable 
number of other non-regular or peripheral workers also 
suffer insecurity: part-timers, temporary workers,
seasonal workers, day workers, ’side-job’ workers, and so 
on. These atypical employees are subject to much less 
favourable terms and conditions of employment than 
regular employees. The proportion of non-regular 
employees among the total number of employees amounted to 
20,2% in 1994. These non-regular employees are to those 
who are called part-timers, ’side-job’ workers, semi­
regular employees or those who are treated differently 
from regular employees at their workplaces.
The Japanese cases described above imply that, if 
the US and Britain were to introduce more rigid
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regulation and a more re-employment-oriented remedy for 
unjust dismissal, then it would be necessary to increase 
the flexibility of employment. Otherwise, companies’ 
costs are likely to increase considerably, with the 
result that anti-regulation views will prevail. It must 
also be carefully considered how companies can maintain 
workplace discipline after the introduction of such 
improvements to the system. It is recognised that the 
Japanese system of dismissal has survived at the expense 
of many insecure non-regular employees. Those who benefit 
from the lifetime employment practice and strict legal 
regulation of dismissal often experience additional 
problems in their private lives due to factors such as 
frequent changes of location, persistent requests to 
perform overtime and a paternalistic or intrusive style 
of personnel management.
Although the Japanese legal system provides a very 
effective re-employment-oriented remedy, such a remedy is 
not very useful for employees in smaller companies where 
the lifetime employment practice is not practicable or 
those who do not want to return to the same employment. 
The Japanese system will, therefore, become more 
inappropriate in the long term as the lifetime employment 
practice becomes less widespread. Many companies which 
have begun to diversify initially employed workers with 
good experience but employees who have become 
dissatisfied with terms and conditions in these companies
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have moved to the tertiary sector where their abilities 
and experience are reflected in their wage levels. Even 
in the manufacturing industry, under circumstances of 
severe trade competition, many companies have come to 
place much reliance on e m p l o y e e s ’ ability and 
productivity when determining their pay and promotion, 
with the result that seniority-based pay and promotion 
systems have become less common. This is because 
employees have been encouraged to change their 
employment. Many companies will be forced to seek workers 
from sources other than school leavers as their numbers 
are set to fall due to Japan’s aging population. This may 
also encourage employees to seek different employment. 
These phenomena will combine to gradually dilute the 
prevalence of the lifetime employment practice. This is 
probably reflected in recent changes in the ratio of 
employees changing jobs. The ratio of employees changing 
jobs among the total number of employees has steadily 
increased from 2.8 percent in 1984 to 4.4 percent in 
1991. Although the ratio for 1992 was lower than that for
o
1991, it still remained as high as 4.1 percent.
In the above circumstances, even in Japan, we should 
consider greater availability of a monetary remedy for an 
employee who did not expect to stay in his employment for 
long from the outset, or an employee who does not want to 
return to the company which has dismissed him. If we can 
utilize the tort theory or contract theory for the
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purposes of awarding adequate damages as a remedy for 
abusive dismissal, other problems concerning the 
prolonged procedure and remedy for abusive dismissals may 
also be partly resolved. For example, an employee may 
bring an action in a summary court, designed to settle a 
controversy promptly, if the action is for damages of 
¥900,000 or less. A judgment affirming an employee’s 
status in the defendant company is an all or nothing 
decision, so therefore, damages are sometimes appropriate 
to resolve a delicate dispute over dismissal. Awarding 
damages against abusive dismissal may sometimes be a 
better choice. If a judgment for adequate damages is 
available, it may be easier for the court to adopt the 
concept of ’constructive d i s m i s s a l ’ . Moreover, an 
adequate award of damages may allow for more flexible 
resolution of disputes where the employer refuse to renew 
fixed term contracts of employment. It has been stated 
that whether or not abusive dismissal should be void or 
only illegal is not prescribed by the Civil Code but 
depends upon a judicial policy decision. Therefore, it 
may be possible for courts to develop a tort or contract 
theory of dismissal. However, decision as to the amount 
of damages to be awarded following an abusive dismissal
q
is problematic.
Any substantial improvement in the level of 
protection provided for employees by dismissal regulation 
systems will not be easy. In the current economic climate
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and with the present state of political and industrial 
relations opinion, it would be extremely difficult to 
improve the systems - particularly through legislative 
bodies - in the three countries. Furthermore, taking 
account of the wider context of employment law, there 
remains serious doubt as to the degree to which the 
protection of employees should be improved as employees 
cannot expect paradise without pain.
455
NOTES
1. J .L .Harrison, "The ’New* Terminable - At-Will 
Employment Contract: An Interest and Cost Incidence 
Analysis", 69 Iowa L.Rev. 327-361 (1984); R.A.Espin, "In 
Defense of the Contract At Will", 51 Chica.L.Rev. 947, at 
962-77 (1984); S.Rottenberg, "Discussion: ’Property in
W o r k ’", 15 Ind.Lab.Rel. 402-5 (1962); M.Emerson,
"Regulation or Deregulation of the Labour Market", 32 
Euro.Econ.Rev. 775, at 778 (1988).
2. "Note: Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful 
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith", 93 
Harv.L.Rev. 1816, at 1828-36 (1980); E.F.Vogel, Japan as 
Number One, pp.131-57 (Harv.U.Press, Massachusetts,1979); 
Special Task Force, Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare, Work in America, pp.96-100 (1972); M.E.Emerson, 
op.cit.
3. T .Doko, "Shokuba Niokeru Privacy No Hogo", H.T., 
Nos.721-3 (1990).
4. The Sankosha case, the Supreme Court in 1977, RHS, 
No.958, p.25.
5. The Supreme Court in 1991, SMS, Vol.48, No.7, p.1270. 
Also see K.Sugeno, "The Supreme Court’s Hitachi Decision 
on the Duty to Work Overtime", Japan Labor Bulletin, May 
1, 1992.
6 . This problem was fully discussed in F.Komiya, 
"Protection of Non-regular Workers and the Law in Japan", 
a paper which was submitted to the Sixth Asian Congress 
of Labour Law and Social Security in Tasmania on 
Februrary 13-15, 1994-95.
7. The Japan Institute of Labour, Japanese Working Life 
Profile, 1994-95 (Tokyo, 1994).
8 . Somucho (Management and Coordination Agency), 
Tokubetsu Rodoryoku Chosahokoku (1984-1993).
9. F.Komiya, "Koyo Shuryo No Hori 0 Kangaeru (3)", 
Hogaku Seminar, No.490, pp.99-104.
456
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(a) Bibliography written in English
ACAS,
Annual Report 1981. London 1982.
Annual Report 1982. London 1983.
Annual Report 1983. London 1984.
Annual Report 1984. London 1985.
Annual Report 1985. London 1986.
Annual Report 1986. London 1987.
Annual Report 1995. London 1996.
iderman , S.D.
Unfair Dismissal (2nd ed.). London
Anon.
"Note: Arbitration After Communications Workers: A
Diminished Role?" Harverd Law Review. Vol.100, p.1037
(1987).
Anon.
"Note: Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith",
Harvard Law Review. Vol.93, p.1816 (1980).
Aspin, L.
A Study of Reinstatement Under the National Labor 
Relations Act (Ph.D. dissertation, MIT, 1966).
Bowers, J.
A Practical Approach To Employment Law. London 1982. 
Batt, F.R.
The Law of Master and Servant (5th ed.), London 1967. 
Blackstone, W.
Commentaries on the Laws of England (1st ed.), Oxford 
1765.
BNA
Basic Pattern of Union Contracts. Washington DC 1983. 
Collective Bargaining Negotiation and Contracts. 
Washington DC 1987.
Individual Employment Rights Manual. Washington DC 1988. 
Labor Relations Reporter: Fair Employment Practice
Manual, Wishington DC 1988.
Burrows, B.
Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (2nd ed.), 
London 1994.
Calamari, J.D. and Perillo, J.M.
Contracts (2nd ed.), St.Paul 1977.
Central Statistical Office
Labour Market Trends. July 1996.
Chaney, W.H.
"The Reinstatement Remedy Revised", Labor Law Journal. 
Vol.32, p.357 (1981).
Collins, D.
"Plant Closings: Establishing Legal Obligations", Labor
457
Law Journal. Vol.40, p.67 (1989).
Collins, H.
Justice in Dismissal: The Law of Termination of
Employment. Oxford 1992.
Commons and Andrews.
Principles of Labor Legislation. New York 1920. 
Concannon, H.
"Handling Dismissal Disputes by Arbitration",
Industrial Relations Journal. Vol.11, p.13 (1980). 
Const, F.
BottTs Poor Laws (4th ed.), London 1800.
Corbin, A.L.
Corbin on Contracts. St.Paul 1963.
Davies, P. and Freedland, M.
Labour Laws: Text and Materials (2nd ed.), London
1984.
Deakin, S. and Morris, G.S.
Labour Law. London 1995.
Department of Employment
Employment Gazette. September 1979.
Resolving Employment Rights Disputes: Option for
Reform. Cmnd.2707 (1994).
Department of Employment and Productivity.
In Place of Strife: A Policy for Industrial Relations. 
Cmnd 3888, London 1969.
Diamond, A.S.
The Law of Master and Servant (2nd ed.), London 1946. 
Dickens, L. et al.
Dismissed. Oxford 1985.
Dobbs, D.B.
Law of Remedies. St.Paul 1973.
Edwards, E.
Right at Work: Employment Relations in the Post-Union 
Era. Washington DC 1993.
Elkouri, F. and Elkouri, E.A.
How Arbitration Works (4th ed.), Washington DC 1985. 
Emerson, M.
"Regulation or Deregulation of the Labour Market”, 
European Economic Review. Vol.32, p.775 (1988).
Epstein, R.A.
"In Defense of the Contract At Will", Chicago Law 
Review. Vol.51, p.947 (1984).
Ewing, K*D.
"Remedies for Breach of the Contract of Employment", 
Cambridge Law Journal. Vol.52, p.405 (1993).
Fairweather
Practice and Procedure in Labor Arbitration (2n ed.),
Washington DC 1983.
Feiman, J.M.
"The Development of the Employment At Will Rule", 
American Journal of Legal History. Vol.20, p.118 
(1976).
Feyers, J.F.
"Notive of Plant Closing and Layoffs - Sigificant Cases
458
Developments, Employee Relations Law Journal. Vol.18, 
p.297 (1992).
Finnegan, S.
"Constructive Discharge Under Title VII and the ADEA", 
Chicago Law Review. Vol.53, p.561 (1986).
Freedland, M.R.
The Contract of Employment. Oxford, 1976.
"The Burden of Proof in Claims of Unfair Dismissal",
Industrial Law Journal. Vol.l, p.20 (1972).
"Leaflet Law: The Temporary Short Time Working
Compensation Scheme", Industrial Law Journal. Vol.9, 
p.245 (1980).
Fryer, R.H.
"The Myths of the Redundancy Payments Act”, Industrial 
Law Journal. Vol.12, p.l (1973).
Goldberg, S.B. and Brett, J.M.
"An Experiment in the Mediation of Grievances", Monthly 
Labor Review. Vol.106, p.23 (1983).
Goldman, A.L.
Labor Law and Industrial Relations in the United States 
of America. Deventer, Netherlands 1979.
Gould IV, W.B.
"Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for
Arbitration", Employee Relations Law Journal.
Vol.13, p.404 (1987).
Wrongful Discharge Litigation Should There Be Unfair 
Dismissal Litigation. A Statement Assembly Laor and 
Employment Committe, California Legislation, 1984. 
Grunfeld, C.
The Law of Redundancy (3rd ed.), London 1989.
Guest, A.G.
Anson's Law of Contract (24th ed.), Oxford 1975.
Hall, M.
"Beyond Recognition?: Employment Representation and EU 
Law", Industrial Law Journal. Vol.25, p.15 (1996).
Hanami, T.
Labor Relations in Japan Today. Tokyo 1981.
Harrison, J.L.
"The ’New* Terminable - At-Will Employment Contract: An 
Interest and Cost incidence Analysis", Iowa Law Review. 
Vol.69, p.327 (1984).
Hepple, B.A.
"Security of Employment" in R.Blanpain (ed.), 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations. 
Deventer, Netherlands 1982.
Holdsworth, W.S.
"A Neglected Aspect of the Relations Between Economic 
and Legal History", Economic History Review. Vol.l, 
p.114 (1927).
Holloway, W.J. and Leech, M.J.
Employment Termination. Washington DC 1985.
Hunter, W.A.
The Master and Servant Act. 1867 and the First Report 
of Royal Commission. 1874: A Lecture. London 1875.
459
ILO
Seventh Item on Agenda: Termination of Employmnet
(Dismissal and Lay-Off). Geveva. 1961.
International Labour Conference. 67th Session 1981.
Report VIII (1): Termination of Employment at the
Initiative of the Employer. Geneva 1980.
Jacoby, S.M.
"The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the 
United States and England: A Historical Analysis”,
Comparative Labor Law. Vol.5, p.85 (1982).
Japan Institute of Labour,
Japanese Working Life Profile. 1994-5. Tokyo 1995.
Kato, M.
"The Role of Law and Lawyers in Japan and the United 
States", Brigham Young University Law Review. Vol.1987, 
p.627 (1987).
Keeton, W.P. et al.
Prosser and Keeton On Torts (5th ed.), St.Paul 1984. 
Keyserling, L.H.
"The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance", 
George Washington Law Review. Vol.26, p.199 (1960). 
Korn, A.
Compensation for Dismissal. London 1993.
Larson, A. and Larson, L.K.
Employment Discrimination. New York, (a loose-leaf 
bound up to 1989).
Lewis, P.
"An Analysis of Why Legislation Failed to Provide 
Employment Protection For Unfairly Dismissed 
Employees", British Journal of Industrial Relations. 
Vol.19, p.316 (1981).
"Compensation in Unfair Dismissal Cases", New Law 
Journal. vol.131, p.115 (1981).
Lewis, R. and Clark, J.
Employment Rights. Industrial Tribunals and
Arbitration. London 1993.
Lockyer, J.
Industrial Arbitration in Great Britain - Everyman^ 
Guide, London, 1979.
McCabe, D.M.
"Corporate Nonunion Grievance Arbitration Systems: A
Procedural Analysis", Labor Law Journal. Vol.40, p.432 
(1989).
McGuiness, K.C. and Norris. J.A.
How To Take Case Before the NLRB (5th ed.), Washington 
DC 1986.
McMullen, J.
Business Transfers and Employment Rights (2nd ed.), 
London 1992.
Malinowski, M.A.
"An Empirical Analysis of Discharge Cases and the Work 
History of Employees Reinstated by Arbitrator", 
Arbitration Journal. Vol.36, p.31 (1981)
460
Marsh, A.I. and McCarthy, W.E.J.
Disputes Procedures in Britain. Research Paper No.2 
(part 2), Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers' Association, London 1965.
Mellish, M. and Collins-Squires, N.
"Legal and Social Norms in Discipline and Dismissal", 
Industrial Law Journal. Vol.5, p.164 (1976).
Meyers, F.
Ownership of Jobs: A Comparative Study. California, 
1964.
Mill Jr., M. and Sinicropi, A.V.
Evidence in Arbitration. Washington DC 1980.
Remedies in Arbitration. Washington DC 1981.
Millard, N. and Stevens, M.
British Workplace Industrial Relations :____ The
DE/ESRC/PSI/ACAS Surveys. Aldershot, 1992.
Ministry of Labour
A Report on Dismissal Procedures. London 1967.
Morris, C.J. (ed.).
The Developing Labor Law (2nd ed.), Washington DC 1983. 
Morris, R.B.
Government and Labor in Early America. New York 1965. 
NLRB
Annual Report 1981. Washinton DC 1982.
Annual Report 1982. Washinton DC 1983.
Annual Report 1992. Washinton DC 1993.
Annual Report 1993. Washinton DC 1994.
Annual Report 1994. Washinton DC 1995.
O'Meara, D.P.
Protecting the Growing Number of Older Workers: the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act. Pennsylvania 1989. 
OECD
"The Importance of Long Term Job Attachment in OECD 
Countries", OECD Employment Outlook. September 1984. 
Oarklander, H.
"United States" in E.Yemin (ed.), Workforce Reductions 
in Undertakings. Geneva 1982.
Parker et al.
Effects of the Redundancy Payments Act. London 1971. 
Perritt Jr., H.H.
Employee Dismissal Law and Practice. New York 1984. 
"Employee Dismissals: An Opportunity for Legal
Simplification", Labor Law Journal. Vol.35, p.404 
(1984).
Pitt, G.
"Dismissal at Common Law: The Relevance in Britain of 
American Developments", Modern Law Review. Vol.52, p.22 
(1989).
Robinson, M.A.
"Fired Worker Turn to the Courts", San Francisco Sundy 
Examiner & Chronicle. September 30, 1984.
Rottenberg, S.
"Discussion: 'Property in Work'", Industrial & Labor
Relations. Vol.15, p.402 (1962).
461
Royal Commission (Donovan)
Report on Trade Unions and Employers* Associations 
London 1968.
Schaber and Rohwen, Contract. St.Paul 1975.
Schramm, L.H.
"Montana Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful Discharge 
From Employment Act: A New Order Begins", Montana Law 
Review. Vol.51, p.94 (1990).
Shapiro, J.P. and Tune, J.F.
"Notes: Implied Contract Right to Job Security",
Stanford Law Review. Vol.26, p.341 (1974).
Sigler, J.C.
"Mediation of Grievances: An Alternative to
Arbitration?", Employee Relations Law .journal. 
Vol.13, p.266 (1986).
Simon, D.
"Master and Servant", in Savill (ed.), Democracy and 
Labour Movement. London 1954.
Simpson, B.
"Recent Cases: Commentary - Freedom of Association and 
the Rigit to Organize: The Failure of an Individual 
Right to Organize," Industrial Law Journal. Vol.24, 
p.235 (1995).
Smith, I.T. and Wood, J.C.
Industrial Law (5th ed.), London 1993.
St.Antoine, T.J.
"Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second 
Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny", Michigan Law 
Review. Vol.75, p.1137 (1971).
Sugeno, K.
Japanese Labor Law. Washington 1992.
"The Supreme Court’s Hitachi Decision on the Duty to 
Work Overtime", Japan Labor Bulletin. May 1, 1992. 
Sullivan, C.A. et al.
Federal Statutory Law of Employment Discrimination. 
Indianapolis 1980.
Summers, C.W.
"A Summery Evaluation of the Taft-Hartley Act", 
Industrial & Labor Relations Review Vol.11, p.406 
(1958).
Szyczczak, E.M.
Partial Unemployment: The Regulation of Short-time
Working in Britain. London 1990.
Tomptins, J.
"Legislating the Employment Relationship: Montana’s
Wrongful Discharge Law", Employee Relations Law 
Journal. Vol.14, p.387 (1988).
Townshend-Smith, Sex Discrimination in Employment. London 
1989.
Upex, R.
"Unfair Dismissal and Agreements to Resign", Industrial 
Law Journal. Vol.9, p.183 (1980).
U.S.Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
Work in America. Washington DC 1972.
462
U.S.Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Bulletin 2013 (1979).
Vogel, E.F.
Japan as Number One. Massachusetts 1979.
Voglahn, A.
"Arbitration Costs/ Time: Labor and Management Views”, 
Labor Law Journal. Vol.30, p.49 (1979).
West, M.S.
"The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge”, 
University of Illinois Law Review. Vol.1988, p.l
(1988).
Williams, K. and Lewis, D.
"Legislating For Job Security: The British Experience 
of Reinstatement and Re-engagement", Employee Relations 
Law Journal. Vol.8, p.485 (1982).
Wood, H.G.
Master and Servant. New York, 1877.
Ziegler, M.
"Dispute Impact Analysis and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, Minnesota Law Review. Vol.68, p.1038 
(1984) .
(b) Bibliography written in Japanese
Ariijumi, T.
Rodo ki.iun Ho. Tokyo 1963.
Chigusa, T.
"Kaiko 0 Meguru Horitsu Mondai" in Senmon Koza Rodo Ho. 
Tokyo 1953.
Chuo-Rodoiinkai (Central Labour Relations Commission) 
"Saikin No Rodokyoyaku No jittai", Chuo Rodo Jiho. 
No.669 (1981).
"Showa 57-Nen Roi Toriatukai Jiken No Gaikyo", Chuo
Rodo Jiho. No.700 (1983).
"Heisei 6-Nen Roi Toriatukai Jiken No Gaikyo", Chuo
Rodo Jiho. No.893 (1995).
"Heisei 7-Nen Roi Toriatukai Jiken No Gaikyo", Chuo
Rodo Jiho. No.910 (1995).
Doko, T .
"Shokuba Niokeru Privacy No Hogo", Hanrei Times. 
Nos.721-723 (1990).
"Jinjikyogi-Doijoko 0 Megru Hanrei Hori No Tenkai", 
Rodo Hanrei. Nos. 447 and 448 (1985).
Fujita, S. and Ishida, H.
Kigyo To Roshikannkei. Tokyo 1970.
Furudate, S.
"Chingin-Taishkukin To Karibaraino Karishobun No 
Hitsuyousei" in Sin.iitumu Min.iisosho Koza. Vol. 11, 
Tokyo 1981.
Hagisawa, K.
"Kaiko To Karishobun", Jitumu Min.iisosho Koza. Vol. 9, 
Tokyo 1970.
Hattori, H.
"Meiji No Koyohou", Kanazawa Daigaku Hogakubu Ronshu.
463
Vol.8, p.l (1960).
Hayashi, H.
"Bisei Ni Okeru Meiji No Koyo Rodo” in T.Ichikawa et 
al. , Hoken Shakai Kaitai No Koyo Rodo. Tokyo 1960. 
Hokao, K.
”Rodo Keiyaku Sho Yori Mita Wagakuni No Rodo Kankei No 
Tokushitsu", Nihon Rodoho Gakkaishi. No.2, p.60 (1952). 
”Nihon Rodoshi (2)” in Shin Rodoho Koza. Vol.l, Tokyo 
1984.
Iwade, M.
”Kaikojiken Ni Okeru Rodokarishobun No Hitsuyosei” in 
Shin.iitumu Min.iisosho Koza. Vol. 11, Tokyo 1982.
KPLRC
"Futorodokoi Niokeru Tuisekichosa”, Chuo Rodo Jiho. 
No.627 (1979).
Kaneda, H. ”Tokugawa Jidai ni Okeru Koyoho No Kenkyu 
(1)", Kokka Gakkai Zasshi. Vol.l, No.7, p.103 
(1927).
Kato, I. (ed.).
Chushaku Minpo. Vol.19, Tokyo 1960.
Kikuchi, T.
"Rodo Keiyaku Ko - Kaiko Sono Ichi", Rodo Hanrei. 
No.351, p.6 (1981).
Kikutani, T.
"Sisaiyo No Kyohi", Bessatsu Jurist. No.101» p.148
(1989).
Komiya, F.
"Koyo Shuryo No Hori 0 Kangaeru (3)", Hogaku Seminar. 
No.490, p.99 (1995).
"Taishoku No Ishihyoji No koryoku", Rodo Horitsu Juhpo. 
No.1133, p.43 (1985).
Kubota, H. and Yokoi, H. (ed.),
Shinpan Gendai Rodoho. Kyoto 1990.
Maki, H.
Koyo No Rekishi. Tokyo 1977.
Okino, T.
"Rodojiken Ni Okeru Honansosho To Karishobun Tono 
Yakuwari" in Shin.iitumu Min.iisosho Koza. Vol. 11, Tokyo 
1982.
"Rodo sosho No Kadai" in Jitumu Min.iisosho Koza. Vol. 9, 
Tokyo 1970.
Rodo-Sho (Ministry of Labour)
Shin Rodokyoyaku No Jittai. Tokyo 1994. 
Taishokukin-Seido Shikyu-.iittai Chosa. Tokyo 1985. 
Saikosaibansho Jimusokyoku
"Rodo Jiken No Gaikyo", Hoso Jiho, Vol.45, No.7 (1994). 
"Rodo Jiken No Gaikyo", Hoso Jiho, Vol.46, No.7 (1995). 
Shimizu, M.
Gendai Nihon Koyo Kanko. Tokyo 1987.
Shimoi, T.
Rodoki.iunho. Tokyo 1990.
Shirai, T.
Kigyou Betsu Kumiai. Tokyo 1968.
Somu-Cho (Management and Coordination Agency),
464
Tokubetsu Rodoryku Chosahokoku. Tokyo 1984 - 1993. 
Sugeno, K.
Rodoho (3rd ed.). Tokyo 1993.
Sumiya, M.
Nihon No Rodo Mondai. Tokyo 1967.
Takahashi, S.
"Meirei Shuketsugo No Roshi-Kankei Karamita 
Futorodokoi-Seido Nituite", Chuo Rodo Jiho. No.365 
(1961) .
Tokyo-To Rodo Keizai Kenkyu Kyoku,
Heisei 5-nen Niokeru Rodosodan No Tokyo Nituite. Tokyo 
1994.
Toya, H.
"Jugyoin No Chiihozen Karishobun Oyobi Karibarai No 
Karishobun No Hitusyosei Nitsuite", Horitsu Jiho. 
No.1270, p.3 (1983).
Wagazuma, S.
Shinpan Minpo Annai. Vo.II, Tokyo 1967.
465
